

GERMANY
4526-14,205

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/21 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100270007-8

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Outside Edges of green
card indicate the edges of
the camera field

Even No. rolls

Exposure is $\frac{1}{25}$ @ f.6.3

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GERMANY 14,205
X LAMBERT, GERALD

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Outside Edges of green
card indicate the edges of
the camera field

Even No. rolls

Exposure is $\frac{1}{25}$ @ f.6.3

Germany - 14205
14205
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TWO-FIFTY PARK AVENUE

June 1943, 1944.

J. G. Edward Smith, Acting Director,
Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Burton:

It is my first opportunity to
thank you for your letter of June twelfth and
its enclosures. These are very interesting and
seem to fit into the pattern of our other results.

Mr. G. L. Cantrell, who is
working on this, will be away on his vacation for
a few days and I will hold the material for analysis
when he returns.

Very truly,
Sincerely,

Gerard B. Lambert
Gerard B. Lambert.

ONE PAGE 40018

Date 7 June 1964To: Mr. Tamm

Commander Bacon prepared this additional letter to Lambert from some material received by radio telegraph from Berne. It is on the subject Lambert is interested in, although not in direct response to the question we asked the field on his behalf.

On the matter of classification, this is classified "Restricted" because the message was "Restricted." However, the Lambert relationship may be such an order that the classification should be "Secret." I do not know enough of the background to judge.

Attachment

Office of the Secretary

(9114)

RESTRICTED

4 June 1945

Mr. Gerard H. Lambert
 Rosedale Road
 Princeton, New Jersey

Dear Mr. Lambert:

The following additional information, received from our Bern source, is submitted regarding the reactions of German citizens to the term "unconditional surrender":

"Here is what is reported to me as the views of a German woman who is a servant in a private family. This person imagines, when she hears of unconditional surrender, that the chaos she saw in Germany after the last war will be repeated, plus the inflation in which her family lost everything. In addition, she sees the Jews returning to take over her brother's business; she sees Russians everywhere, and joins with them the bad elements in her own village, who, after the war, were first Communists, then Nazis, and ultimately Gestapo. This is a person who is quite certain that the Nazi officials have scindled and that the Gestapo are a bunch of brigands. It is not so much her pride as a German which makes her oppose unconditional surrender, as it is the practical certainty which she feels that under such circumstances it would really be better to be dead. She is personally quite sick of Goebbels' propaganda, but, like a vast number of women in Germany, she feels that her country's only hope is to cling like death to Hitler and to pray that he may find a way to save the Fatherland."

We will keep you advised as additional material of this type reaches us.

Very truly yours,

G. Edward Buxton
 Acting Director

EABacon:IH

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C. 31 and 32, as amended. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

Mr. Gerard B. Lambert
 Rosedale Road
 Princeton, New Jersey

Dear Mr. Lambert:

The following additional information, received from our Bern source, is submitted regarding the reactions of German citizens to the term "unconditional surrender":

"Here is what is reported to me as the views of a German woman who is a servant in a private family. This person imagines, when she hears of unconditional surrender, that the chaos she saw in Germany after the last war will be repeated, plus the inflation in which her family lost everything. In addition, she sees the Jews returning to take over her brother's business; she sees Russians everywhere, and joins with them the bad elements in her own village, who, after the war, were first Communists, then Nazis, and ultimately Gestapo. This is a person who is quite certain that the Nazi officials have swindled and that the Gestapo are a bunch of brigands. It is not so much her pride as a German which makes her oppose unconditional surrender, as it is the practical certainty which she feels that under such circumstances it would really be better to be dead. She is personally quite sick of Goebbels' propaganda, but, like a vast number of women in Germany, she feels that her country's only hope is to cling like death to Hitler and to pray that he may find a way to save the Fatherland."

We will keep you advised as additional material of this type reaches us.

Very truly yours,

G. Edward Faxon
 Acting Director

EABacon:IR

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SECRET

(S)

12 Jan
1944

Mr. Gerald B. Lambert
Rosedale Road
Princeton, New Jersey

Dear Mr. Lambert:

Submitted herewith are four sets of answers to the questions contained in your memorandum of 3 March 1944:

- A. Source: Member of Nazi party and where the activities continue employed by German firm in Paris as travelling inspector. Will return to Paris before reporting personally to high office in Berlin.

1. Of course we had our own ideas in this war in England and we have also taken. Now we are on the front each with the other (Germans). We have not hit a low point. Our retreat in Russia is only because we want to shorten the front and everybody in Germany knows that. We know stronger that way, and the Russians make because they are more distant from their bases and we are nearer them. The lowest point in the war was in 1941 after the German invasion against Russia. Now we are not alone. It's only back in 1941 becomes more severe. We are on the defensive but, one day we will retake the offensive. The worst thing now is bombing. We shoot down a lot of enemy planes, but our bases are destroyed and our generators are becoming important (de - pressed? of). They also want Germany's victory, but quickly, otherwise they wish Allied invasion, but quickly, too. They have enough of war, particularly the old people. Our army has had great losses, but it is very strong yet, and first of all, it has had more experience with our than other armies of the world. Nearly in every home there is one killed on the front or by bomb. The parents, of course, are not enthusiastic about war, but brothers, and sisters and friends of theirs are very proud, all want to take revenge. Revenge against Russia and England. We are very angry against England because they are responsible for the war, without having great losses. They looked us down with enemies we did not want to have. The SA soldiers are

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SECRET

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Mr. Gerald N. Langer

- 2 -

May 1945

murderous but they are stupid to be doing. They don't know why they are fighting against us. They are fighting against us for the sake of pleasure, for selfish and vain. This England will pay to exterminate you for all they do to us, because without them we could already have won the war. The German people are on the front lines and they know far as bombing is concerned, this is the military field as are even. The bombing is different because you have to expect it all the while at all hours of the day. In the morning Germans are nervous and suspicious. Even the friend now Germans expect great changes in the Allied camp. believe that Russia will not long be allied with the Anglo-Saxon powers, believe that the stupid Americans will become aware of British perfidy. There will also be great military miracles in the front.

2. The German people know that if the Allies conquer Germany it might be that they'll give some liberties to the Germans and leave them some of their personal property but the homes occupied by the Germans will be completely destroyed, physically and morally. The Allies will not destroy the military and he believes all Germans think that. The military will be reinforced by the Allies as the last obstacle against communism and the Allies may need Germany against Russians and Japs. Germans believe they will have to pay for the destruction in foreign countries. He says when Allies take the wealth from the rich people, the population is touched too, because they put the money they save into banks and commercial or industrial shares, so they'll be "just as much touched" as the rich. The Germans would expect a vacation after the war and hope to get profits from the money they're saving now. If Germany loses they must continue the hard labor they are now doing for payment of war debts and for reconstruction of Germany. If Germany wins the war the others will have to pay and work. However, the question is silly because Germans do not think about what might happen after the war. They are busy thinking about the war and what is happening now.

3. There will be no revelation in Germany - not because of the Gestapo, but because of the fact that Germans who are against the government and they are very few, would not act now against the Hitler regime. Because the most important thing for all Germans is to win the war and there

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Mr. Gerald B. Lambert

- 2 -

10/11/44

will be no dialogue in Germany. After the war, if we lose the war, there will be a revolution. It will probably be a military government, but there will be no anarchy as long as Germany is unified. If there are no serious disorders between the members of the party or between the party and the army, that fact alone will mean that they would take power. All Germans are on the same side and without the signals all the other important officials cannot act.

- B. The following matters were made by a German writer whose present feelings are less pro-Axis than Herold's. He has freely admitted to local German newspaper editors he interviewed this group confidentially and the following summary constitutes the summary thereof. Although several of the German newspapermen in question are known to be party members, most of them are either known opportunists, or not even party members.

1. There have been but two trends in the war as far as most of these Germans are concerned - the spread of German military power through the world and Germany's rise until the winter of 1944. When Germany had a setback due to the Russians and the Allies, until then a conspiracy began to rise to come almost at a level with the German. For the moment is a barrier for them as it was for Hitler, and though the Anglo-American forces are very strong, it is doubtful still in the minds of most Germans whether they can establish more than a few local strongholds in the European continent. Germany thinks most Germany has withdrawn like a wounded lion into her den, and, unless Allied bombs smash the den and kill the lion, she will be coming out again on the offensive at the first opportunity. Here again our informant reported a considerable difference between the vague discussions in the "Beerhall" of the cafe and his conversations with certain German and Axis stayers. Separately they agreed that the present trend favors both the Russians and the Anglo-American forces, they say Germans cannot think of the United Nations, but only of Russia on the one hand, and the Allies (Anglo-American) on the other. They said thinking Germans realize that Germany's main hope is to hold the Allies on the Atlantic front only so long as they can hold or press back the Russians in Poland and the Balkans. They feel that should the Russians progress when the Allied offensive begins, there will be a lessening resistance on the part

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Mr. Gerald M. Lambert

- 6 -

22 May 1966

of the Germans facing the British and the Americans, a falling off of resistance in direct proportion to the speed of the Russian advance. They say that there are still many Germans who expect to see the British moved into the sea, new waves of German refugees coming to other Britain, new German offensives collected, not to campaign in the East, but to destroy the Russian advance and then strike off toward the West coast of Europe, the East route, and the Arctic route -- but they don't believe it very much themselves. The Russian figure is large in their conversation -- they said everything is turning out better of little else.

11. Most Germans are little different because a "little bit of disaster" and a "German disaster" at the present. They do not expect to be all shot up against a wall and shot when the Allies come in. They are not actually party members and are not living with German do not fear for their lives in case of Anglo-American occupation. They do not feel that they are going to be shot up before a firing squad if the Russians come in. The thinking of the younger generation has been influenced by Nazi propaganda and the writings of Karl Marx. In their mind the German was the hero, the American was a dog, and the British was a traitorous capitalist leader of slaves and human quality, while the Russian was the universal world, that they feel only that an Anglo-American occupation would drag their workers down (sic) to the same level as the American and British workers who are all like my worst of the Welsh miners and the worst of the Irish sharecroppers. The workers, maybe, would prefer communism to Anglo-American occupation, particularly if the communist would keep the Russians out. But even the workers quiver to think of Russian occupation since they are sure they would all be shot, while their children would all be crushed to the sub-human level slaves. One German of the group -- this one a business man only recently back from Germany, who lost a son in Africa -- says Germans back from the front are amazed at the home front's view of the Russian, whom he knows as a shrewd and capable fighter, but not at all amazed and in agreement with the home front's view that almost anything would be better than Russian occupation. The visitors say this group might not destroy German civilian life, but they would make it a slave to their own economic and imperial interests. They refer to the British, for while the Germans feel the Americans might like to be the intellectual and idealist leaders

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Mr. Gerald B. Lambert

- 1 -

of the world toward cooperative democracy. They feel they are too stupid to stand their ground against a minority slavey maneuvering. A newspaper in the group said it was too bad the Anglo-American Alliance did not have an additional courier, because the two ones had already said they intended to make every German a worker, including Russia. Under the Anglo-American plan the Americans would probably be unable to prevail against Britain and Britain would reduce the workers to Polish and Chinese and the US would shut the Germans out of the South American markets, and the money would go to get and Germany would be lucky if they escaped communism, and if they did it would be only to try again and recognize their rightful place in the world by peaceful means until Britain again forced them to war. The middle and upper classes had only one worry - their income and their capital, both of which would be reduced practically to nil under Allied occupation and certainly to nil under Russian occupation. One German newspaperman told our informant that the way was laid out "only the intelligent people look back" now. Another said the war "may be lost, but the people are too busy sticking heads to think of the consequences".

3. This group agreed, both together and separately, that no minority group could take over from the Nazis until complete collapse made the Nazi hand over to something as they ran. They feel that any shakiness of the government would be plugged up promptly and silently by the Nazi army leaders since the army is well aware of the fact that a shakeup or a change in Berlin would tell the country the end was imminent and all Goebbels propaganda could not change their minds. Anyhow, they say, except for the bombs, conditions are not bad in Germany in the hands of a German who has known nothing about anything since a state of war since 1934, when Hindenburg went to a better world.

- G. A German technician and 4-year resident in a neutral country obtained the opinions submitted below from another German who had fled Germany via Belgium because his grandmother had been a Jewess.

1. Our front is solid now. Only the bombings are very bad because even when we shoot down bombers the bombs go off when they land. The people hate these bombing men and call them assassins, but that is what they lose a close relative and the have been vanished in their anxiety to save their own families and worry over their own lives. The invasion

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Mr. Gerald B. Lambert

- 4 -

20 May 1944

will fail and most Germans would agree with me because we are very strong with our best troops on the Western front. The soldiers spared from the Russian front because the Russians are weaker. We know in Germany that the threat of atom bombs and lightning campaigns has helped us and that the Allied power and might has increased, but we do not yet believe that night is greater than day - except perhaps the darkness, and many believe that we will win the day over Britain, as they now look up. We see a vision of a world where those might is now being challenged and after the challenge then Germans may know whether their enemy's star is rising while Germany's star sets. Some think the hour has come and believe no longer in our victory but that there will be victory for nobody, even perhaps the Russians, and even if there is an Allied victory there is nothing for them to do now but work and live. Some recognize the need to test Allied power, but what can they do about it? They fear the Russians...

2. In the opinion of industrialists a new League of Nations will be formed after the war, of course, but the Germans will in this case have but one voice against the Anglo-American powers and will be in a position in which case the divided states will certainly be a disaster. A German is a German whether he's a liberal, a socialist or a communist. The workers of Germany believe they will be enslaved and exterminated under the Russian old communist. They are expelled under the Allies. The first they want to avoid by any means and the second they feel would be a continuation of the hardworking bid for a German victory which they have endured for so many years. They would be quite willing to listen to the creation of a German communist state if they thought they could get a little job in it - they would not want a big job. If they lose this war they are quite willing to do nothing but live and live while their children worry about how to surrender the conqueror's boot and prepare for the next. As for the workers, they have nothing to lose except the money everybody will lose - they lost their homes by bombing, their clothes by wearing them out and their jewels by changing them for goods. They know that the Reichsmark is an internal artificial currency, but they have their money in the bank and little to spend it for, so in many of their minds the war is the defense of their bankbooks as well as their future. Perhaps the Allies have some financial scheme to fix that up for them, but if they have they'd better spill it.

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Mr. Gerald F. L. Smith

179 1944

3. No German believes it will be a change of government. The German people are not so stupid. If the German people failed, the Communists are not so stupid. The German people would let the German people and helped them out of their social and economic miseries and then I hope all Germany's enemies. No other government had done this as quickly as go on still all Germany is a state of war. The German people are not so stupid. In German newspapers there are the people executed are not constructively criticizing the government, but are only nihilists who can destroy but not build...

D. The following answers were obtained from a young East sympathiser and student at a German university who was interviewed during a visit to a neutral country:

1. Of course, we had to win in this war, but our leaders always determined that. Most people are so with-draw in Russia because we wanted to. Now the Russian front is stabilized. We are better politicians, organizers and we have better generals than the Allies. When looting began in Germany we thought we would have to surrender ourselves, because it was so terrible. But now our leader has given us hope and has organized to the land all the people not necessary in the towns. And those in the towns and cities are soldiers like those on the fronts.

2. The foe of England, USA, Russia and all the others which have imperialistic ideas is not the German government, nor the rich people, but the German people. We never will surrender because we know we will be destroyed by our enemies. There will be a second Versailles because they know that as long as the German people exist, there will be a German state and a state fighting for its liberty. We would consider ourselves as traitors, were we better treated than those who were our leaders because they only carry out our will and our ideas. And our enemies will know that we are a united people and know that if they treat the German people well, so much the better for them because then a few years later we will be powerful enough to liberate ourselves, as we liberated ourselves in 1933. England and America must give us a chance, because they fear Russia as much as we do.

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Mr. Gerald M. Lashmet

20 May 1941

3. There will never be a group in Germany which will be as powerful as they are everywhere the movement which represents the German people. Hitler, and Hitler eliminated all our Socialists, Communists, Democrats, etc. Our army and our party is one united body.

We shall forward any additional material to you promptly upon its arrival.

Very truly yours,

G. Edward Burton
Acting Director

WASHCOB:DIENLACK

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

TO : Colonel Buxton

FROM : D. C. Lee

SUBJECT:

DATE: 31 May 1944

1. The attached letter to Mr. Lambert was prepared at the request of the Secretariat by Commander Bacon of General Magruder's office. As you will see from the attached file, General Donovan had previously answered certain inquiries from Mr. Lambert's office. A copy of Cable No. 480 to Argus in response to which this information was elicited is annexed.

2. Commander Bacon asks if there is any objection to sending copies of the body of this letter (after deleting anything that would indicate that it is a communication to Mr. Lambert) to SI and other branches which may be interested. Specifically, one request has been made by Mr. Ferdinand Mayer and I told Commander Bacon that if these indications were deleted as he suggested, I was sure there would be no objection to Mr. Mayer having a copy of the information.

Attachments

D. C. L.

SECRET

R 4920

Germany - 1944
SECRET

Madrid
May 8, 1944

MEMORANDUM

TO: 109

FROM: Argus

SUBJECT: Your Cable No. 480 and my Letter Dated May 6, 1944.

Attached please find two reports obtained from German nationals recently arrived in Spain. Although the material contained in these reports is not in direct answer to the questions asked in your Cable No. 480, I believe that they may add to the general background information on this subject.

Also attached is a newspaper clipping from "Madrid" of May 8, 1944, which may be of interest to you.

Argus.

* The report from the two girls is in answer to your suggested questions put to them by a Spanish newspaperman. (2)

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COMMENTS RELATIVE TO MORALE OF GERMAN NAVAL PERSONNEL, AS REFLECTED BY
NAVAL DESERTION TO AN ASSISTANT NAVAL ATTACHE

- 1). Subject stated that because of his extensive service in different units and in different locations in the German Navy, he felt qualified to state that the morale of practically all petty officers and men who have been in service for several years is at an all time low ebb, and he believes that many will desert when and if given the opportunity. On the other hand, he stated that the younger men who have been inculcated with the Nazi ideology nearly all their lives, enter the naval service (which is the elite of all the German services in subject's opinion) full of enthusiasm and zeal. Serious attempts are made to maintain this high morale, by constant transfers at frequent intervals, in order that the high spirits may not be dampened by long association with the same older men.
- 2). Subject stated that he had been in Germany as recently as six weeks ago, that especially in the North Sea and Baltic Sea coast areas, and in Berlin, the German populace appears to be desperately resigned to hold on until the bitter end. He stated, however, that no one, with the exception of the youthful recruits mentioned above, seem to feel that there is any possibility for Germany to emerge victorious on the Continent.
- 3). Subject stated further that a source of bitter disappointment to German naval personnel is the intense feeling in French ports against the Germans stationed there. He stated that all personnel have rigid orders never to walk on streets alone, but always in groups of at least two or three; that in spite of this precautionary measure, many sailors and soldiers are found strangled or with their throats cut, and others have disappeared without any trace.

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May 7, 1944

The following information was obtained from **STROHMER**, about 50 years of age, visiting Spain. She is a German chemistry student at the University of Edinburgh. With her is her friend **ROSEMARIE SCHLIEF**, also a student on vacation. Both are Nazi sympathizers and of the same opinion:

- 1). "The foe of England, USA, Russia and all the others which have imperialistic ideas is not the German government, nor the rich people, but the German people. We never will surrender because we know we will be destroyed by our enemies. There will be a second Versailles because they know that as long as the German people resist, there will be a German state and a state fighting for its liberty. We would consider ourselves as traitors, were we better treated than those who were our leaders because they only carry out our will and our ideas. And our enemies will know that we are a united people and know that if they treat the German people well, as much the better for them, because then a few years later we will be powerful enough to liberate ourselves, as we liberated ourselves in 1933. England and America must give us a chance, because they fear Russia as much as we do.
- 2). There will never be a group in Germany which will be so powerful that they can overthrow the government which represents the German people. Happily, our Fuhrer eliminated all our foes: Jews, Communists, Democrats, etc. Our army and our party is one united body.
- 3). Of course, we had trends in this war, but our leaders always determined them. Some months ago we withdrew in Russia because we wanted to. Now the Russian front is stabilized. We are better politicians, organizers and we have better generals than the Allies. When bombing began in Germany we thought we would have to surrender ourselves, because it was so terrible. But now our leader has given us hope and has evacuated to the land all the people not necessary in the towns. And those in the towns and cities are soldiers like those on the fronts."

14-00000

[illegible]

Germany, 19.04.44
repetition
SECRET
1 Jan. 1944

Wagner
WHS
MO
1944

Madrid
May 5, 1944

MEMORANDUM

TO: 109

FROM: Argus

SUBJECT: Your Cable No. 480, Listing Questions to be Asked of Germans Newly Arrived in Spain or Now in Spain.

Attached you will find a report obtained from a friendly newspaper man, who has access to Spanish newspaper circles. I would appreciate your advice as to whether or not this is the type of information you require, since we expect to be able to get further reports along the same line.

Argus:

Att. (1 - 5 pages)

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Madrid 7/14/44
Summary of interview with
German official in Madrid
conducted 9 August 1944

7/1-44
 Arnold Schroder, employee of A.E.G. in Paris, and now with A.E.G. in the Iberian Peninsula as an inspector. He has been in Portugal for some weeks, will be in Madrid for several weeks and then will return to Paris before reporting personally back to AEG in Berlin. He is a member of the Nazi party and wears the swastika emblem.

1A - In answer to the first question, the German people know that if the Allies occupy Germany it might be that they'll give some liberties to the Germans and leave them some of their personal wealth, but the homes occupied by the Russians will be completely destroyed, physically and morally. The Allies will not destroy the military and he believes all Germans think that. The military will be reinforced by the Allies as the best obstacle against communism and the Allies may need Germans against Russians and Japs. Germans believe they will have to pay for the destruction of German in foreign countries. He says when Allies take the wealth from the rich people the population is touched too, because they put the money they earn into banks and commercial or industrial shares, so they'll be "just as much touched" as the rich. The German workmen expect a vacation after the war and hope to get profit from the money they're saving now. If Germany loses they must continue the hard labor they are now doing for payment of war debts and for reconstruction of Germany. If Germany wins the war the others will have to pay and work. Moreover, the question is silly because Germans do not think about what might happen after the war. They are busy thinking about the war and what is happening now.

2A - There will be no revolution in Germany - not because of the Gestapo, but because of the fact that Germans who are against the government and they are very few, would not act now against the Hitler regime. Because the most important thing for all Germans is to win the war and there will be no bad things in Germany. After the armistice, if we lose the war, there might be minorities in power (probably a military government) but they never will appear as long as Germany is fighting. If there are sometimes discords between the sub-chiefs of the party or between the party and the army, that doesn't mean that one of them would take power. All Germans are on the same ship and without the captain all the other important officers cannot act.

3A - Of course we had ups and downs in this war as England and USA have also theirs. Now we are on the level each with the other (balance). We have not hit a low point. Our retreat in Russia is only because we want to shorten the front and everybody in Germany knows that. We become stronger that way, and the Russians weaker because they are more distant from their bases and we are nearer Paris. Our lowest point in the war was in 1942 after the winter campaign against Russia. Now we are not down, it's only that the war becomes more severe. We are on the defensive now, but one day we will retake the offensive. The worst thing now is bombing. We shoot down a lot of enemy planes, but our houses are destroyed and weak characters are becoming impressed (depressed). They also want Germany's victory, but quickly, otherwise they wish Allied invasion, but quickly too. They have enough of war, particularly the old people. Our army has had great losses, but it is very strong yet, and first of all, it has had more experience with war than other armies of the world. Nearly in every home there is one killed

SECRET

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on the front or by bombs. The parents, of course, are not enthusiastic about war, but brothers and sisters and friends of theirs are very ardent, all want to take revenge. Revenge against Russia and England. He is very angry against England because they are responsible for the war, without having great losses. They loaded us down with enemies we did not want to have. The USA soldiers are murderers but are too stupid to be guilty. They don't know why they are fighting against us. They are doing war against us for the sake of plutocrats, Pro-British and Jews. For this England will pay us expensively, pay for all they did to us, because without them we would already have won the war. The German people are on the down trend now only insofar as bombing is concerned, for in the military ~~front~~ field we are even. The bombing is different because you have to expect it all the nights at all hours all over Germany. In the morning Germans are nervous and sleepless. From this trend now Germans expect great changes in the Allied camp, believe that Russia will not long be allied with the Anglo-Saxon powers, believe that the stupid Americans will become aware of British perfidy...There will also be great military miracles in the front.

V/2-44 The following comes from a Spanish newspaperman, pre-Axis earlier, though now less so, long a personal friend of mine - fairly close ~~to~~ during the civil war - merely an acquaintance when I first came here in 1938-1941, and now interested in coming closer again. He sees the Germans frequently, mainly the newspapermen of the German colony, and the questions were posed to him to drop in the midst of this newspaper group. Of the newspaper group several are bona-fide Nazis but most are either lukewarm opportunists Nazis or not party members at all. This is a summary of their answers - not in their direct words.

7. 1A - Most Germans see little difference between a "little bit of disaster" and a thorough disaster at the present. They do not expect to be all stood up against a wall and shot when the Allies come in, so those who are not actually party members and are not taking that chance do not fear for their lives in case of Anglo-American occupation. They do not feel that they may well be stood up before a firing squad if the Russians come in. The thinking of the younger generation has been so influenced by Nazi propaganda and the writings of Karl May, in which the German was the hero, the American was a dope, and the Briton was a traitorous scoundrel devoid of every good human quality, while the Indian was the uncivilized world, that they feel only that an Anglo-American occupation would drag their workers down (sic) to the same level as the American and British workers who are all like the worst of the Welsh miners and the worst of the Ohio sharecroppers. The workers, maybe, would prefer communism to Anglo-American occupation, particularly if turning communist would keep the Russians out. But even the workers quiver to think of Russian occupation since they are sure they would all be shot, while their children would all be crushed to the sub-human brute status. One German of the group - this one a business man only recently back from Germany, who lost a son in Africa - says German's back from the front are amazed at the home front's view of the Russian, whom he knows as a shrewd and capable fighter, but not at all amazed and in agreement with the home front's view that almost anything would be better than Russian occupation. The visitors say this group might not

SECRET

...the war as far as most of those Germans are
concerned in the world and Germany's

[illegible]

SECRET

-4-

destroy German civilian life, but they would make it a slave to their own economic and imperial interests. "They" refers to the British, for while the Germans feel the Americans might like to be the intellectual and idealistic leaders of the world toward cooperative democracy, they feel they are too stupid to stand their ground against Britain's clever maneuvering. A newspaperman in the group said it was too bad the Anglo-Allies did not define unconditional surrender, because the Russians had already said they intended to make every German a worker, rebuilding Russia. Under the Anglo-American powers the Americans would probably be unable to prevail against Britain and Britain would reduce the workers to Third class miners and the US would shut the Germans out of the South American markets, and the money would go to pot and Germans would be lucky if they escaped communism, and if they did it would be only to try again and reconquer their rightful place in the world by peaceful means until Britain again forced them to war. The middle and upper classes had only one worry - their income and their capital, both of which would be reduced practically to nil under Allied occupation and certainly to nil under Russian occupation. One German newspaperman told our informant that the war was lost but "only the intelligent people back home" knew it. Another said the war may be lost, but the people now are too busy ducking bombs to think of the consequences.

2. 2A - This group agreed, both together and separately, that no minority group could take over from the Nazis until complete collapse made the Nazi hand over to somebody as they ran. They feel that any shakiness of the government would be plugged up promptly and silently by the Nazi army leaders since the army is well aware of the fact that a shakeup or a change in Berlin would tell the country the end was imminent and all Goebbels propaganda couldn't change their minds. Anyhow, they say, except for the bombs, conditions are not bad in Germany in the minds of a German who has known nothing about anything save a state of war since 1934, when Hindenburg went to a better world.

1. 3A - There have been but two trends in the war as far as most of these Germans are concerned - the spread of German military power through the world and Germany's rise until the winter of 1942. Then Germany had a setback due to the Russians and the Allies, until then a nonentity, began to rise to some extent at a local with the Germans. Now the Channel is a barrier for them as it was for Hitler, and though the Anglo-American powers are very strong, it is doubtful still in the minds of most Germans whether they can establish more than a few basic bridgeheads on the European continent. Germany thinks most "Germany has withdrawn like a wounded lion into her den, and, unless Allied bombs smash the den and kill the lion, she will go roaring out again on the offensive at the first opportunity. Here again our informant reported a considerable difference between the vague discussions in the "tertulia" at the cafe and his conversations with earlier comers and late stayers. Separately they agreed that the present trend favors both the Russians and the Anglo-American powers, they say Germans cannot think of the United Nations, but only of Russia on the one hand, and the Allies (Anglo-American) on the other. They said thinking Germans realize that Germany's main hope is to hold the Allies on the Atlantic front only so long as they can hold or press back the Russians in Poland and the Balkans. They feel that should the Russians progress when the Allied offensive begins, there will be a lessening resistance on the part of the Germans facing the British and the Americans, a falling off of resistance in direct

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-4-

proportion to the speed of the Russian advance. They say that there are still many Germans who expect to see the Allies tossed into the sea, new waves of German bombers sweeping over Britain, new German offensives calculated not to progress in the East, but to destroy the Russian advance army and then strike off toward the Ural arms centers, the Iran route, and the Arctic route, - but they don't believe it very much themselves. The bombing figured large in their conversation - they said everybody in Germany now talks of little else.

Madrid

7/2-44

The following from a German mining engineer now in Spain, where he has worked for three or four years, approached in a discussion at a Spanish friend's house, a discussion continued in a cafe afterwards, by a man whom he too took to be a German established in Spain since the war, having gone there from Belgium after the occupation because of fear of his Jewish blood from a grandfather. The questioner said he had some American friends, but otherwise expressed friendship of German-to-German. The mining engineer is a member of the Nazi Ausland organization, but does not wear a badge and is not an over-enthusiastic Nazi. He seemed interested in the questions and in answering them. The questions were not posed in the exact wording, but the exact words and sense were used, broken into several questions.

1. 1A - In the opinion of industrialists a new League of Nations will be formed after the war, of course, but the Germans will in this case have but one voice unless the Anglo-American powers subdivide Germany into little states in which case the divided states will certainly collaborate. A German is a German whether he's a liberal, a Nazi or a communist. The workmen of Germany believe they will be enslaved and exterminated under the Russians and economically exploited under the Allies. The first they want to avoid by any means and the second they feel would be a continuation of the hardworking bid for a German victory which they have endured for so many years. Many would be quite willing to listen to the creation of a German communist state if they thought they could get a little job in it - they would not want a big job. If they lose this war they are quite willing to do nothing but lie low and live while their children worry about how to overthrow the conqueror's boot and prepare for the next. As for the workers, they have nothing to lose except the money everybody will lose - they lost their homes by bombing, their clothes by wearing them out and their jewels by changing them for food. They know that the Reichsmark is an internal artificial currency, but they have their money in the bank and little to spend it for, so in many of their minds the war is the defense of their bankbooks as well as their future. Perhaps the Allies have some financial scheme to fix that up for them, but if they have they'd better spill it...
2. 2A - No German believes there will be a change of government. The Kaiser failed, the Social Democrats failed, the Communists are feared and the Moscow communists hated... Only Nazism in the minds of many simple souls let the Germans march and helped them out of their social and economic morass and hurled back all Germany's enemies. No other government had done this so Nazism must go on until all Germany goes, or until Germany wins. The executions reported in German newspapers show that the people executed are not constructively criticizing the government, but are only nihilists who can destroy but not build...
3. 3A - Our front is solid now. Only the bombings are very bad because even when we shoot down bombers the bombs go off when they land. The people hate these bombing men and call them assassins, but that is when they lose a close relative and the hate soon vanishes in their anxiety to save their own skins and worry over their own lives.

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"The invasion will fail and most Germans would agree with us because we are very strong with our best troops on the Atlantic with soldiers against them on the Russian front because the Russians are weaker. So here in Germany they are afraid of our victories and lightning conquests has helped for us and that the Allied power and might has increased, but we do not yet believe that might is greater than ours - except perhaps the bombers, and may believe that we will conquer last Britain as they now bomb us. We are a nation victorious whose might is now being challenged and after the challenge then Germans may know their enemy's power is rising still. Germany's star sets. Even those who have lost heart and believe no longer in our victory feel that there will be victory for nobody, even perhaps the Russians and even if there is an Allied victory there is nothing for them to do now but wait and live. Some recognize the trend toward Allied power, but what can they do about it? They fear the Russians....

SECRET

7 April 1944

Mr. Gerard E. Lambert,
Office of Public Opinion Research,
Box 480,
Princeton, New Jersey.

Dear Mr. Lambert:

General Donovan is away at the present time, but I should like to inform you, in accordance with the request contained in your letter of 4 April 1944, that the response to the last question as set out in General Donovan's letter is in a part of our correspondent's report. It should have been enclosed in quotation marks.

When additional replies have been in, we shall of course bring them available to you.

Sincerely,

G. Edward Sutton,
Acting Director

SECRET

Germany Index
1. Opinion
2. Summary

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

OFFICE OF PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH
 BOX 410
 PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY

SECRET

April 6, 1944

Brig. Gen. William J. Donovan
 Office of Strategic Services
 Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

Your letter to me of April 3rd was received here in Princeton and I'm writing this from Hadley Cantril's office where we have examined it with great interest. We find this first result of your operation very helpful. It shows clearly the wisdom of descending replies to specific questions.

The answer to the first question reveals that the German people are conscious of trends and therefore a propaganda line pounding at the trend would be "kill two". The answer to the second question indicates that our guess was right and that a method of qualifying "an additional surrender" is needed and could possibly convince the Germans that carrying on to the bitter end is a bad decision.

The comments on the third question, as typed without question marks, may be from your correspondent or the comments may be your own. If from the correspondent, they are especially significant to us because this question, you will remember, was carefully chosen as a control question to be completely lacking in plausibility. If the answer had been affirmative, we would have doubted the accuracy of this system of research.

We will recall that our basic thought is to relate different opinions to each other in terms of probable plausibility and effectiveness. Although this is only one report and will eventually be compared with others, a rough result may be stated as follows --
 1. Approach 1, most plausible; Approach 2, next most plausible; Approach 3, least plausible.

We are very grateful to you for your assistance. The speed with which this first reply has come through encourages us to look forward to the future. From this report alone a pattern for

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Brig. Gen. William J. Donovan

April 4, 1945

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successful propaganda is beginning to form.

For our records, we hope you will take a moment to advise whether the response to the last question is part of your correspondent's report.

Sincerely,

George
Edward B. Lambert

P.S. In sending any further mail, please ask your secretary to send it to me at Rosedale Road, Princeton, N.J. instead of to Washington.

W.D.

SECRET

John Edgar Hoover
Director

4 April 1946

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HARRISON

MR. HARRISON

Fitchell has told me that John suggested that he was entirely in accord with Egan's reply to the series of questions and asked whether it would be possible to anticipate our officers from their present difficult position. I agree with Egan's reply as will be seen from my message to him. It will be noted that he had anticipated the list of questions and had obtained the answers which were needed.

This is good intelligence work. If others have done it, we should have the results of their inquiries if they have not done it, they should have done it. There is nothing from which they should be anticipated. This kind of intelligence is valuable, and, instead of restricting the men in the field, they should be encouraged to obtain it.

William F. Donovan
 Director

cc: Colonel Burton

SECRET

SECRET

2 April 1944

Mr. Gerald Lambert,
78 Kalorama Circle,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Gerry:

In accordance with your request, I had some of the various questions submitted to me. I have just had a reply from Bern. They report specifically as follows:

"Regarding the 1st question: The Germans are certainly aware of an inescapable trend. Their hopes at the present time center mainly on:

1. Elimination of Russian interest upon attaining the local boundaries, or also friction between the USSR and the western Allies.
2. Frustration of endeavors to land in the Balkans or in France, added to sur-forgiveness on the part of the western countries, the forthcoming elections in the United States, and the degree to which the United States views the war against Japan as its primary concern.
3. A miracle of some sort, such as a secret weapon, although this hope is fading.
4. An era of chaotic confusion throughout Europe, from which Germany would emerge in as good shape as any other country.

Regarding the 2nd question: The majority of Germans believe it very possible that the Allies wish to ruin the economic as well as the military strength of Germany, and thus to demolish what they feel to be a normal and successful civilian life. The expression "unconditional surrender" therefore signifies to most

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SECRET

Mr. Gerald Lambert

3 April 1944

of them total catastrophe for the country and for the individual German, as we ourselves haven't done a thing to offer them any hope of any sort optimistic meaning for this expression. It has never been indicated by us that military and party leaders are the only groups to which "unconditional surrender" refers. The German pessimistic interpretation of "unconditional surrender" is supported by lack of statements from the United States, the widespread feeling that the Atlantic Charter has been discarded or at least does not hold good for Germany, and by the Prime Minister's mention of compensation to Poland by giving her German territory. It is a debatable question whether any now and to them more optimistic interpretation of "unconditional surrender" could be effectively impressed upon the German people, in the face of the propaganda system of Dr. Goebbels; however, granting the issuance of authoritative and harmonizing proclamations from Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin, it is probable that it could be achieved in time. Up to this point, back-handed encouragement from the Free German Committee in Moscow has been the only source of hope for the Germans, although this committee is regarded as a trap by a large number of the people.

Regarding the 3rd question: Unless the following chain of events occurred -- the murder of Hitler and certain other Nazi potentates followed by the assumption of authority by the Military -- it is believed by the majority of Germans that no minority faction could now seize authority over the existing ruler. At the present time, no effective opposition group, military or civilian, exists which favors the western powers. Most anti-Nazis who desire western orientation at this time do not see any justification for risking their lives in order to promote the materialization of any plans submitted to date by the western powers insofar as concerns Germany. Other anti-Nazi elements in the Reich prefer to have the authority and responsibility maintained by the Nazi and Military cliques until the ultimate debacle, so that the whole blame for the war and for Germany's downfall will rest on the shoulders of Hitler and the Military for all time. The German Socialists, especially, do not intend to assume any-

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Mr. Gerald Lambert

1947 11 2 April 1946

trol as they did the last time and thus have to answer for the armistice and peace terms. The Catholics' point of view is much like this. The Communists possess no known leader. Of course, a new group probably would be created in case we chose to offer any indication that such a group would be able to engage in dealings with us; however, until the capitulation, the strength of this group would be insignificant. In the conviction that such a proposition was unwise, untimely and opposed to our policy, I have never given any stimulation to his action.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director**SECRET**

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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11/1/54

MEMO

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DISTRIBUTION

CONTINUATION TO ORIGINATOR

SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER**SECRET**

TO: SAC, NEW YORK. Reference your 10/29/54.

By the full treatment it gives to the question of the possible use of opinion strictly within the limits of the information available to us, and I thank you for the advice and additional queries from me, you need take no action in this matter. I concur fully with the conclusions in paragraph 7, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have no objection to the proposal as to how the phrase "within the limits" is handled.

I am departing from here for the Headquarters of the Department of State, and I have arranged for your cables to be sent on to me. I will continue to receive them with extreme interest.

SECRET

J.F.B.

FILE COPY

INITIALS OF "RELEASING" OFFICER

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Please return to Mr. O. D.

Mr. Putzell - for General Darnes
files, in connection with

Others in dropped ^{2011 11/11} ~~prosecution~~ ^{8 13}

in this day

MS

Germany 1942-1945

R. D. Pennington

x Lambert

Outside Edges of green
card indicate the edges of
the camera field

Top ↓

(JSM)
Form 69 (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE March 31, 1944

FROM

BERN, SWITZERLAND

TO

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DISTRIBUTION

(FOR ACTION)

(FOR INFORMATION)

DIRECTOR

SECRETARIAT, WASHINGTON, DC

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 10-37222-1

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET

#2652-67. From 110 to 109. With reference to your #1406-1410.

I am extremely concerned over the inquiries put forth in your message, and I should like to give you my present opinion before going ahead with the matter.

1. If I or any other official is involved in any way with distributing the 2nd and 3rd questions, the idea may be formed a) that we are suggesting or preparing to offer a new definition of unconditional surrender, and b) that we might be interested in negotiating with a minority group if such a group were created. Unenlightening and very likely uninteresting responses will be elicited if on the other hand, the questions are disseminated anonymously.

2. In our candid opinion here, allowance is not made in these questions for the current state of affairs in Germany or for our own policy toward the German nation to date. If my co-workers, Breakers, for example, were presented with this questionnaire, I would be at a total loss to reply to the questions which they would ask of me. Unison X-64 is an agent, of comparatively low class.

3. The following are the replies which I think would be given by Germans to these inquiries. This material is not founded on interviewing but on innumerable reports and on extended consultation with individuals qualified to discuss such topics, who have come from Germany.

4. Regarding the 1st question: The Germans are certainly inescapable trend. Their hopes at the present time consist of a) diminution of Russian interest upon attaining the 1941 boundary; b) less friction between the USSR and the western Allies; c) from endeavors to land in the Balkans or in France, added to war-fa part of the western countries, the forthcoming elections in the states, and the degree to which the United States views the war Japan as its primary concern; d) a miracle, of some sort, such as

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OFFICE

FROM BERN, SWITZERLAND

weapon, although in
throughout Europe
other country

b. 11

very poor

0189
Form 00a

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

FROM BERN, SWITZERLAND

TO OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

REF. NO. 2659-87

RECEIVED

weapon, although this hope is fading; d) an era of chaotic confusion throughout Europe, from which Germany would emerge in as good shape as any other country.

SECRET

5. Regarding the 2nd question: The majority of Germans believe it very possible that the Allies wish to ruin the economic as well as the military strength of Germany, and thus to demolish what they feel to be a normal and successful civilian life. The expression "unconditional surrender" therefore signifies to most of them total catastrophe for the country and for the individual German, as we ourselves haven't done anything to offer them any hope of any more optimistic meaning for this expression. It has never been indicated by us that military and party leaders are the only groups to which "unconditional surrender" refers. The Germans pessimistic interpretation of "unconditional surrender" is supported by lack of statements from the United States, the widespread feeling that the Atlantic Charter has been discarded or at least does not hold good for Germany, and by the Prime Minister's mention of compensation to Poland by giving her German territory. It is a debatable question whether any new and to them more optimistic interpretation of "unconditional surrender" could be effectively impressed upon the German people, in the face of the propaganda system of Dr. Goebbels; however, granting the issuance of authoritative and harmonizing proclamations from Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin, it is probable that it could be achieved in time. Up to this point, back-handed encouragement from the Free German Committee in Moscow has been the only source of hope for the Germans, although this committee is regarded as a trap by a large number of the people.

6. Regarding the 3rd question: Unless the following chain of events occurred--the murder of Hitler and certain other Nazi potentates followed by the assumption of authority by the Military--it is believed by the majority of Germans that no minority faction could now seize authority over the existing ruler. At the present time no effective opposition group, military or civilian, exists which favors the western powers. Most anti-Nazis who desire western orientation at this time do not see any justification for risking their lives in order to promote the materialization of any plans submitted to date by the western powers insofar as concerns Germany. Other anti-Nazi elements in the Reich prefer to have the authority and responsibility maintained by the Nazi and Military cliques until the ultimate debate, so that the whole blame for the War and for Germany's downfall will rest on the shoulders of Hitler and the Military for all time. The German Socialists, especially, do not intend to assume control as they did the last time and thus have to answer for the armistice and peace terms. The Catholics' point of view is much like this. The Communists possess no known leader. Of course, a new group probably would be created in case we chose to offer any indication that such a group would be able to engage in dealings with us; however, until the capitulation, the strength of this group would be insignificant. In the conviction that such a proposition was unwise, untimely, and opposed to our policy,

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FORM 89a

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

FROM BERN, SWITZERLAND

TO OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

RECEIVED

icy, I have never given any stimulation to this notion.

7. The above opinions constitute my candid beliefs, professed in discussion with other persons here. Refer to my January 31 Flash, which I believe still holds true, with respect to the overall state of affairs in Germany. I am waiting for additional direct news from you concerning the treatment of the actual questions in your message. I do not favor any sentimental approach to the German problem, but it is my conviction that the war could be brought to a quicker conclusion by the exercise of a more realistic attitude in the sphere of psychological warfare,

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FOR: 3/31/44 1:01 PM

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

April 21, 1944

MEMO, 3-11-44

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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121.30708

SECRETARIAT: 121.30708

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There is receipt of a question which has been put to the
 Secretariat by the Swiss, and which is still in their hands. It
 is a question of questioning people who are in the hands of
 the Germans now. All of us have agreed to put forth our
 views on this matter. Question: Are the Germans aware of the
 trend, as against the war, of the knowledge of any in the
 world they are open to a type of propaganda, as in
 the case of the German? The following is a recommended
 approach: It appears to you in retrospect, viewing the
 war as taken, that for long periods of time the Allies have
 been aware, on some occasions in the Allies' favor and at other
 times in the Germans' favor. In your opinion, what trend is apparent in
 the Allies' favor? Can German civilians be made to believe that the
 Allies' "total surrender" is not necessarily synonymous with
 the Allies' "total surrender" as individuals; this will allow us to parallel
 the path to which we have committed ourselves, the path of
 "total surrender". The following approach is recommended: (A) The
 Allies' party who have made the capitulation? Is it not so, after all,
 "total surrender" only the surrender of military equipment, arms
 and so forth? Is it your firm opinion that "surrender" implies that
 civilians would have to surrender their belongings, persons and the
 like? (B) Is it your opinion that the Allies are foolish enough to
 the extent of their victory, it would be wise for them, in their
 interests, to destroy in Germany a national and effective
 organization: In the opinion of Germans is there any likelihood that
 they could come to the fore and wrest the power from the
 government? The following is a suggested line of approach for the
 conditions do not improve for Germany in the near future, in
 some new group be capable of taking over the reins of
 power? This last question is deliberately added as not very plausible.

INITIALS OF "RELEASING" OFFICE

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

FROM: OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

TO:

RUMEL, WILSON

TRANSMIT

SECRET

ask you to do everything in your power to get real results on this questionnaire and to consider all the qualifications listed in this highly vital assignment.

Wilson K-24 seems to be equipped to undertake this job, and it might be wise to use him in this connection.

SECRET

C: 5/27/64 9:30 p.m.

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Germany 1945

10 pages

1 Lambert

70 Kalorama Circle
Washington, D. C.
March 1, 1944

SECRET

Dear General Donovan:

Herewith is the material which you have asked Hadley Cantril and me to prepare for you.

If we have appeared somewhat dogmatic that the questions shall not be changed, it is because long experience in working with these intangible matters has taught us that there are almost as many opinions as persons concerned in a discussion. In this case, something specific must be adhered to if we are to get going.

While we have avoided stating so in the material, you will notice that the third question put in as a control question is purposely not very plausible.

Sincerely yours,

Gerard B. Lambert
Gerard B. Lambert

Report - replies

To

Cantril - Princeton 714

Lambert - Columbia 6693

SECRET

EXPLANATION OF METHOD FOR DETERMINING BEST PROPAGANDA LINE TO GERMANS

From:
G.B.L. & H.O.

March 2, 1944

Primary 1944

1. WARNING

We are outlining below a method specifically designed for obtaining intelligence in reference to propaganda lines. If you recognize any part of the method as old, don't make the mistake of thinking the entire mechanism is the same as you have been accustomed to.

SECRET

2. OBJECTIVE

Our objective is to find out - through conversations with Germans - what method of approach to the German nation will be most effective in creating the first break in their determination to fight to the bitter end. There are many possible lines that could be taken. The primary objective of this work is to determine the relative plausibility and effectiveness of several different lines so the one which is most effective can be used with assurance.

A further objective is to obtain this information in such a way that there can be no doubt that it is conclusive and not accidental or based on the opinions of one or two individuals.

3. FORMER METHODS INADEQUATE FOR THIS PURPOSE

For the purposes of this particular objective, old methods of intelligence are inadequate. Too often this information has been a collection of incidental items merely reported without having relation to any particular and specific problem. In the case where the information required has been clearly defined, it is not obtained from enough sources to assure that it is representative of the whole people and therefore could justify a program for that whole people. The technique outlined below does not intend to belittle the importance of the usual work.

4. ASSURANCE THAT METHOD CAN SUCCEED.

Briefly, the method to be employed is a modified form of the public opinion poll, a method new in intelligence practice but well established in other fields. The essential features of the polling method are:

- To obtain the opinions of a small group of people who are as far as possible a representative, miniature sample of the whole nation - industrialists, workers, poor, rich, etc.
- To obtain from this representative population the same uniform type of information within a definite and known time interval.

Experience through several years has shown that astonishing results may be obtained from very few interviews if those who are interviewed are truly representative of the whole. A national election in Canada has been predicted with less than 5% error with only 200 interviews; and election in New York State was predicted with less than a 5% error with

SECRET

only 100 cases, even 25 or 50 cases properly selected will show the drift of opinion.

While no one expects that any such accuracy may be achieved with the enemy, if results of value are to be obtained, the technique and technique prescribed here must be adhered to rigidly and the danger of mixing this with systems used for other purposes must be avoided.

SECRET

5. WHAT WE WILL OBTAIN

The purpose of this work can perhaps be best explained by using an individual as illustration rather than a whole nation. In the mind of every individual, there is some thought which, if discovered, can be successfully exploited in convincing a person to act. The most plausible argument can only be discovered by trying out several arguments. If several arguments to bring about action are advanced and if the effect of each is registered, it is possible to decide which one is most convincing. Just as a weakness can be uncovered with one individual, so can a nation's weakness be uncovered. Stated briefly, we want to find the tendon of Achilles of the German people on the question of surrender.

It must be remembered that no psychological approach is likely to bring about collapse in itself, but if the proper mental reactions have been created, the advent of military events in combination with that preparation will more quickly bring about the desired submission.

6. STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH

The problem must be taken up piece meal to be successful. We cannot simultaneously investigate the whole range of possibilities for breaking German morale.

7. YOUR INVESTIGATION SUPPLEMENTED BY OTHERS

Similar work on this problem will be conducted in several different areas and through various other agencies. Therefore, you will not be undertaking an isolated study. The results from the inquiries made by others will afford a check on your own work, just as yours will be a check on theirs.

8. CONDITIONS NOT IDEAL

The ideal way to make a public opinion survey in a free country is to obtain a statistically adequate sample of the population and then to ask questions directly, simply, and openly of the people selected. Obviously such conditions can be only very roughly approximated in dealing with the enemy.

We are indicating below a few fundamentals to be watched because of the enormously different conditions under which surveys must be taken in free democratic countries and in such an operation as you will have to conduct.

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9. A FEW FUNDAMENTALS

(a) Above all, you must avoid arousing suspicion on the part of any person you talk to. Your questions must be asked most indirectly, in a casual, conversational style. Specific suggestions for obtaining the required information by indirection will be provided you. In addition, use your own ingenuity in devising these indirect approaches.

(b) The ideal achievement by any agent would be to obtain the desired information from a group representing all types of people in the area in which he is operating, making sure that the number of any one type talked to is roughly in proportion to that type in that area. For example, if he can talk to 10 people, there will be very few well-to-do, more workers, etc. Obviously this perfection cannot be attained but every effort should be made to approach these conditions as nearly as possible.

However, remember that all conversations are valuable, even if there is no opportunity to attain any balance or proportion. Especially for this reason, the essential background data of each person talked to should be obtained and noted. We should know: occupation, age, income group, locality and any other description helpful to define the person's status. Even if all conversations by a single agent are limited to persons of one classification (for example, shopkeepers), the information will be invaluable when pooled with other results.

(c) Exact reporting is more than ever called for in this type of work. But remember that the report should cover only replies relating to the specific questions assigned. As soon as conversation is ended with a person, ~~again~~ the basic replies should if possible be written down at once. If there is no opportunity to write a complete report, at least make sufficiently detailed notes so final reports will be accurate.

Never try to make a report fit the pattern of any previous information. An agent should never allow his thoughts to alter the literal reporting of the actual responses received. If, however, an agent cares to include some interpretation of his own of the replies obtained, the information will be valuable but should always be clearly labelled has his interpretation.

(d) Agents should remember there is a reason behind the specific questions assigned and irrespective of his own judgment, he should stick closely to the basic thoughts the questions contain.

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PROPOSAL OF A METHOD TO OBTAIN MOST EFFECTIVE PROPAGANDA LINE FOR GERMANY

From: G.B.L. & H.C.

March 1, 1944

PURPOSE

It is proposed that a modified form of public opinion poll be utilized to determine by test what propaganda line is most effective in hastening the collapse of Germany. The system will differ from ordinary intelligence methods in that brief and specific information will be demanded on clearly defined subjects. This is in contrast to a mass of incidental and random information filtering through.

If our results are sufficiently conclusive, indicating that a certain propaganda line is best, they can be recommended for use to the highest authorities of Allied governments.

METHOD

Our method is to test only a small number of propaganda lines at any one time so the relative effectiveness of one against the other may be determined. Reports will be confined to the prescribed subjects. In furnishing the questions to be asked and outlining the information desired, it will be made clear that this information must be obtained through indirect methods of conversation. Suggestions and examples of indirect methods will accompany each question on which we want information.

Since any one agent will have access to a limited number and type of persons, every effort should be made to record the background data of each person talked to. In this way the central office may compile a reasonably adequate cross-section from the combined reports.

When the most plausible line of propaganda has been determined, the process should be repeated as a check for reliability.

Control. In order that the central office may be sure the mechanism is registering accurately, we will include among any given set of questions, one question which to the central office is obviously not very plausible and which should, therefore, receive a low rating of plausibility when tested in practice.

DETERMINATION OF QUESTIONS

Obviously, success of this idea will depend entirely upon our ability to create questions for testing which have a high chance of real success as propaganda lines. The most elaborate testing of ineffective questions will never make them effective.

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For Central Office and Agents
 SPECIFIC QUESTIONS

March 2, 1944

THESE PROPAGANDA LINES WOULD BE RELATIVE RETROSPERECTIVE
 IS TO BE TESTED IN THE FUTURE

Germany Matter

1. The information we want

Are the Germans conscious of the inevitable result of a trend as contrasted to awareness only of daily events, and would they therefore be susceptible to propaganda capitalizing on unfortunate and inexorable trends?

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Suggested indirect approach to get this information by talking with Germans somewhat as follows:

Looking back over the course of the war, doesn't it seem to you that there have been definite trends for considerable periods - sometimes in favor of Germany and sometimes for the Allies? What trend do you think we are in now?

2. The information we want

Is it possible to persuade German civilians that the phrase "Unconditional Surrender" does not necessarily mean complete disaster for them as individuals, so that we can still consistently maintain the line to which we are committed - unconditional surrender?

Suggested indirect approach to get this information by talking with Germans somewhat as follows:

(a) Don't you agree that the word "surrender" applies only to party and military leaders who make the decisions? After all, isn't it true that "surrender" means surrender only of those leaders and of military equipment, etc.? Do you really believe it would mean that civilians would have to give up their persons, their possessions, or their ways of life?

OR

(b) Do you think the Allies would be stupid enough to feel that even if they should win the war, it would be wise in their own interests for them to destroy an effective and normal civilian life in Germany?

3. The information we want

Do the Germans think any minority group could get started and gain control over present rulers?

Suggested indirect approach to get this information by talking with Germans somewhat as follows:

If things don't get better soon for Germany, do you think any new group might be able to take charge of the government?

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12 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The following notes consist mainly of statements of fact and generalizations about German troop morale, based upon interrogations of P.O.W.s at PW 12th, Aversa, during the period of January 20 to February 20, 1944. Most of the generalizations have, however, been checked with interrogators of long experience.

A. VULNERABILITIES.

1. Non-Germans. In the past six months, the Wehrmacht seems to have been making increasing use of Volksdeutsche for combat service. The proportion of these troops to Germans varies from unit to unit, from 2 or 3 percent to 20 percent (including Austrians). In descending order of numbers the various nationalities are as follows: Austrians, Alsace-Lorrainers, Poles, Czechs, and Russians. Desertions run high in these groups.

2. Older men and men drawn from previously de-

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Deferred Occupations. It is well known that the Wehrmacht is drawing more heavily upon men in the thirties, a good proportion of whom are skilled workers previously deferred. In the course of a series of interrogations of skilled workers, it was found that the overwhelming majority of these men have poor morale because:

- a. Many of them have families to worry about.
- b. They find the transition to army life difficult at their age.
- c. They worry about the future more than the average younger soldier.

d. They feel that when skilled workers are called up things must be going very badly indeed. This group would be particularly susceptible to factual statements of production figures of the Allies, compared with facts about what is happening to the German production.

3. Intimidated Men. Prisoners taken at the Anzio beachhead area brought reports that some of the units consisted of men who scarcely knew how to fire a gun. One

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squadron leader reported that his group had been rushed to the front from a supply and quartermaster battalion and were completely unprepared for combat. Morale among these men was very low. When the time came for a counter-attack only two out of ten men followed him from the holes in which they were lying.

4. Supply. In some sectors, notably around Cassino, supplies come in irregularly because of the difficulty of the terrain and heavy artillery fire. Sectors in which these conditions prevail might be singled out by MO, but attacks would have to be carefully timed. In general, the supply situation seems to be fairly well in hand. There are remarkably few complaints about food from P's/W. The two most important items are cigarettes and Commisbrot. The latter especially occupies an important position in soldier morale. All P's/W, when comparing their food in the camp with that in the Wehrmacht, mention that the slab of white bread given them with meals at the camp is no substitute for Commisbrot, which is very filling.

In every other respect the food at the camp is

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considered superior to their food in the Wehrmacht. Even the fanatics admit this.

5. The absence of the "Luftwaffe". The average P/W, though he admits the absence of air support in Italy, does not interpret this as very significant. P's/W whose morale was good before capture fall into the following categories on the matter:

a. The High Command knows what it is doing. If there is no Luftwaffe around there is good reason for it.

b. Some are more explicit, saying the reason is that it is being saved up for a future plan, or it is needed worse in Russia. The general state of mind expressed by P's/W suggests that the absence of the Luftwaffe is not a very important morale factor because it is not clearly interpreted as a sign of a serious breakdown. To make a successful attack on this theme, it would have to be shown that the Luftwaffe is not in Italy because the GAF simply doesn't have the planes.

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Factual reports of bombing of aircraft plants in Germany without further comment might be more effective in this line than any propaganda editorializing.

6. The Officers. The average P/W has very little to say about officers of the Wehrmacht in general. He forms his opinion on the basis of his own immediate officers and on things he hears from his comrades in the battalion. The following reports from P's/W on officers do, however, exhibit characteristics general enough to form the basis of an MO attack:

a. The veteran soldiers do not think highly of the newer corps of officers. This is more significant than the typical "Second Looney" or "Brasshat" grips. It is based on comparison in combat conditions with previous campaigns.

b. It is commonly understood that officers must have political views favored by the party in order to get any place. Among the soldiers who are fed up with the party this had important implications in their relations with officers. Officers trained in NAPOLI have an

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unsalubrious reputation, even with the unpolitical soldiers.

c. Apart from the usual "tough officer" yarn, two types of anti-officer stories recur in interrogations.

i. Stories of officers "collecting" large amounts of silks, linens, etc. to send home from Italy.

ii. Stories of officers lying to their troops about the strength and/or nature of the forces opposing them. Rare instances of cruelty on the part of officers might also be exploited.

7. Worries about Home. With the exception of worries about aerial bombardment these worries follow the usual pattern of soldier worries. Mail service appears to be adequate and spot-censored so that the soldiers in general feel they are getting news from their friends and relatives which is dependable and unworried by censorship. The Nazi propaganda line about the indiscriminate bombing of civilians by the Allies appears

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to have had a minor boomerang effect on the soldiers. It is difficult to assess it, but the impression created by P'n/T is that it has caused them to worry more than it has increased their determination to fight. It should be remembered, however, that prisoners are not ideal sources of information on this theme.

One worry about home does not seem to be very widespread. No instance of a prisoner who was afraid that his wife or girl was deceiving him with a foreign soldier, French or other nationality, has been encountered. Though this is difficult to discuss in interrogations, it never seems to have been the subject of conversations among the troops, nor are there any stories at the expense of "other guys". On the other hand, there is a good proportion of stories about French, Dutch, and Belgian girls and German soldiers. However, if any news stories from German papers on this theme can be found, it might be worth a try. No file.

4. ~~Delusions among the troops.~~ Among the average run of troops, front line experience seems to make

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ordinary frictions disappear in the general atmosphere of "we are all in the thing together". Tolerance on one's comrades is outstanding. There are no evidences that religious or regional frictions play a significant role in troop morale. Apart from the German-non-German split, the only others worth mentioning are the dislike of the fanatical Nazis who make any kind of frank discussion of the war or politics unpleasant, if not dangerous, and the dislike of the SS. The large majority of the soldiers, however, are fighting as "good Germans" and "doing their duty". The sense of sharing their troubles and the general front line camaraderie is much stronger than political or social differences.

9. Vergeltung. The long-promised Vergeltung is no longer taken seriously by the majority of the troops, and has given rise to a considerable number of jokes. The few who do believe in it neither constitute a worthwhile target nor is it likely that they would be susceptible to any sort of propaganda. The best possibility offered by this theme is as a part of another attack in which a ludicrous Vergeltung reference might be

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effective.

10. Attitude toward Captivity. The average soldier is confident that if he is captured he will be well handled. American captivity has an especially good reputation, with the English a close second. Some of the prisoners from Cassino report that there were rumors that the Germans took no prisoners. In general, however, a good treatment is taken for granted. So much so that a few instances in which officers tried to harden their troops for combat by stories of bad treatment in captivity were reported by P's/M's to have been flat failures. Propaganda making use of captivity promises should therefore avoid gilding the lily or even direct appeals based on its attractions, but should rather regard it as well established credit.

11. The Secret Weapon. The belief in a secret weapon of some sort is still fairly strong and the number of versions of what it is attest to the fact that it is a frequent subject of conversation. Prisoners have described it as a radio-guided plane which is one large bomb, a death ray, a new gas, a super long range rocket bomb, and "elec-

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trical gun", and as an "atomic" bomb. It is significant that the number who regard it as a joke is far smaller than those who laugh at Vergeltung. The major weaknesses in the belief are the delay in its appearance and the large number of versions as to what it is.

B. STRENGTHS

1. Hopelessness of defeat. One of the major factors making for a stronger morale than one might otherwise expect is the feeling on the part of the average German that he is now fighting to save Germany from annihilation. He is fighting as a German and, as noted above, this tends to subordinate the whole Nazi question. If there were some inkling of hope for a defeated Germany, the appeal to stop dying for Hitler might have more effect; at present, however, the sense of doing his duty as a German is strong enough to put the disgust with the party, which many of them feel, definitely in the background. Blaming the party for the war also becomes comparatively unimportant to them. What matters is that if Germany loses the war she is done for. A majority of the prisoners no

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no longer believe in the possibility of a German victory. Many still think she can hold out if they all fight well. Others just don't see anything else to do.

2. Sense of Duty. Many prisoners are frank to admit that they do not like the war and would be glad to see it over quickly. They are unaware of any political implications, but are fighting simply because "It is their duty". This state of mind fits in with the one described above, but with many soldiers it is not causally related. That is, they usually describe themselves as "little people" and "unpolitical". The issues involved are not clear to them and they are relatively unaffected by Nazism. They want to war simply because the authorities told them it was necessary and it was their duty to respond. This group is generally unaffected by anti-Nazi or other ideological and political propaganda. Many of them come from agricultural districts, but the type is by no means confined to the peasantry.

3. Pride in being a good soldier. The average soldier is conscious of the fact that the German fighting

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is an excellent one. He feels that his unit is more than a match for the enemy's. He takes pride in the efficiency and discipline of the troops.

William J. Donovan
Director

SECRET

SECRETNOTES

V. 8/11/43
 x Unconditional
 surrender

1. The unconditional surrender formulae has been used by German leaders to argue that, if accepted, it will give the Allies power to destroy her political existence, to starve and enslave her people and to destroy and bolshevize her country.
2. This argument and the hope of a compromise peace has strengthened German morale.
3. Weakness of Allies position on this is that official statements have not included a clear formulation of our intention in the treatment of Germany and thus gives opportunity for deliberate distortions by Nazi propaganda.
4. Recent reports indicate that during the last three or four months German morale has stiffened, rather than weakened.
5. The German people expected that the fall and winter of 1943 would bring the decisive crisis of the war, and that if they survived that, she could stick to the end. Germany has now survived 1943. Germans are impressed by the fact that the Southern Front has been stabilized and

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that no major disaster has happened to the Eastern Front.

6. The widespread saying in Germany is, "Enjoy the war. The peace will be terrible."

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141048
x Sullivan rec
x [illegible]
3 April 1944

Miss Grace Tully,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I should be grateful if you would
send the attached to the President for me.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan,
Director

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14 040
 X Intelligence
 X Report
 3 April 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I have just received the following cable relating to conditions in Berlin.

"Today 2 April 1944, through the assistance of a close mutual friend, we had one hour alone with the Persian Minister to Sweden who was going back to Teheran by way of Baghdad. In order that he be allowed to visit his wife's grave in a suburb of Berlin, a diplomatic permit was obtained for him by Stockholm which allowed him to spend a single day in the German capitol. He spent Tuesday 28 March 1944 in Berlin. The following quiet and convincing eye-witness account of his visit was given today after our repeated oaths to maintain secrecy: With the exception of Schlesischer Bahnhof which is unscathed up to this time, all the major railroad stations in Berlin have been completely demolished. All the rail traffic

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seemed to be running on a punctual schedule and our informant's train was on time at every stop. Where there are no stations, rail tickets must be procured from the police and only emergency cases and special pass holders are permitted to buy tickets. The appearance of the rolling stock was clean and in good shape. 30th Charlottenburg and Tempelhof are entirely demolished, without a single building left standing. 50% of the buildings on Unter den Linden are intact and the other 50% destroyed. Both the Legation Quarter and the Tiergarten are completely demolished. The Luftfahrt Ministry and Gestapo Headquarters are entirely destroyed. Not a wall is standing at the airport which is a shambles. The Mosbit Criminal Courts are demolished. Informant claims he drove in a cab through central and west Berlin for a distance of 6 miles without observing a single house standing. Only about 25% of the subway system is in use; the remainder has been converted into giant shelters and a tremendous machine repair shop. In the major portion of the city,

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the street cars are running. For the most part, the population of Berlin is living underground. They have evacuated all of the small children. The older children and the women are working on a 16 hour a day schedule. All food is stringently rationed, however, on a generous basis sufficient for the basic requirements. Positively no item can be had which is not rationed. This applies equally to clothing. The essential business of Berlin proceeds to function doggedly, however, some of the Ministries, the Luftfahrt included, have moved to Vienna. Tremendous slave labor forces, for the most part made up of Russians and Poles, are in evidence everywhere doing safety demolition and cleanup. These men are forced to stay out in the open during raids since there are not enough shelters available for everyone in Berlin. During a single raid in March, it is reported that 40,000 of these Poles and Russians were killed. Our informant reports that a relatively accurate and glossy picture is being given to the general populace about all the Theaters of War including the Eastern Front defeats. This results in a fabulous fear of the Russians

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
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but a reaction of intoxication, almost as though they were under the influence of morphine, with no sign of collapse and yet a general despair of ever gaining the victory now. Everyone is convinced that the only hope is to fight to the end and there is a glimmer of hope that England and America may, in self interest, turn against Russia once they see that the Soviet is about to assume complete control. In this way, the German cause will be rescued. The Minister passed through Bucharest which did not seem, from the train, to be damaged; he also went through Sofia which he approximates is 25% destroyed. However, he was not allowed to speak or see anyone in Rumania."

William J. Donovan
Director

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WESTERN UNION

(331)

SYMBOLS

DL=Day Letter
NL=Night Letter
LC=Deferred Cable
NLT=Cable Night Letter
Ship Radiogram

147 20 GOVT COLLECT-UD KANSAS CITY MO 5 13 AM 3 45

CON G C DOERING JR

252 OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES 25 AND E STS NORTHWEST

WASHDC

PLEASE LOOK AT DASH 354 DASH 41 PREPARE IT IN USUAL MANNER
AND SEND IT TO GRACE FOR ME

RECALL

Germany 14.0.45
X Intelligence
X Report

Even No. rolls

Exposure is 125 @ f.6.3

RESTRICTED

14,045
German x Outfitter
x 12,000

20 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I give you below a report regarding the situation in Germany on March 1st. Our representative says the following:

"I reproduce this as received; the ideas are not mine, but come from a good source. The destruction in Berlin is enormous, but it is extraordinary to observe the fatalism with which the inhabitants accept the new situation. Thousands of persons live in the ruins, in cellars and in temporary shelters. At the beginning of the bombardment, there were many complaints. Now it seems the population is somewhat used to them. The common misfortune which all are sharing has the result that those who suffer are not openly complaining. The air bombardments have not caused any internal revolt. People are not any longer raising the question of who is responsible. The misery is so great and so general that it stifles reaction.

"Among persons above 40 years of age, i.e. those who have had knowledge of, or participated in, the war of 1914-18, there is a considerable proportion of anti-Hitler sentiment, even of desertion. Persons of this generation are in open opposition to those of the generation which followed them, that is to say, those from 18 to 30

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years old, who are mostly out-and-out Nazis. Now there is coming along a third generation - the young people from 12 to 18, who are far from being devoted to the present regime. In a school in Wiesbaden recently, the scholars agreed among themselves to beat up any of their school comrades who gave the Hitler salute. This young generation is not communist, because it does not know what communism is, but it has in it the elements of anarchism.*

William J. Donovan
Director

SECRET

March 1944

Attention is directed to the report
you asked to see in connection
with cable dated to Stockholm.

This report should be
submitted to Mr. Meyer in SI.

Secretary

SECRET

1208-9

Rating: C - 0

Source: " [REDACTED] "

... was secured by a regular source
... reliable from a person who was sent into
... in 1947 to engage in underground work.

Even No. rolls

Exposure is 1/25 @ f.6.3

July 18, 1940.

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In the years prior to the outbreak of war many "gleichgeschaltete" persons or NSDAP-members really represented the interests in such corporations and they actually believed that the NSDAP was created for that purpose. Within the DAF and the NSDAP circles there have been lively discussions to this effect. However, it was stopped by Himmler who saw the danger and instead of members of the DAF, NSDAP, etc., SS, "Werkscharen" (Nazi spies and police units formed by the workmen) etc., have taken the lead. The lower DAF and NSDAP groups have lost their importance, in view of which however, a number of persons have detached themselves ideologically from the NSDAP.

And now with respect to the broad labor masses. In these circles a much wider adhesion to the Nazi doctrines has taken place than is generally presumed. Our informant thinks that one has to make it clear how disappointed and miserable the working classes were in the beginning of 1933 and that really a relatively small section was really inspired by the SP and KP. Many of the adherents acquired by the KP during the years of crisis (only a small portion were really organized) became happily connected with the new regime. They had been given work and bread; help for their children, group amusements, vacation trips, hygienic improvements in the workshops (besides the whip there was bread and sugar in the form of extras, sick-rooms, medical treatment, etc., in the large factories and other advantages. The Gestapo-terror of those of them who in the eyes of the public attempted crazy rebellions (this was in 1934 and the following years). Fear was a sudden one or the other of the workmen ceased to appear at work and was taken care of by the Gestapo. But it was quickly forgotten in the midst of the usual daily life.

There was great fear of the threatening war and no active stand was taken. But the masses thought: Hitler had decided to start the war. In Munich indeed everything was in an uproar. And then the English suddenly began to talk for other reason than the Corridor and Danzig, they wanted to humiliate Germany. (Our informant says it cannot be denied that they were right, how fatal it was that even England was not at the Munich Conference). Therefore war was inevitable. The great number of individuals who had been and ventured to speak were taken care of (in the form of small circles). Then the result of the propaganda campaign carried on by the Nazis had awakened a great number of young workmen. In 1940 were recalled to their homes in Belgium and France. But also rose and the opinion spread that Germany would be destroyed (effects

the outbreak of war against the
of the former SP- KP- and
were taken by the Gestapo
for work on fortifica-
a former labor
people. There was a certain

fear

...smaller effect on the masses. However, the war in the ... and workmen who had been taken ... had no longer their own thoughts.

...only been heard by relatively few ... radio, however, much more ... middle circles. But English ... undesirable effects. Combined ... arisen during the war that ... will be made responsible and that ... after the defeat (while the ... as a slave existence). ... the English radio would ob- ... merely reported facts and would ... reorganization work after the war in ... was no longer ruled by the Nazis

...domestic inactivity, it ... in the meantime formed ... (often SS) which has understood to ... This SS organization is well ... prevented from making too close ... They are allowed to visit only ... in the opinion of our informant ... of the old regime. It would be ... from the labor classes before ... absolutely certain. It would only ... of thousands and would be of no ... would discover every thing. ... conscious laborers are directed ... in the day of defeat and what ... of course the effects of the ... diminish with the defeats

...among those of the former ... associated themselves with ... and employees of the sick ... found similar jobs under the ... have no further problems.

...number of experiences with ... belonging to labor and other ... to the problems. ... apprentice in the build- ... lived in the same house ... time. He tried all ... a young man, who ap- ... reflected type. Finally ... in a shop; he ... would not play ... a young man did ... for a long time ... there was so ... after all the ... he had

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... 1911
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After all the other passengers had left the car they discussed the future and how the future would shape itself. At the end the sergeant major gave the address where he was staying during his leave and urged our informant to come and see him in the coming week so that they could go on discussing matters. Then he suddenly left the train together with our informant declaring that his fiancée would have to wait another day for him. It would be better if he passed the night at this station so that they could go on with their discussions. Then they talked the whole night.

In a restaurant garden a man who looked like an important industrialist began to scold the Nazis. At last he said: The Nazis won't win the war this year, they won't win it next year, and the following year the English will have won it for them. Our informant wanted to leave as he thought the man was a provocateur. The latter said, however: "You want to go and denounce me to the Nazis? You may do that, but besides yourself nobody has heard me and you will never believe my words." Then he added: "But I do not believe you will do so, you look too wise for that."

Our informant had no relations with any shopkeepers. He heard more from young farmers. He thought that a characteristic for this class was that they cared nothing about the difficulties of their fathers; they were enthusiastic about technical questions, collective farming on a broad scale, etc. Several of them, although under arms, were working on farms, or attended agricultural schools and were of a completely different mentality than the old farmers. They were angry as the old farmers were furious about the "Kreisbauernrat" which commented everything. They wanted to have their own administrative organizations. (Our informant, however, had no detailed knowledge or connections in this field.)

III. The Party and the Intellectuals

Our informant had an excellent connection in these circles. He was able to get some people to stay so that he could see them in the best hotels where he met them. He was very careful with them, everything was on an informal basis. One of these persons he had known since the time he had taken place in the underground and at which time he had been in a discussion with them about the steadily increasing war concerns in Germany and in the East, especially in the East. He had a certain amount of artistic talent and he was very much affected by the special concerns of the war. His main concern had been the "German question" (State of Germany) and he had decided that they had to be taken care of and withdrawn. He was very much with the party and the intellectuals.

(

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

Director, OSS

Ferdinand L. Mayer

Attached report

DATE March 4, 1944

I believe you would be
interested in this conversation apropos
of the report sent you yesterday as a
result of your query concerning our
case # 12 to Stockholm.

F. L. M.

SECRET

Date: February 1, 1944

The following is an account of a luncheon discussion between Jacob Wallenberg and John Scott, Sweden correspondent for TIME Magazine. The factual information is probably quite correct. The point of view in this account is John Scott's. This information may be of interest to I-2, who are probably compiling a file on Sweden's most prominent people and the ones who are most intimately acquainted with German economic and industrial developments.

JACOB WALLENBERG

Fifty-one year old Jacob Wallenberg is a tall, strong, healthy man with greying hair. His movements are impetuous and vigorous. His nose is slightly bulbous and somewhat red, although he seldom drinks anything but beer. He is a dominant figure not only in Swedish banking but of a whole series of Swedish industries. Formally he is a Director of Stockholms Enskilda Bank, the Swedish Match Co., the Swedish East Asiatic Co., the S.K.F. Ball-Bearing Co., Diligentia, A/B., Separator, A/B., the Göta Canal Co., Aug. Stenman, A/B., Stockholms Kopparb. Bergslags. A/B., and Vikmanhytte Bruks A/B., but actually his power in Swedish and Central European economy and finance is extremely great. He and his banks have extensive interests in Germany and other Central European countries. Generally speaking Jacob Wallenberg has left his Anglo-American business to his younger brother Marcus, while he himself has directed the Axis side of his banking enterprises. But in all questions Jacob is the senior, the abler and the most powerful of the Wallenberg family since his father's death.

Jacob Wallenberg took me to lunch in the Kastenhorf Restaurant, a baroque rococo balconied eating-house belonging to the Stockholms Enskilda Bank and situated around the corner from the Bank. Jacob Wallenberg turned down the copious Swedish smörgåsarbord which the waiter offered him, took two earlines, two pieces of bread and butter and an order of game-bird entrée which required no green meat-coupons.

Wallenberg was interested in Russia. He listened attentively while I gave him my opinion, namely, that the Russians' main interests for several decades will be internal rather than external, that Russian territorial interests will be confined to a security belt in Eastern Europe calculated to make Russia safe from any future aggression.

"Fine," said Wallenberg in the perfect, idiomatic English which he learned in America. "When the Russians take this security zone, don't you think that this is just the beginning?"

"For several years Sweden has been run by the Social Democrats, partly backed by a large majority. They have run the country reasonably and wisely. When they took power did you think that was just the beginning?" I asked him.

"No," he answered. "I still think that it is just the beginning. Friends of mine keep coming up to me with a song of sorrow to the effect that what is going on in the war and the bombings they are being con-

...telling them that
...are losing it."

...be done after
...The first thing
...Government
...the Americans
...Government will have to

...with a Government?" I

...and I regret to say
...fulfill these
...Government."
...days so at every

...with a number of Social
...in recent weeks had
...ability to do any-

...said Wallenberg.
...democrats, some of them
...able to assume positions
...plans to do so. But
...in Germany they will
...from the British and
...in power must feed
...This will be a tre-

...of post-war
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...post-war German
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...in two
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- 3 -

The question of Poland also arose. Said Mr. Wallenberg: "I were a Pole I hope I would have sense enough to see that the interests of Poland demand a renunciation of territories inhabited by other people. Western Ukraine and Western White Russia are not inhabited predominantly by Poles. These territories were seized by the Poles against the decision of the British and French at a time when Russia was momentarily weak. Now Russia obviously is militarily strong. Therefore a revision of this frontier is natural, and from the Polish standpoint probably desirable. If the Poles would forget their ideas of a large Poland, renounce all territories in the east and west whose populations are predominantly non-Polish, and concentrate their attentions on improving the standard of living of Poland Proper, they would be much better off."

Mr. Wallenberg added that he had been in Poland in his capacity as one of the directors of the Swedish Match Trust many times for important negotiations with the Polish Government. He had found Polish Government officials, he said, relatively honest but fairly consistently incompetent.

Form 1 (Revised)

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OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE April 2, 1944

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The following report is appraised as A-2: Today, through the assistance of a close mutual friend, we had one hour alone with the Foreign Minister to Sweden who was going back to Teheran by way of Baghdad. In order that he be allowed to visit his wife's grave in a suburb of Berlin, a diplomatic permit was obtained for him by Stockholm which allowed him to spend a single day in the German capital. He spent Tuesday in Berlin. The following quiet and convincing, eye-witness account of his visit was given today after our repeated efforts to maintain secrecy: With the exception of Schlesischer Bahnhof which is unscathed up to this time, all the major railroad stations in Berlin have been completely demolished. All the rail traffic seemed to be running on a punctual schedule and our informant's train was on time at every stop. Where there are no stations, rail tickets must be procured from the police and only emergency cases and special pass holders are permitted to buy tickets. The appearance of the rolling stock was clean and in good shape. Both Charlottenburg and Tempelhof are entirely demolished, without a single building left standing. 50% of the buildings on Unter den Linden are intact and the other 50% destroyed. Both the Legation Quarter and the Tiergarten are completely demolished. The Luftfahrt Ministry and Gestapo Headquarters are entirely destroyed. Not a wall is standing at the airport which is a shambles. The Mosbit Criminal Courts are demolished. Informant claims he drove in a cab through central and west Berlin for a distance of 6 miles without observing a single house standing. Only about 10% of the subway system is in use; the remainder has been converted into giant shelters and a tremendous machine repair shop. In the major portion of the city, the street cars are running. For the most part, the population of Berlin is living underground. They have evacuated all of the small children. The older children and the women are working on a 10 hour a day schedule. All food is stringently rationed, however, on a generous basis sufficient for the basis.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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requirements. Positively no item can be had which is not rationed. This applies equally to clothing. The essential business of Berlin proceeds to function doggedly, however, some of the Ministries, the Luftwaffe included, have moved to Vienna. Tremendous slave labor forces, for the most part made up of Russians and Poles, are in evidence everywhere doing safety demolition and cleanup. These men are forced to stay out in the open during raids since there are not enough shelters available for everyone in Berlin. During a single raid in March, it is reported that 40,000 of these Poles and Russians were killed. Our informant reports that a relatively accurate and gloomy picture is being given to the general populace about all the Theaters of War including the Eastern Front defeats. This results in a fabulous fear of the Russians but a reaction of intoxication, almost as though they were under the influence of morphine, with no sign of collapse and yet a general despair of ever gaining the victory now. Everyone is convinced that the only hope is to fight to the end and there is a glimmer of hope that England and America may, in self interest, turn against Russia once they see that the Soviet is about to assume complete control. In this way, the German cause will be rescued. The Minister passed through Bucharest which did not seem, from the train, to be damaged; he also went through Sofia which he approximates is 25% destroyed. However, he was not allowed to speak or see anyone in Rumania.

ACTION

TIME: 4/2/44 3:30 p.m.

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*Original JIC
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File*

Germany 14002
SECRET
x JIC memo 14002
1. Jutelebens
2. "Overlord"

(Notes on JIC Memorandum for Information
No. 45 - German Plans and Intentions dur-
ing the first half of 1944, with particu-
lar reference to "OVERLORD")

UNDERLYING STRATEGY

1. Germany must hold most of her offensive divisions in the East, guarding the frontiers of Germany and the Balkans. Her disposition will be affected by the fact that she will have to face an attack in Western Europe.
2. Her military and economic resources could not sustain major campaigns in the East, West and South. In order to prevent destruction, she must stop any Allied invasion at the very beginning. If something like this could be done, she believes the resulting discouragement might help her win a compromise peace.
3. Considering the above, she will probably put all that she can spare from her defensive set-up to meet the danger in France.
4. In Russia, the Germans still have space for retreat. With that in mind, she will hold the Russians with what she has today, giving ground when she must, inflicting punishment on the Russians in the hope of slowing them. Two things would force her to strengthen the East: (1) major encirclement of her forces, and (2) Russian advances beyond the River Enisei - Warsaw - Riga, or possibly Memel.
5. Italy and the Balkans will probably rely on what they have now but know that improving weather conditions will help the Allied air force and armored formations.

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6. In general, they have disposed of their forces to meet the strategic situation they have to face in the spring or summer of 1944.

GERMAN APPRECIATION OF PLACE AND TIME OF OPERATIONS
AGAINST WESTERN EUROPE

7. She knows, as everyone does, that Allied forces are being built up in the United Kingdom and she indicates that she expects the main attack across the English Channel.

8. She probably figures that the Allies will not attack until there is weakening of the forces in French Eastern Front.

9. No comment

PROBABLY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE VARIOUS THEATRES OF WAR IN THE
FIRST HALF OF 1944

Eastern Front

10. Don't know much about Russian intentions and strength.

11. Russian superiority in the air, as well as on land, has enabled her to try out the German defenses from the Crimea to Leningrad, and when they find a weakness to exploit it. As a result of this, the Germans are holding a longer front than the Leningrad-Rostov line of mid-summer 1943.

12. She will delay the Russian advance and avoid a break through by yielding territory rather than by bringing in reinforcements.

13. This kind of strategy runs a risk of encirclement, as happened at Konyev. Also, the Germans are having great transport difficulties. Bad weather has slowed the Russian advance, but this kind of weather also affects withdrawal of German heavy material.

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14. It is likely that by early summer Germans will hold the positions covering River Dniester - Warsaw - Riga.

15. Farther west the Germans are forced to withdraw towards Rumania and Germany and it is more important to hold the Russians off. The shorter the line the greater the concentration the Russians could bring against it. Russian pressure forces large salients in the German position.

Finland

16. If you have peace between Finland and Russia, then the Germans might try to retain forces in the Petsamo area but would try to withdraw her forces in the rear of Finland and have them absorbed in the Eastern Front where the Russians would be stronger.

Norway

17. The Germans would still like to hang on to Norway because of its important naval and air bases.

Italy

18. The whole problem there is to delay the Allied advance and reserving divisions from Southern France, North Italy and the Balkans to the Anzio bridgehead shows how important they think this is. So long as we have to fight south of the Pisa-Rimini line, we are going through a bottleneck without ability of maneuver.

19. When they are forced to retire, the Germans will carry out demolitions, not only military, but the kind that will burden the Allies, but more and more the Italian population, removing rolling stock and locomotives, disrupt land and other communications, and still control the power stations in Northern Italy.

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20. Even if the Allies reach the Pisa-Rimini line and force it, and even though the Germans are weak in Northern Italy, they will fight delaying actions until they reach their final line of defense in the Maritime Alps in the West and Venetia and Istria in the East, and they have this object in mind: (1) to deny us airfields in Northern Italy, (2) to delay us as long as possible from reaching the southeastern borders of France, and (3) to prevent us making contact through Istria with the Partisan forces in Yugoslavia.

Southeast Europe

21. Transit facilities through Hungary and Rumania are necessary for the supply of the Southern part of the Eastern Front and for obtaining supplies from Turkey, and so as the Germans are driven West, it will be more important for them to control communications in Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria.

22. If any of those three drop out, it would be a big hole in her defenses.

23. She can't give up territory in the Balkans because it would be such a sign of weakness to start the deterioration there.

24. Not likely that Turkey will enter the war by May or June.

25. No comment.

East Front

26. Russian advance and heavy air attacks ought to increase the demoralizing effect. The security services and the fear of defeat probably prevent opposition to Hitler. Greatest danger to the home front is apathy and exhaustion, reduction of civilian war effort to a low level, confusion and dissension among those responsible for planning military and civilian supply.

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27. German industrial production is declining. Output of armaments have fallen 10% during the last nine months of 1943. Stringency in certain major equipment, tanks and aircraft, have shown itself.

28. Weakness of their air defense exposes their industry to increasingly heavy, accurate and selective air attack. There will probably be a decline in production during the first six months of 1944, even greater than 1943. Up to now they have been able to off-set the fall of production by general policy of conservation of resources. Allied operations in the coming six months should make it impossible to continue this policy. Current production will fall short of wastage on all fronts. All of this makes it imperative for the German High Command to stop any invasion of ours.

GERMAN DISPOSITIONS TO MEET "OVERLORD"

29. This is the background upon which the Germans are completing their dispositions to meet the strategic situation they must face.

Naval Forces.

30. Possible disposition of German naval forces by early summer, 1944.

a. Surface Ships

31. Norway, either at Trondheim or further North. Both pocket battleships and one or both heavy cruisers with attendant destroyers and torpedo boats.

Dutch, Belgian and Channel Coasts. Small destroyer and torpedo boat force with many light craft of all types.

Western Baltic or Skagerrak. 2 light cruisers.

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Biscay Coast. Small destroyer and torpedo boat force.

Central and Eastern Baltic. Possibly 1 heavy cruiser, 2 light cruisers, 2 old battleships and a force of destroyers, torpedo boats and other light craft.

TIRPITZ probably undergoing repair at Gdynia.

b. U-Boats

32. Shift of center of U-boat activity to an area between Latitude 45 and 60 North, and East of about 25 West. This redistribution forced on enemy due to shortage of long endurance and supply U-boats. Enemy hopes to find targets in waters enroute to and from United Kingdom.

33. This disposition makes available a strong U-boat force which can be quickly concentrated against convoys.

34. No comment.

35. There are at present 52 German divisions in France - 12 are offensive - 36 defensive - 4 unidentified.

36. This is likely to be increased.

37. No comment.

Air Forces 38.

38. By the first of May, the strengthened disposition of the German Air Force should be:

Western Front	1800
S. Germany and Austria	250
Mediterranean and Balkans	600
Eastern Front	1200
Refitting	<u>150</u>
Total	4000

39. Assuming Allied superiority in other theaters during OVERLORD, the close support force available to the Germans for operations in the OVER-

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LORE area is estimated at some 350 aircraft, as follows:

<u>L.R.B.</u>	<u>V.b.</u>	<u>S.E.F.</u>	<u>T.S.F.</u>	<u>T.R.</u>	<u>Total</u>
350	75	300	75	50	850

40. No comment.

CONCLUSION

41. Germany must retain greater part of army in the East to prevent close approach of Russia to Germany and Balkans. Germany will allot to France and Low Countries all available forces after meeting minimum defensive requirements of other fronts. The estimated opposition to OVERLORD may amount to:

Land Forces - some 55 divisions, about 16-20 offensive divisions, 39-35 defensive divisions. If the planned Russian offensive is launched concurrently with OVERLORD, it is unlikely that any battle-worthy divisions could be released from Eastern Front.

Air Forces - Some 850 aircraft operating as a close support force.

Naval Forces - main Naval opposition will be U-boats, torpedo boats, E-boats and possibly destroyers.

NOTES FROM APPENDIX "B"

The Germans have about 195 divisions on the Eastern Front, 30 of these are defensive, about 6 in Finland, 11 in Norway, 5 in Denmark, 6 in Poland, 9 in Germany, 32 in France, 21 South-East Europe, 21 Italy, or about 132 divisions.

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by May or June, the combat divisions will have so drawn upon resources of manpower, both inside and outside the army, that they will be unable to replace casualties at anything approaching the 1943 rate, so that they will be dependent on new age groups and further dilution with foreign personnel.

There certainly must be a deterioration of quality of the German Army, part from the wastage of war, replacements from industry must now be over 35, lowering of medical standards, dilution by foreign elements, lowering of standard of training and certain deficiencies of equipment.

Yet there is no evidence of any weakening in the fighting efficiency and discipline in battle of the German Army.

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THE FUTURE OF THE FIRM

TOP SECRET

23 March 1945

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I think the attached memorandum
will be of interest to the President. Will
you please see that it reaches his desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

Attachment

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

23 March 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I attach a report which is of exceptional interest. It relates to future plans of the German Intelligence Service. It was prepared by our Counter-Espionage Branch.

The report indicates that the Nazi Party Intelligence Service (RSHA), controlled by Himmler, has absorbed the ABWIR and that the two services are being consolidated into an effective tool which may be used by the underground after military defeat.

Among other things the report indicates that officers for a German resistance army of between 15,000 and 40,000 men are receiving training in resistance methods and guerrilla warfare at special Nazi schools. There is also evidence of the seeking of supplies and that RSHA has issued directives which, although they have not as far related to continuing guerrilla resistance, have directed intelligence, subversion and sabotage activities.

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- 2 -

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The memorandum details assignments of specific post-defeat functions to branches of the RSHA together with methods of operation. Among the latter are the surrender of selected SS personnel as a means of going underground as prisoners of war and the infiltration of Nazis into the Communist party.

There is also evidence of a shift in attention from tactical to long range strategic intelligence reporting. Interest has been shown in areas which can be explained only on a long range basis. Plans with reference to Spain are of particular interest. It is reported that in order to forestall expulsion certain Germans there are to be naturalized in the interest of continued German intelligence.

The world-wide interest of German intelligence shows how extensively we must spread ourselves to guard against their activities.

2075 651

William J. Donovan
Director

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17 March 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL PORTER

VIA: Lt. Robert Thoma, USNR

FROM: Roger A. Pfaff, Lt. Col., Inf.
Acting Chief, I-2 Branch

SUBJECT: Future Plans of the German Intelligence Service

1. We are transmitting herewith new pages 13 and 14 and new Table of Contents to replace original pages presently in the report dated 24 February.
2. Your attention is directed to Section 5, Romanian Planning, this being the only addition to the original study.

R. A. P.

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

24 February 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL DONOVANFROM: Roger A. Pfaff, Lt. Col., Inf. *RAP*
Acting Chief, X-2 Branch

SUBJECT: Future Plans of the German Intelligence Service

1. We are transmitting herewith an X-2 study on the Future Plans of the German Intelligence Service. It summarizes pertinent information which we have in our files on this subject. The Western Hemisphere is not covered by this report.

2. This document clearly illustrates the importance of trained counter-espionage personnel operating throughout the world for the purpose of securing complete factual information on the enemy intelligence service, including the identification and location of its personnel. It also demonstrates that only through such a world-wide counter-espionage organization, having in its possession such facts, can the enemy intelligence service be neutralized and rendered ineffective. Both of the two functions mentioned above are presently being performed by the X-2 Branch, OSS, except in the Western Hemisphere.

3. We have classified this document Top Secret in view of the type of intelligence information contained therein and it is our recommendation that this document be most carefully restricted in its dissemination.

document sent to White House

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THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

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C O P Y

G-TSX-1404

FAILURE OF THE GERMAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

14 006 -
German Intelligence
Any report upon the failure of the German Intelligence Service written at this time must perforce be an interim one. The interrogation of the senior German intelligence figures, while now under way, at this time is far from complete. A thorough study of these interrogation reports will be necessary before any definitive report on the German Intelligence Service can be attempted. Although no known German resistance groups are in existence now, it is possible that after the shock of total defeat has worn off, and as the hardships of the coming winter become apparent to the Nazi, some such organization may come into being. These organizations will certainly warrant attention in such a report.

Hence the less in examination of the GIS from a counter-espionage point of view, it becomes plain that the German secret intelligence services failed in World War II because of four factors and the successful exploitation of these factors by the Allied secret services. The four factors in the German failure were: a) bad security, b) complex and repetitious organization, c) bad staffing and poor personnel, and d) corruption, financial and professional. The failure of the German secret service is no more the cause of the defeat of the German nation than is the success of the Allied services the prime reason for our victory. Without doubt the Allies could have won the war without any secret intelligence whatsoever, for such was the prowess of our field forces. It is possible, however, that the Allies might have lost the war had the Germans had an efficient and capable intelligence service.

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There are many outstanding failures to be observed of the German service, most notable of which was the complete surprise attending the Allied invasion of North Africa, a campaign representing the initial Allied attack upon the German forces. Other, and possibly more debatable points, are the German failure to appreciate the fullness of the British military set-back at the time of Dunkirk; faulty interpretation of the military and supply potential of the United States; failure to establish a workable stay-behind network of agents in Europe; apparent failure to establish a reservoir of personnel and funds in neutral countries to spur resistance groups within Germany itself.

The most important German failure was that of security - by definition one of the first considerations in secret intelligence work. The tremendous sum of knowledge amassed by the Allies on the organization of the German services and the personalities concerned therewith, was so great as to require no considerable revision either in view of the preliminary assessment of the tons of documents now available or study of preliminary interrogation reports coming from German intelligence chiefs.

This vast knowledge of the German Intelligence Service, its organization, personnel, and the diverse political movements existing within the service, was largely made available to us through the bad German security. A great lapse in the German security system occurred early in the war, in the German Intelligence signal section.

Other instances of bad German security occurred frequently in the training and handling of agents. These agents were often trained in groups of ten or more at the various FAT or FAK headquarters. Dur-

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ing the course of this training, sometimes prolonged for many weeks, it was natural that each agent should have much knowledge of the other members of his group. Capture and successful exploitation of one of these agents usually led to the arrest of the members of his group. Also these agents were often billeted near the FAT or FAK headquarters and in daily association with the members of the headquarters often picked up considerable information about the organization and the personalities connected with it. In some cases, German agents were actually aware of plans for future operations.

Because of the general weakness of German security it was often possible for the Allied Secret services to check their efficiency and the success of their operations in the field. The Pignatelli case in Italy is illustrative of this point. The Princess Pignatelli was recruited as an OSS agent in Italy. She expressed willingness to undertake a short mission to Rome, saying that she also wanted to ascertain the whereabouts of her children while there. The mission was arranged and the Princess went through the lines. Once in the German area she either reported to the G13 or was apprehended by them. She was interrogated and willingly gave information concerning Allied military operations in Italy. The Princess also agreed to accept a German mission into the Allied zone as a double agent. At the time she contacted the G13, either by misfortune or design, the entire project became known to I-8. As she re-entered Allied territory she was immediately arrested as a German agent. If it were not for bad German security this and similar German operations might have had much greater success.

Coupled in importance with the security shortcomings of the

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GIS was the faulty and parallel organization of the basic German intelligence system. Two agencies, the Abwehr and RSHA, were operating with the same purpose and almost identical missions until June 1944. The Abwehr was charged with running agents abroad, planning and executing sabotage and subversive missions and maintaining security in occupied Europe. The RSHA had the same responsibilities plus three almost extraneous responsibilities - crime prevention and detection, ideological research and suppression of any elements considered to be in opposition to the Nazi government. It was this parallelism that led to disastrous quarreling and bickering so common in the GIS. Though it might be considered that with two agencies doing the same work one such arm might discover something missed by the other, this was not the case. In practice any such benefits were far outweighed by the increase in numbers of highly trained specialists required and the needlessly increased danger to overall security.

The Abwehr, being the accredited secret intelligence office of the OKW, was loyal to that organization and to the Prussian military clique who ran it. In this way the Abwehr was frequently in opposition to the Nazi Party and to its intelligence service, the RSHA. The Glasius report on the July 20th attempt on Hitler gives evidence of this, stating that Admiral Canaris had been involved in several attempted Putschs against the Nazi Party since the outbreak of war. In the famous July 20th plot two senior Abwehr officials, Obertauchen and Froying von Loringhoven, were removed from office, and the Abwehr was dissolved. Canaris is now known to have been involved in the July 20th plot, though no longer head of the Abwehr at that time, and it is believed he was forced into hiding after the failure of the plot. The RSHA representing the Nazi Party in the intelligence

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field, had long been envious of the Abwehr and considered it most dangerous that this politically unreliable organization should be allowed to operate under little supervision in neutral countries. To this end the RSHA took every means at hand to make the faltering Abwehr appear inefficient and weak in the eyes of the Nazi Party and the GNR.

The friction between two organizations grew to such an extent that in some places work came to an almost complete halt while the local Abwehr and RSHA men battled it out. This internal friction was in part responsible for the Abwehr defections in Turkey in 1944, when three of the leading Abwehr officials there surrendered themselves to the Allies. Hans Weissenner, GIS head in Switzerland, at one time refused to accept orders in Switzerland when the SD took charge in May 1944. Weissenner was an Abwehr man and has openly expressed his hatred of the SD. In the Abwehr offices in Paris, Hitler is reported to have been referred to as "Unser Maxl," and Himmler as the "Reich Heime." Where the SD and the Abwehr were operating in the same zone the latter organization was found to have despatched improperly trained agents to the field in order to beat the SD to the punch. When, in the Spring of 1944, the Abwehr was officially swallowed into the RSHA, Abwehr men often considered themselves a much more select group than the RSHA "cut-throats" and avoided contact with their new colleagues. As the RSHA was comprised of SS men, or men with assimilated SS rank, when the Abwehr, composed of Wehrmacht personnel, was absorbed, its members were sometimes given a choice of assuming SS status or remaining as Wehrmacht - most stuck to their Wehrmacht uniforms.

The interrogation report of Joseph Ledebur, an Austrian Army officer attached to Abwehr Hq. gives further light to the conditions

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existing between the two organizations. He stated that it was no secret that Admiral Canaris and Himmler were "arch-enemies." In the spring of 1943 SD representatives began to take part in the daily discussion of cases by Abwehr III F (cyber-espionage section) and the Abwehr lost the right to come to a decision regarding any arrest or release. In Germany, after the Abwehr had been reformed as the Mil. Amt, Schellenberg Amt VI Leiter had been anxious to merge his Pol. Amt with the Mil. Amt (at that time under Oberst Hansen) for the Mil. Amt offices were much more comfortable. There was some discussion of this and Schellenberg, becoming annoyed, transferred the Mil. Amt to wooden barracks some miles away.

With such violent squabbles upsetting the personnel of these agencies, cooperation was at a low level. Information coming into SD or NSA hands was rarely made available to the appropriate sections of the Abwehr, and vice versa. An example of this friction may be seen in Lisbon where Schroeder, SD chief was in constant argument with Bendixen, former head of IM and von Scheven, head of IL, both Abwehr men. Schroeder seems to have made his point, as was usually the case in Abwehr - SD disputes, and Bendixen went back to Germany in June 1944. Schroeder was also given access to the records and files of Gramer, chief of Gruppe III in Lisbon. Previous to Schroeder's appearance on the scene no one outside of Gruppe III had been allowed to see these files.

Instances of squabbling within the German intelligence structure are to be found on every hand. Because of the apparently playful nature of this squabbling one should not discount this friction as negligible in its effect upon the general picture of German intelligence. Though the prominent examples of this bickering and feuding

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are few and familiar, it was from the hundreds of smaller quarrels often mentioned only in passing in interrogation reports, that the real harm came to the GIS. A full view of the GIS, which is not to be had at this time, will doubtless show this quarreling in its true light and will justify its consideration as one of the two greatest factors in the German failure, and possibly as the fundamental reason for the German intelligence defeat.

Further German shortcomings are noticeable in the recruiting policies of the Abwehr and RSHA. These policies left both organizations weak in efficient operating personnel and staffs. The Abwehr, taking its direction from Admiral Canaris, himself an old line intriguer, at first recruited by the score the Oppenheim-like professional secret intelligence personnel so common in Europe. The RSHA, bending backwards to accommodate the Nazi Party, often accepted and promoted personnel with little recommendation but a long record of service to the Nazi Party.

At the outbreak of the war the Abwehr was "issued quantities of over-age Wehrmacht reserve officers. These men usually had no qualifications at all for their job, but were glad to accept it and the relative life of ease that it offered. As the war continued and the full cost of the Russian campaign was felt in the Army, these officers looked upon their desks with even more affection and no effort would have blasted them from their desks. Another type of personnel found in the Abwehr were grubby Germany business men with records of residence and enterprise in foreign countries. Though much better qualified for intelligence work, by reason of their residence abroad and their knowledge of languages, than the over-age officers, these men introduced a new element to the Abwehr. Accustomed to sharp business practices these men were loathe to discontinue such habits merely

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because it involved loss to their country rather than to a competitor. It was through these men that a large part of the corruption in the Abwehr was first introduced.

On the positive side of the picture, the Abwehr was given a certain amount of personnel through the Army classification system. These men, glad too to have jobs of importance enough to keep them from the front and to allow them a life of relative ease, worked hard at their trade, and proved the most efficient Abwehr officers. The RSHA had the benefit of being 100% Nazi, with every member of it bound inextricably to the fate of National Socialism. As their personal fortunes depended entirely upon the success of the Nazi ideal, it is only to be expected that these men, no matter how inefficient would work hard at their tasks.

There were two kinds of corruption which plagued the German intelligence services during the war - financial corruption and the no less dangerous professional corruption. Both of these were common in the Abwehr and both existed, though to a lesser degree, in the RSHA. Financial corruption caused many of the Abwehr members to commit all manner of indiscretions, and misdeeds. Professional corruption kept both sides from admitting to mistakes and from free liaison and the resulting dissemination of information.

Introduced into the Abwehr by the earlier mentioned business men recruited in numbers early in the war, financial corruption soon grew to be a major concern of the Abwehr. In Paris an Abwehr official is known to have been working in closer cooperation with members of the black market than he was with members of the RSHA with whom he was supposed to be cooperating. There is also the classic story of the Abwehr business man representative in the Lowlands, who

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before his intelligence assignment, had been in the fishing business. His Abwehr mission was to organize a chain of maritime agents to spy on British and Allied shipping in the Channel. To this end, he bought a fleet of fishing ships with Abwehr funds and sent them to sea on fishing missions. As the fishing was carried on close to shore and the British shipping habitually stayed beyond hailing distance of German occupied Europe it was obvious to all that little information could have trickled back to the OKW through this ring. However, as this company had the only fishing licenses and petrol permits for miles around, there was a hefty profit available for the Abwehr man who organized the venture. Such stories are legion.

Professional corruption, along with clogging channels for the dissemination of information, kept personnel from admitting their mistakes. Every mistake meant a reprimand from a higher headquarters; the more reprimands the better the light in which the other service appeared. Late in the war, when German intelligence could have served its masters best, such mistakes became critical. With the RSEA breathing down its neck, the Abwehr, in the race for intelligence supremacy, could hardly afford to confess to any inefficiencies. The RSHA on the other hand spent much valuable time looking for gaffes on the part of Abwehr with which to impress their superiors - time which would have been turned to good stead fighting Allied intelligence.

Instances of this corruption are numerous. There is one case in Italy where the American service had successfully turned a would-be German agent. He had been operating successfully for some time against the German service, his reports well received in the German headquarters. As time went on another German agent was appre-

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handed and it was decided that he too should be turned. In an effort to impress the German control officers with the new agent's efficiency, the Americans decided to have the second agent report that the first agent was in American hands and was being played back as a double agent. This was done, the report sent by radio to the German headquarters. The Germans answered with a polite thank-you to the second agent, and continued to use both agents - refusing to admit that the first agent was a double agent, continuing to pass his reports to the German staff as bona-fide intelligence. This, rather than admit to a higher headquarters that they had been deceived by a double agent.

In the Iberian Peninsula, long the happy hunting ground for professional agents, the GIS had a long record of corruption. A German operating under commercial cover, maintained huge networks of agents in Spain and even stretching into England. For these nets the GIS paid appropriately high sums. Needless to say, nine-tenths of the network was notional, and its only value was in lining the pockets of its organizer. Had this ring actually been in existence the Germans might have not been so completely surprised by the Allied invasion of north Africa. Had the Germans not believed that this ring was in existence, they might have made stronger attempts to create a real chain of agents in these areas.

In some cases GIS officers were known to have recruited personnel for missions into neutral or enemy countries when they knew full well that the agent in question had nothing in mind but to escape from Nazi-occupied areas. These agents when reaching the safety of these countries would either defect to the Allies or sever all con-

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sections with the GIS. Whether these people were recruited through ignorance of the administrative officers, for financial considerations, or in order to pad reports to Berlin with a large number of operations staged, is not always known. It is well known, however, that many such operations took place.

An SD officer visiting an Abwehr headquarters in Italy made the following report which indicated some of the faults resulting from corruption, both financial and professional: 1) "All three arms (of the Abwehr) were running their own separate schemes of recruitment, training and planting of agents, which resulted in waste of money and opportunity." 2) "Recruiters were very often corrupt, maintaining non-existent agents on their payrolls." 3) "Discipline, security and training were slack, especially in the schools in Milan, where big city life distracted agents." 4) "Agents were trained far too rapidly, particularly in Major Berger's school at Rovereto (which the source referred to as a 'cannage factory') and consequently had insufficient background." 5) "W/T training was particularly sketchy and the control station was being unjustly blamed for not receiving signals which were badly sent."

Careful consideration of the four points contributing most heavily to the failure of the German intelligence effort indicates that corruption, along with bad personnel, and staffing, must take second place in importance to the German security weakness and the structure of the system as a whole and the friction and waste resulting from this faulty structure.

Though it is apparent that the Abwehr and KONA considered themselves as competitors in the field of intelligence, careful examination of evidence available here does not warrant unconditional sup-

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port of the premise that it was through this internecine bickering that the German Intelligence Service failed, causing the ultimate defeat of the German nation. It does appear true, however, that this faulty organization, and the inefficiency resulting from it, may have played an equal part with the bad German security measures in causing the final crack-up of the intelligence service. The total effect this failure had upon the outcome of the war is impossible to assess at this time.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

German 14, 11
Waffen-SS
SS-Verfügungsbereich

1 March 1944

TO: MR. DONOUGH
FROM: MR. DONOUGH, Major, U.S. Army
Acting Chief, A-2 Branch
SUBJECT: Report on German Intelligence Services

Forwarded to you for your information is a copy of a recent report on the German Intelligence Services received from our London Office.

When you have finished reading this report, will you please return it to us for our files.

J. E. Donough
J. E. Donough

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THE GERMAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES

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PART I

THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OF THE GERMAN HIGH COMMAND. (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht: Amt Auslandsnachrichten/Abwehr).

1. INTRODUCTION

The Intelligence Service of the German High Command, or as it will be called for the sake of brevity, the "Abwehr", is an inter-service department whose task is to supply the armed forces of the Reich with information from both inside and outside Germany which will contribute to the more efficient conduct of operations, and keep the General Staff fully informed about every aspect of enemy or potential enemy activity. Such information is obtained by secret means and concerns the armed forces only in so far as its ultimate aim is the preservation of Germany in the widest sense and with the widest aims. It is not concerned with keeping the Nazi party in power; this is the aim of the parallel intelligence service, the Sicherheitsdienst of the Reichsführer, which will be called the S.D. It follows also that the Abwehr is concerned with intelligence for the armed forces. The collection of political intelligence is, by an agreement reached in 1936, the task of the S.D.

The functions of the Abwehr are limited to obtaining information, not using it, except for sabotage purposes. This information is passed on to the services of Departments concerned, including - if it concerns enemy subversive activities, sabotage and espionage in Germany or occupied territories - the secret State Police (Gestapo). The only active part played by the Abwehr is in neutral and enemy territory, for the planning and execution of which there exists a special department.

To sum up, the functions of the Abwehr are briefly threefold:

- (1) To obtain information concerning the war machine of countries actually engaged or likely to become engaged in war with Germany.
- (2) To sabotage any part of the enemy war machine (in its widest sense) with explosives and subversive activity.
- (3) To discover and frustrate any attempt on the part of foreign powers to injure or spy upon the German (total) war machine.

The way this is done (or attempted) will be shown in the chapter dealing with the internal organisation.

2. THE POSITION OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE HIGH COMMAND

Hitler is the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (Oberster Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht) and immediately under him is the Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces (Chef des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht), who is in effect a Minister of Defence.

The High Command of the Armed Forces is a Defence Ministry to which the three Service Ministries are subordinate, subject only to the right of the respective Commanders-in-Chief to direct access to Hitler.

The functions of the High Command of the Armed Forces include:-

- (a) General conduct of the war, strategy and operational planning;

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- (b) A large part of intelligence and security;
- (c) Financial control of the three Service Ministries;
- (d) Supply (including priorities);
- (e) Economic warfare and home security;
- (f) Decisions upon inter-service disputes;
- (g) Administration of matters affecting more than one service.

The High Command of the Armed Forces consists of an operational Directorate under a Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces; three Directorates (Amter or Amtsgruppen), each including various departments; a number of Administrative Departments directly under the Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces.

The Directorates are as follows :-

OPERATIONAL DIRECTORATE (Führungsamt or Amtsgruppe Führung Stab)

This consists of :-

General Staff.

The General Staff of the Armed Forces is concerned with the general conduct of the war, and the main outlines of strategy, and is responsible for operational planning. The extent to which the General Staff of the Armed Forces carries operational planning is not exactly known. The procedure is, however, believed to be as follows. Once an operation has been decided upon, the General Staff of the Armed Forces prepares plans in a broad sense. It then selects a commander to carry out the plan. He is chosen with special regard to his experience and qualifications and may belong to any of the services. He is, except probably in the case of a large scale campaign, allowed to choose his own force and his own subordinate commanders. He defines his wishes to the General Staff of the Armed Forces, who pass on his requirements to the Service Ministries, leaving them to work out the detailed plans in conjunction with the commander and his staff.

Home Defence Department (Landesverteidigungsabteilung).

This Department is responsible for home defence against land and air attack. It takes over control of the occupied territory in the rear of the army up to the point where the zone of operations is considered to begin.

Department for Signals Communications of the Armed Forces. (Abteilung für Wehrmacht-Funklichtverbindungen - W.N.V.)

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY (Amt Auslands Nachrichten und Abwehr - A. Ausl./Abw.)

Abwehr 2 (Zentralstelle)

Foreign Countries Department (Amtsgruppe Ausland - A.G.Ausl.)
Reports of Embays, Attaches, etc.

Security Department (Abwehrabteilung - Abw.)

1. (Abw I) Operational and Economic Intelligence, organisation, administration.

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II. (Abw II) Sabotage and subversive activities.

III. (Abw III) Counter-espionage and security measures.

DIRECTORATE OF GENERAL MATTERS CONCERNING THE ARMED FORCES. (Amtsgruppe Allgemeine Wehrmachtsangelegenheiten - AWA)

General Department (Allgemeine Abteilung - W. Allg.)

Home Department (Inlandsabteilung - J)

Punishments, civilian claims, status of non-Aryans, etc.

Supply Department of Armed Forces (Wehrmachtsversorgungsabteilung - W. Vers) - Quarters, buildings, food, currency, allowances for civilians, etc.

Department for Prisoners of War -(Abteilung für Kriegsgefangene)

WAR ECONOMICS DIRECTORATE OF THE ARMED FORCES (Amtsgruppe Wehrwirtschaftsstab - WStB.)

This fulfils the function of a Ministry of Supply and a Ministry of Economic Warfare.

War Economics Department (Wehrwirtschaftliche Abteilung - W.Wi.)

Armaments Department (Rüstungswirtschaftliche Abteilung - W.Rü)

Raw Materials Department (Rohstoffabteilung - W.Ro.)

It is to this department that the Section HWK (Handels und Wirtschaftskrieg) probably belongs. This section has come to notice on account of its particularly close connection with the Abwehr. It deals, so far as it is possible to judge at the moment, with small scale purchases, smuggling, etc.

Instructional Staff for War Economics Department (Lehrstab für Wehrwirtschaftliche Abteilung - WLe)

3. HEADQUARTERS ORGANISATION OF THE ABWEHR.

In the first chapter, the threefold nature of the activities of the Abwehr was explained in outline and these three points were taken into consideration when the Abwehr was organised in its present form. The chief of the Abwehr (Amtschef) has under him several departments (Abteilungen or Gruppen). Each of these three has its own chief (Abteilungschef) and each is divided into smaller sub-sections. Thus the picture obtained is as follows:-

AMTSCHEF - Personal Staff (Chefgruppe)

Amtsgruppe Ausland	Zentralstelle	Abwehr I	Abwehr II	Abwehr III
(A.G. Ausland)	(Abw. 2)			

The functions of Amtsgruppe Ausland are not quite clear, though we know that information obtained from Attaches passes through it. Moreover the chief of this section is Canaris' personal deputy, no doubt on account of his high rank as a Rear-Admiral. In matters other than general

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policy, however, the Chief of Abwehr I represents Camarillo.

Abwehr Z controls the general planning of the Abwehr (Z.O.); the Abwehr adjutants (Z.A.); finances (Z.F.); card indices (Z.X.); legal matters (Z.R.).

Abwehr Departments I and III are sub-divided according to the particular branch of information in which they specialise. Such sections are described by a letter added to the Roman numeral I or III, the letter usually being the initial of the particular activity. (Example: 'Heer' is German for 'Army'; I-H consequently is the section obtaining secret information about foreign armies; while III-H is concerned with preventing enemy espionage against the German army.)

The more important sub-sections of I and III are as follows:-

I H (cor)	Espionage against foreign armies.
I M (marine)	" " " navies.
I Luft	" " " air forces.
I W	Economic espionage.
I T/LW	Espionage in air industry.
I G	Forged documents, secret communications.
I i	Wireless communications.
III - H	Protection of the (German) army.
III - M	" " " navy.
III - Luft	" " " air force.
III - W	" " " industry.
III - C	Discovery of espionage by civilians and liaison with other security services.
III - F	Discovery of espionage by foreigners and double agents.
III - O	Organisation of counter-espionage work.
III - S	Counter-sabotage.
III - D	Misleading information for double agents.
III - S.V.	Archives
III - E.G.F.	Prevention of espionage in prisoners of war camps.

Most of these sections are again sub-divided on a different system, the majority of the I sub-sections being numbered according to the areas in which they are working, e.g. Sections I-H (West) and I-H (East).

Section II on the other hand is only sub-divided into two large sub-sections: II-East and II-West, which again are sub-divided into two sub-sections each as follows:-

II

II-East		II-West	
II O/N	II O/S	II W/N	II W/S
(II East-North)	(II East-South)	(II West-North)	(II West-South)

4. WORK IN THE FIELD

To obtain the information the German Intelligence Service has established a network of stations (Abwehrstationen) in Germany, occupied and neutral European countries, and many of these stations control one or more sub-stations of varying size and importance. Sub-stations arranged according to their importance are:-

- 5 -

Abwehrleitstelle = ALST
 Abwehrstelle = AST
 Nebenstelle = NEST or ANST
 Aussenstelle = AUST
 Maldekopf

However large or small these stations are, their organisation is an exact replica of that of the Headquarters in Berlin, though they may be so small that a single officer combines in his person the separate functions of several or even all the Departments.

5. PERSONNEL

All the senior officers of the Abwehr (Abwehroffiziere) are drawn from the armed forces or the various reserve organisations, and there are grounds for believing that the Services seldom give of their best. It is not known whether any (and if so what) qualifications there are for transfer to this branch of the service, but the standard does not appear to be very high and a number of disabled officers are known to be so employed. (In order to make it possible for specially suitable civilians to work in the Army, the rank of Sonderführer has been introduced in three different grades. The lowest grade, Sonderführer Z, ranking with, but after, a sergeant, Sonderführer G, ranking with, but after a lieutenant, and Sonderführer K, ranking with, but after an army captain. It is doubtful, however, whether the higher posts in the Service are open to these civilian-soldiers. This type of temporary officer is also to be found in the Abwehr.

6. RELATIONS WITH OTHER DEPARTMENTS

Gestapo

By an agreement made in December 1936 which closely defined its sphere of responsibility, the Gestapo was made to all intents and purposes subordinate to the Abwehr, which, as a secret organisation, has no executive powers. Consequently, whenever it is necessary to carry out an arrest for sabotage or espionage, the case must be handed over to the Gestapo for such action as it sees fit to take, and vice versa whenever the Gestapo, in the normal course of its duties, comes across a case of suspected espionage or sabotage, it must turn it over to the Abwehr for investigation. It is known that the Gestapo finds this kind of subordination to an organisation of the armed forces a little irksome, and cases have repeatedly been reported of the Gestapo having spoiled a case by the premature arrest of suspects without the authority of the Abwehr. Similarly the Gestapo has on more than one occasion tried to gain mileage by continuing an investigation behind the Abwehr's back.

Lehrregiment Brandenburg

The Lehrregiment Brandenburg is not part of the Abwehr, but as a collecting centre for all kinds of people with special qualifications, it is of course an invaluable recruiting media for espionage purposes. Several cases are known of individuals who were originally members of the Regiment having been drafted into the Abwehr organization for a particular purpose for which their special qualifications fitted them, and it is known, too, that whenever the Abwehr need an agent or saboteur (usually the latter) they can call upon the Lehrregiment to supply a suitable man. (See Appendix A).

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The Abwehr's dealings with the S.D. are described in Part II.

7. CO-OPERATION WITH THE ARMY IN THE FIELD

Arrangements for liaison between the German Intelligence Service of the High Command and the Forces in the field are worked out on a twofold basis: permanent and temporary.

(a) Permanent: Every unit of the German Army, from the company upward has among its ranks someone responsible for Abwehr matters in his unit. He is responsible for contre-espionage in his unit in co-operation with the Field Security Police (Geheime Feldpolizei or GFP), and also acts as liaison with the mobile intelligence units which may be co-operating with his unit (see 7(b)). The distribution of these duties in the various units is as follows :-

In a company the task of looking after the Abwehr interests is usually allotted to an N.C.O.; in a battalion or regiment, as a rule, the adjutant, who has the title: Offizier für Abwehrrangelegenheiten; in the Division the I.O. (divisional intelligence officer); and in the Generalkommando the "Oberquartiermeister 4" (O.4.).

Full time Abwehr officers, drawn from the staff of the Abwehr organisation, are allotted to Army High Commands and Army group commands.

(b) Temporary: In the case of an operation on the part of the German Army, such as an invasion, mobile intelligence units are attached to the various army commands in addition to the permanent staff mentioned under 7 (a). These units are responsible to the army command only as far as matters of discipline and immediate operational instructions are concerned. With regard to their intelligence work they are responsible only to their superiors in the Abwehr organisation. The units are organized as follows :-

The lowest unit of the organisation is the Abwehrtrupp. An Abwehrtrupp is commanded by one with the rank of Captain or Lieutenant and usually consists of one interpreter and the necessary W/T operators and drivers. It is equipped with motor cars and motor cycles.

The Abwehrtruppe operate with the front line troops and are among the first to enter captured towns and villages, where they immediately begin to search for material of operational and C.E. interest, and to carry out arrests of suspects. Officers in charge of an Abwehrtrupp have the disciplinary powers of a company commander.

Three or more Abwehrtruppe form an Abwehrkommando or Einsatzkommando, which is usually commanded by a Major or Captain. The Headquarters of the Abwehrkommando are situated somewhat to the rear of the scene of fighting and serve as a co-ordinating station for the activities of the Abwehrtruppe and as a collecting post for any material captured. Officers in charge of an Abwehrkommando have the disciplinary powers of a commander of a non-independent battalion.

Information obtained by these mobile units is either passed on to the Army commanders on the spot or, if it is of long range, sent back to the Intelligence Stations directing their operations whence it finds its way back to the High Command.

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APPENDIX A

THE LEHRREGIMENT BRANDENBURG

z.b.V. 800

1. THE REGIMENT(a) Origins

The enquiries made regarding the origins of the Lehrregiment Brandenburg z.b.V. 800 have led back to a 'Baulehrkompanie'. Two such units are known to have existed - one the Third and the other commanded by Hauptmann Hüttler but it has not been possible to identify either of them with the "Baulehrkompanie z.b.V. 800 Brandenburg", which is said to have been the foundation stone of the whole Regiment.

The formation of this Baulehrkompanie was one of the measures applied to cope with the influx of Germans who returned to Germany at and after the outbreak of war and who turned, in particular, to the Office of Overseas Germans in Stuttgart for help.

Some hesitation was felt, so it would seem, about admitting some of these Overseas Germans to a full share in the life of the community, since they might not be well schooled in Nazi ideas, and might, moreover, include some foreign agents. Accordingly, whilst many were found employment, some were earmarked to be brought under military control, and it was desirable that these latter should serve a probationary period in some such unit as z.b.V. 800 where their activities, sympathies and mental attitude could be subjected to careful scrutiny. It may be noted in this connection that the group included some older men as well as those of military age.

The need, therefore, was for a special unit, which was subsequently formed under Hauptmann von HIPPEL, a former African colonial and an Abwehr officer. He had plans to train overseas Germans for warfare in Africa and many of those returning from that continent turned to him for a lead. Their numbers may have been swelled by some of the sons of German settlers, still in Africa, who had come to Germany to study. Another definite group appears to have been constituted by returned German settlers from Palestine ('P' Group) and the transfer of population from the Baltic States created a parallel problem and yielded another group.

The Kompanie thus grew to a battalion which had its headquarters at Brandenburg with von HIPPEL still in command. By the end of May 1940 - by which time a second battalion was certainly in existence at Baden-Baden - the establishment had been given regimental status. At this point, with von HIPPEL's failure to secure the command of the Regiment, which was given to Major KAEWISCH, there ended an initial period of easy-going paternalism. There was apparently some friction. After a short time, von HIPPEL was compelled to relinquish command of the 1st Battalion, a fact which caused considerable resentment among his fellow South Africans. His post was not filled until after August 1940, at which time KAEWISCH himself was replaced as Commanding Officer by Major HEINZE who, in turn, was replaced and finally took over the command of the 1st Battalion. HEINZE was succeeded by Colonel

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ERSTLING VON LANZETTAUER who was still in command of the Regiment in November 1941. A third battalion was added, probably in October 1940. Now the regiment has been expanded into the Division Brandenburg.

(b) Organisation and Equipment

The Regiment appears to be administratively self-contained. It has no depot or feeder battalion. Its men are now recruited from other units - largely, but not exclusively, pioneers by means of calls for volunteers or by individual selection.

The Regiment has no insignia of its own. Its men continue to wear those of their original units. It has not been found ever to have belonged to any division or corps. The position is well illustrated by the method of obtaining replacement clothing. This was simply to procure it from the nearest depot, of no matter what branch. In this way some of the 2nd Battalion found themselves with pink Armoured Corps patches.

Regimental H.Q. and Troops

The regimental staff is divided into :-

- I (a) Tactical
(b) Intelligence
- II (a) Personal questions (officers)
(b) " " (O.R.'s)
- III Medical
Paymaster
Transport

The regimental H.Q. establishment also appears to include the Signal or Wireless Company, some 200 strong. Originally, besides a regimental W/T Section, there were battalion W/T Sections. These have now, however, all been combined into the regimental company, which keeps one Unter-officer and four or five men in each battalion to maintain communications.

There is not, so far as is known, any regimental Infantry, Gun or Anti-Tank Company.

1st Battalion

The Headquarters of this battalion is stated to keep a card index of all men with special linguistic qualifications.

One of the unusual features of this battalion was the so-called 'Stabskompanie'. This was from 170 to 180 strong in May 1940. It is described as a company to which men were assigned pending re-posting. It appears at one time to have comprised members of both the 'P' Group and the Baltic Germans who later passed into one of the battalion companies. It also contained a number of older men with special linguistic qualifications, whose duties were limited to parading in the morning and giving linguistic training to the men as required. The languages mentioned in this connection are French, Spanish, Russian, Persian and Arabic.

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These men, too, were in the end transferred or found special employment, and the *Stabskompanie* was abolished in May 1941. In its place there came the 1st Company which, with the 2nd, 3rd and 4th, makes up the main structure of this battalion. Of these, the 3rd Company has been referred to as comprising parachutists. These men consisted of volunteers taken from the whole battalion.

Apart from this, there has been a reference to a Pioneer unit, but it has been suggested that this is in effect a regimental and not a battalion unit. Apparently its equipment is limited to a few ordinary digging implements, wire-cutters and five or six assault boats. This battalion is stationed at Brandenburg.

2nd Battalion

This consists of the 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th Companies. An 'R' (or Roumanian) Company referred to as comprising Germans from Transylvania and the Banat, is stated to be identical with the 6th. It is stationed at Baden near Vienna.

3rd Battalion

This Battalion, which is believed to consist of the 10th, 11th, 12th and 15th Companies, is not known to present any special organisational features. It is stationed at Duron in the Rhineland.

2. LIAISON WITH THE ABWEHR

Though the *Lehrregiment Brandenburg* is not a part of the Intelligence Service of the German High Command, the latter organisation nevertheless draws upon the Regiment in cases where intended operations, especially sabotage operations, require the use of officers and/or men with special qualifications. There have been several instances in which the *Abwehr* organisation has been supplied by the Regiment with men from its ranks with a good knowledge of English when sabotage or espionage in the United Kingdom or territories of the British Empire or the U.S.A. were contemplated.

1. TRAINING

The general scope of military training, i.e. the use of fire-arms, flame-throwers, explosives and assault boats, as well as demolition, diving and mine-removal, wireless transmission and vehicle driving, accords well with the impression that the *Lehrregiment Brandenburg* in its military capacity is trained as a Pioneer assault unit.

The general purpose of the training is not to enable the battalion to fight as a unit. This is why no battalion troops such as an Infantry Gun Company or an Anti-tank Company are provided. Nor is the purpose to gain and occupy ground by storming trench lines and digging in, or by street fighting.

The men are trained to work in advance of the Infantry in small parties and to capture special objectives such as bridges, waterworks, factories, etc. One way is to drive boldly forward in lorries so as to take the enemy by surprise. The aim, moreover, is not indiscriminate destruction, but is on the contrary the preservation of structures in appropriate cases by the removal of bombs or mines. The preservation of bridges was, in 1940, one of the duties of the 8th Company in the Belgian and French campaigns.

Our latest information points to the fact that Division Brandenburg is now an ordinary Infantry division only, but that a special battalion called the 'R' Battalion is at the disposal of the *Abwehr*.

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PART II

THE SECURITY SERVICE OF THE NATIONAL SOCIALIST PARTY
(Sicherheitsdienst des Reichsführers SS)1. INTRODUCTION

The Abwehr organisation of the German High Command is commonly regarded as being the German Intelligence Service, but in actual fact there is one important field of espionage with which it is not concerned: political information. This important function is allotted to the Security Service of the Nazi Party (Sicherheitsdienst des Reichsführers SS - usually 'S.D.').

Unlike the secret service proper, the S.D. is, on the one hand, not a part of the armed forces, nor, on the other hand, is it a part of the police, like the Gestapo, but no account of it would be complete without a brief examination of both the German Police System, with which it co-operates closely under a common chief and of the S.S. (Schutzstaffel) from which, in common with the Gestapo, its personnel is recruited.

2. THE GERMAN POLICE SYSTEM

In 1936 Heinrich HIMMLER was appointed Chief of the German Police. (Goring had, up to that date, been the Chief of the Gestapo, though Himmler was Chief of the SS from 1929 onwards.) From that date the general organisation of the German police has not changed. Heinrich Himmler himself is now Minister for the Interior.

Directly under Himmler the Police Force is divided into two major parts each under a Police General: the Ordinary Police (Ordnungspolizei, Schutzpolizei or Schupo,) under Kurt Daluege, and the Security Police (Sicherheitspolizei or Sipo) till recently under Reinhard HEYDRICH, now KALTBRENNER, who combines this function with that of chief of the S.D.

(a) Ordinary Police (Ordnungspolizei - Orpo)

This is the force which controls road traffic, issues various licenses, inspects and reports on the conditions of roads etc. They constitute that body of men, mostly from pre-Nazi days, who wear the familiar pale green uniforms with the queer double-peaked caps, well known to everyone who has visited Germany. They have no intelligence functions.

(b) Security Police (Sicherheitspolizei - Sipo)

Sipo is under one man, but it is not a single body. Of its two great sub-departments one (KRIPD) deals with criminal, the other (GESTAPO) with political offences. Other departments deal with the issuing of passports, frontier control, supervision of aliens, and various administrative matters, but the only unit whose functions find a place in a note on the German Intelligence Service is the GESTAPO.

According to the 'law' passed on February 10th 1936 defining the activities of the Gestapo, it is their mission "to search out and combat all activity dangerous to the nation, to gather and evaluate evidence of rebellion, to advise the Government, and to keep other officials informed on important situations and to be prepared to meet instances of unrest.

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The Chief of the Gestapo in agreement with the Ministry of the Interior decides which matters will be handled by the Secret State Police."

This law then goes on to say: "The methods employed by the Gestapo are not subject to later examination by the Administrative Courts", a phrase which demonstrates how the Gestapo not only have powers of life and death in respect of every one living under Nazi domination, but also is answerable to no one but the political Minister of the Interior.

3. THE SCHUTZSTAFFEL (S.S.): Its relation with the Gestapo and the S.D.

The S.S. was formed in 1925 as a small, more or less disciplined bodyguard ideologically suited for and physically capable of protecting the leaders of the N.S.D.A.P. and of ejecting from their public meetings anyone voicing objections to their doctrines and perhaps wishing to lend force to his arguments by an exhibition of physical strength. It is from this irregular body that the present huge force has developed, especially since 1929 when Heinrich Himmler gained control of it.

The S.S. is the pick of Nazi manhood. Unlike the brownshirts or "Stormtroopers" of the (Sturmabteilung) S.A., which include in their ranks almost anyone wishing to join, the S.S. has for years enrolled only men whose political views were in no doubt. They have to be of "nordic" race; their "Aryan" ancestry as far back as 1800, and in the case of future leaders as far back as 1750 must be proven and, in most cases at least, the officers have higher education.

It was quite obvious that such an important public organisation as the police would have to be penetrated by the Nazi party, and the people to do it were those most to be relied upon, the S.S. Consequently it is now laid down that all new members of the police force are recruited from the S.S. and all new police officers must have completed their military service in the military S.S. (Wehrmacht S.S.) (There are several ways of serving in the S.S.; some part-time, some whole-time, or in the Wehrmacht S.S., but no account of the organisation need be given here.) Consequently all members of the Gestapo are S.S. (when in uniform they wear the S.S. uniform) and so are an increasing number of the Schutzpolizei, though the latter wear ordinary police uniform with the double S.S. sign on the left breast of their tunics.

The same rules as regards recruiting apply equally, however, to the S.D., thus not only have the Sipo and the S.D. one chief, but their staffs are also recruited entirely from a body of trusted party members.

4. THE S.D.

(a) General Functions of the S.D.

"As official Information Bureau of the N.S.D.A.P. and the State, the S.D. has important missions to fulfil, especially in supporting the Security Police. The S.D. is active in the national service and this requires close and understanding collaboration between the S.D. and the general and inner administration." (Proclamation of 1936).

In other words, the S.D. is primarily a research department in the political sphere, in the same way that the Abwehr works for the armed forces. But just as the officers in the Abwehr, being drawn from the armed forces, also take executive action in the battlefield (e.g. the

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capture of documents and special prisoners) when required, so the S.D. in the field is known to examine the political reliability of the people in occupied countries immediately behind the German lines. (It is known, for example, that the S.D. carried out the interrogation of Russians in the occupied Ukraine suspected of being partisans.)

Ordinarily the S.D. wear regulation S.S. uniform, when they wear a uniform at all. In the field they wear a uniform similar to that of the army, but with the tunic and trousers of the same shade of grey, not of different shades as with the ordinary soldiers. Another difference is that they wear the collar of their tunic open, not closed like the ordinary soldier, and showing a brown shirt and a black tie. The German eagle is worn on the upper part of the left sleeve, not on the right breast. They have a skull on their cap and a brassard of white material and from 4 to 5 cm. wide on their left sleeve. Also on their sleeve in white embroidery are the letters S.D.

(b) Organization

i) Headquarters: The joint Sipo and S.D. Headquarters over which HEYDRICH formerly presided is divided into six departments each of which controls the exercise of certain of the functions of the two organizations.

1. Bureau of Administration and Law.
(Verwaltungs und Rechtsamt)
2. Bureau for the discovery of opposition.
(Gegwererforschungsamt)
3. German sphere of life bureau.
(Deutsches Lebensgebietamt)
4. Bureau for combatting enemy forces.
(Gegnerbekampfungsamt)
5. Bureau for combatting criminal forces.
(Verbrechensbekampfungsamt)
6. Bureau for foreign countries.
(Auslandsamt)

ii) Substations: In each Army area there is a "higher S.S. and police leader", who is also responsible for S.D. operations in his area. He takes command of all police and S.D. forces whenever pooling is desirable for specific missions. Under the higher S.S. and police leader, but equally responsible to the Chief of Police, is a single inspector of the Sipo and S.D., whose task is to co-ordinate the work of these two services, inspect the personnel, etc.

Units of the S.D. are stationed in the following major districts:

(Leitabschnitte)

Berlin	Karlsruhe	Prague
Breslau	Koenigsberg	Reichenberg
Darmstadt	Munich	Stettin
Dresden	Muenster	Stuttgart
Hamburg	Posen	Vienna

Under the control of these higher units there are lesser S.D. establishments with smaller areas (Abschnitte) of responsibility as follows:

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Jachen	Graz	Litzmannstadt
Allenstein	Halle a.d.S.	Lueneburg
Augsburg	Hohensalza	Neustadt a.d.W.
Beyreuth	Innsbruck	Neustottin
Bielefeld	Karlsbad	Nuremburg
Brunswick	Kassel	Oppel.
Bremen	Kattowitz	Potsdam
Chemnitz	Kiel	Salzburg
Darmstadt	Klagenfurt	Schwerin
Dessau	Koblenz	Tilsit
Dortmund	Cologne	Thorun
Dusseldorf	Leipzig	Troppau
Frankfort-am-Main	Liognitz	Weimar
Frankfort a.d.O.	Linz	Wurzburg

(c) Relations between S.D. and Gestapo

In view of the origin of their members and the unified command, co-operation between these two services is naturally very close. Generally speaking, the S.D. is an advisory body without executive powers, similar to the Abwehr. Though the S.D. permeates industry and political life in Germany, any information received which calls for action is referred to the Gestapo. Special note must, however, be made of the functions of the S.D. in occupied territory and behind the German lines, where the uniformed members of the S.D. are in fact given executive powers to examine the papers of political suspects and generally to act as a political police force with executive powers. Apart from this the Gestapo's relationship to the S.D. appears to be similar to that of the Gestapo to the Abwehr. Any political activities contrary to the interests of the Nazi party are referred to the S.D. for investigation, in the same way that activities against the German war machine are referred to the Abwehr.

(d) Relations with the Abwehr.

It is known that as far back as 1937 Heydrich and Canaris had come to an agreement defining their respective spheres of activity wherever they were likely to come into conflict. It was agreed that the Abwehr organisation should be responsible for espionage, sabotage and counter-espionage on behalf of the armed forces of the Reich, for crippling the war machine of potential enemies and for combatting activities likely to impede the German war effort. It was not to meddle in politics of an internal nature and in external politics only in so far as they might interest the High Command.

The S.D., on the other hand, was to steer clear of military espionage both at home and abroad and to concentrate solely on political activities (in the widest sense) that were likely to endanger the supremacy of the Nazi Party and Nazi industry.

(e) The S.D. Abroad

The chief agents of the S.D. abroad are usually stationed in places where they are able to gather political information, i.e. in German diplomatic and consular missions. In those places they are able to collect information which is not always available to their superiors on the spot, because their inferior position enables them to make

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contacts either in circles which are closed to a man of superior official standing, or because they enjoy less limelight.

Such information is then passed on to KALTENERBRUNNER's office (Reichssicherheitshauptamt), not to Von RIBBENTROP, who is only vouchsafed so much of it as Hitler thinks good for him.

The S.D. also supervises the political activities of members of the German colony in a foreign country. It is in this sphere of activity that they are so often confused with the Gestapo, especially in the press - a mistake which is easily explained by the close co-operation of the two departments. In actual fact, the S.D. usually leaves to the Gestapo all action which its "supervision" may render necessary.

In some countries, however, such as Norway and the occupied territories of Russia (i.e. in places where German rule is insecure), the S.D. has assumed certain police functions, taking on a very large part of the work which, elsewhere, is performed by the Gestapo, such as the arrest of agents, saboteurs, etc. at the recommendation of the Abwehr.

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German 75758
SECRET
*Regulation
Questions
Discussion*

9 March 1944

Lt. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney
Deputy Chief of Staff
Room 3E944 Pentagon Building
Washington, D.C.

My dear General McNarney:

Here is a copy of the cable received from the Russians relative to the questioning of the German agents now held by us in Cairo. It gives us a pretty good line on the way the Russians think about these operations and the danger they are guarding against.

It was very good of you to come yesterday and all of us appreciate it.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

Attachment No. 1-11
Expenditure 11-25-65

SECRET

Form 64 (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE March 4, 1944

FROM

MOSCOW, DEANE

TO

AG. R. OSS ATTENTION GEN. DONIVAN
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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FOR ACTION

(FOR INFORMATION)

DIRECTOR

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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-57863-1

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER**SECRET**

#272. REFUR 314 dated Feb. 23.

I have received a letter from Ossipov, which thanked you for your courtesies and requested that the German Abwehr who have been taken to Cairo be asked the following questions:

1. The personal characteristics of the cadre staff operators of the below listed intelligence organizations in Turkey, to include duties, identification data, nicknames, and character on work: Naval Intelligence; Military Intelligence, including 1st, 2nd, and 3rd dept. of Abwehr; The Gestapo; SD (Security Service); Diplomatic Intelligence; Economic Intelligence. What is interrelationship and structure of above listed organizations.
2. In working from Turkey against USSR a description of the actual tasks and scope of work of German espionage and counter espionage. Results of German espionage work in USSR, including methods of communications and methods.
3. Detailed characteristics of agents of German Intelligence in Turkey, also those working for Germany who are of other nationalities.
4. The operating points location in Turkey of German Intelligence who try to smuggle agents into USSR.
5. For operations against Russia to what extent does German Intelligence try to use Ukrainians, Russians, Azerbaijan, and other nationalities who have immigrated to Turkey.
6. As a screen what German firms in Turkey or other countries do German intelligence or espionage agents use.

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SECRET

STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

PAGE 2

FROM

MOSCOW, RUSSIA

TO DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

REF. NO.

RECEIVED**SECRET**

7. What contacts do the German espionage Intelligence have with the leadership of the Turkish Intelligence and espionage activities. Who of the Turkish group are connected with the Germans personally. How do they work together.

8. To Iran from Turkey what is the extent of German espionage, including its director, methods of communication to German Intelligence Hqs in Turkey from Iran, composition and location of operational points, name of agency, and assignments given to such agencies in Iran.

9. Request any information regarding German propaganda in Turkey, including agencies, its leaders, connections with the Turkish press, and methods.

10. Hitlerite party activity and organization as well as other German organizations in Turkey.

11. Any information regarding the activities in Istanbul of the German Teutonia Club.

12. Information regarding the personal and structure of the central organ of the Abwehr.

13. Information regarding any differences there might be between representatives of the Nazi party in Turkey and Von Papen.

14. Information regarding German espionage schools out as well as in Germany, including methods of planting spies in foreign countries, numbers trained, and methods of training.

Note: 314 is CW-OUT-9861, Feb. 23 (G-2 OSS)

Actions: G-2 (OSS)

Information: OPD, JCS Capt. Royal, USN

CW-IN-3245, March 5

War Department Paraphrase

TOP: 3/6/44 2:36 pm

SECRET

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German 13728
agents
x 11/11/44
(25)

8 March 1944

SECRET

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

Would you be good enough to hand
this to the President for me? Thank you.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

SECRET

SECRET

9 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached is a list of questions from the Russians to be asked of the former Gestapo agents now held by us in Cairo.

These questions give us an index of the things the Russians look for and also of the way they work.

William J. Donovan
Director

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C. (25)

SECRET

8 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

As an evidence of the kind of thing we might do with the Russians, I give you the attached list of questions which they have asked me to have answered by the German agents of the Abwehr who were established with the German Embassy in Turkey, and who came over to us.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

*The attached is a list
of questions from the Russians
to be asked of the former
Sutopo agents now held by us
in Cairo.*

*These questions are the
only index of the things
the Russians know for which
this is the way this would*

SECRET

SECRET**LIST OF QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY THE RUSSIANS:**

1. The personal characteristics of the cadre staff operators of the below listed intelligence organizations in Turkey, to include duties, identification data, nicknames, and character on work: Naval Intelligence; Military Intelligence, including 1st, 2nd, and 3rd dept. of Abwehr; The Gestapo; SD (Security Service); Diplomatic Intelligence; Economic Intelligence. What is interrelationship and structure of above listed organizations?
2. In working from Turkey against USSR a description of the actual tasks and scope of work of German espionage and counter espionage. Results of German espionage work in USSR, including methods of communications and methods.
3. Detailed characteristics of agents of German Intelligence in Turkey, also those working for Germany who are of other nationalities.
4. The operating points location in Turkey of German Intelligence who try to smuggle agents into USSR.
5. For operations against Russia to what extent does German Intelligence try to use Ukrainians, Russians, Azerbiadzhans, and other nationalities who have immigrated to Turkey?
6. As a screen what German firms in Turkey or other countries do German Intelligence or espionage agents use?
7. What contacts do the German espionage Intelligence have with the leadership of the Turkish Intelligence and espionage activities? Who of the Turkish group are connected with the Germans personally? How do they work together?
8. To Iran from Turkey what is the extent of German espionage, including its director, methods of communication to German Intelligence Hqs in Turkey from Iran, composition and location of operational points, name of agency, and assignments given to such agencies in Iran.

SECRET

- 2 -

SECRET

9. Request any information regarding German propaganda in Turkey, including agencies, its leaders, connections with the Turkish press, and methods.
10. Hitlerite party activity and organization as well as other German organizations in Turkey.
11. Any information regarding the activities in Istanbul of the German Teutonia Club.
12. Information regarding the personnel and structure of the central organ of the Abwehr.
13. Information regarding any differences there might be between representatives of the Nazi Party in Turkey and Von Papen.
14. Information regarding German espionage schools out as well as in Germany, including methods of planting spies in foreign countries, numbers trained, and methods of training.

SECRET

WASHINGTON, D. C.

23 February 1944

*from release came. Lovell
 + I was afraid of this interpretation.
 We assume the President was talking
 about American occupation money which Germans + Japs both put
 OKed -*

TO: Colonel G. Edward Burton
 FROM: Stanley P. Lovell
 SUBJECT: German Radio Comment on FDR Press Conference

ROOSEVELT CALLED FORGER BY GERMANS

Berlin, in its domestic press service, reports: "REUTERS reports that on Tuesday Roosevelt declared at his press conference that he would not be at all surprised if the U.S. were already printing German banknotes for use on the European Continent. It goes without saying that the German people are little surprised if Roosevelt is now shown up as forger of banknotes, since he has for quite a time publicly preached the murder of women and children and the destruction of irreplaceable European cultural values.

Death Penalty--"Nobody ought, therefore, to be surprised if one day U.S. pilots are captured with German banknotes in their possession and are sent to the gallows for that reason. This would be all the more natural since the forgery of banknotes is punished in Germany with the death penalty." (Berlin, in German to Germany, Feb. 17, 1:20 p.m. EDT)

Stanley P. Lovell
 Stanley P. Lovell, Director
 Research and Development

SECRET

11 March 1944

Mr. Lauchlin Currie
Foreign Economic Administration
Washington, D. C.

Dear Lauchlin:

I am returning the memorandum which you forwarded to us concerning the views of Treviranus, former German Cabinet Minister, on present conditions in Germany.

You may be interested in knowing that, about ten months ago, this organization terminated such relationship as it had previously had with Treviranus. Our present plans do not seem to provide any place for the proposals made in this interesting memorandum.

I should like to add that notwithstanding Treviranus' claims to intimate and clandestine connections inside Germany, I am inclined to doubt whether he is in any position to speak the mind of the German people, Nazi or non-Nazi, after his long residence outside Germany since 1933.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan
Director

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: General Donovan

FROM: Whitney H. Shepardson

DATE: 4 March 1944

SUBJECT: Attached paper which contains Treviranus' ideas.

*Seuchlin Currie
Def 4 of State**ref. letter to Currie
along timeline*

About ten months ago such relationship as we had had with "T" was closed out, and the account was liquidated. At that time we notified Department of Justice that we had no more interest. "T" returned to Canada. We stated to Justice that though we had no interest in him, we would only insure his ~~agreement~~ to go to Canada (not his going there) and that we had no interest in seeing him again (but would assume no obligation to keep him out of the country.)

I think that the advantage of seeing again or pursuing his ideas further is highly problematical: the disadvantages of any association with him are as clear now as before. Furthermore, I doubt very much, in spite of his claims to intimate and clandestine connections inside Germany, that he is in any position to speak the mind of the German people, Nazi or non-Nazi, after being out of the country during the whole war and longer.

WHS

ENCLOSURE 2

SECRET*WHS*

Mr. Shepardson

Pennington 3796
X 5 8/14
A Treveranus

The attached was handed to me
by Launchin Currie. Could you look
into the situation and see if it
would be worthwhile to discuss the
matter with Treveranus again.

I thought that we came to the
conclusion that it was useless to do
so. It might be wise to take another
look

SECRET

Equally

who carry on the struggle. Finally, no alternative to unconditional surrender was publicly defined by Allied leaders, propaganda free rein in emphasizing the of military submission. It is a long way from the present state of morale in Germany, to the strength of German military resistance to the prospect of unconditional surrender.

II EFFECT OF LOWERED CIVILIAN MORALE ON RESISTANCE

1. Reduction of production. Some reduction in output through absenteeism, inefficiency, and the will to produce. Up to now there has been evidence of sabotage in German industry and of a serious breakdown in police control. This has immediate prospect of sabotage to an extent which seriously affect German production.

2. Effect of Civilian Morale on the Home Front. There is no substantial evidence so far that the home front has affected the German war effort except for submarine crews whose morale is isolated, morale is still high. This is due to military disasters or by lack of supplies.

3. Popular Revolt or Coup d'Etat. This is highly improbable. The state of mind of the German people is one merely of exhaustion. There is no revolutionary organization or program for a substitute regime or lenient peace. Little evidence of a police organization, and it could be organized only by powerful armed force; communist and Socialist underground movement likely only if a large portion of the

Outside Ed,
card indicating
the camera

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(From "SURVEY OF INFORMATION COMPILED ON GERMAN CIVILIAN MORALE")
Strategic Intelligence Branch, G-2, ETC.

Germany 13,782

I. PRESENT STATE OF GERMAN MORALE

German civilian morale is very low. War weariness and desire for peace are almost universal. Few German believe that an ultimate victory is possible, and there is general apathy amidst conditions of increased suffering and hardship. Other factors are air raids, military reverses, defection of German allies, apparent solidarity of the United Nations, decreasing confidence in Hitler's leadership. But contrary to adequate food supply, clothing and fuel; fronts in Italy and Russia are still a long way from the Reich, hope of stemming the tide of retreat and of stopping an invasion from the West, of averting defeat through the use of a secret weapon. Fear of what the regime will do to those who defy it is probably the principal source of strength to carry on the struggle, also the deep fear of Russia. Finally, no alternative to unconditional surrender has been publicly defined by Allied leaders, and this allows Nazi propaganda free rein in emphasizing the fearful results of military submission. It is a long step from the present state of morale in Germany, to action which will impair the strength of German military resistance, or force acceptance of unconditional surrender.

II EFFECT OF LOWERED CIVILIAN MORALE ON GERMAN MILITARY RESISTANCE

1. Reduction of production. Some reduction of industrial output through absenteeism, inefficiency and loss of the will to produce. Up to now there has been little evidence of sabotage in German industry and in the absence of a serious breakdown in police control there is no immediate prospect of sabotage to an extent which would seriously affect German production.

2. Effect of Civilian Morale on Morale of Military Forces. There is no substantial evidence so far that the morale of the home front has affected the German armed forces., except for submarine crews whose morale seems to have deteriorated, morale is still high. This may be broken by military disasters or by lack of supplies.

3. Popular Revolt or Coup d'Etat. Appears to be highly improbable. The state of mind of the mass of German people is one merely of exhaustion and apathy.. There is no revolutionary organization or leadership and no program for a substitute regime or hope for a more lenient peace. Little evidence of disintegration in the police organization, and it could be broken from the outside only by powerful armed force; some evidence of Communist and Socialist underground movements. Revolt is likely only if a large portion of the Army joins in; up-

United States

SECRET

Equally Subject Matter, Policy, and Security

-2-

ular revolt will probably be a consequence of military collapse, and not a cause of it. A coup d'etat might be effected by a combination of anti-Nazi generals with conservative factions of Nazi party, industrialists, Junkers and church leaders. Structure of regime makes a shift of power difficult except by overwhelming force.

III POSSIBILITY OF BREAKDOWN IN CIVILIAN MORALE CAUSING A CESSATION OF GERMAN MILITARY RESISTANCE PRIOR TO APRIL, 1944.

We cannot conclude from the experiences of 1918 that lowered German morale will force an early capitulation in 1944. The 1918 armistice was instigated by military leaders and the breakdown in civilian morale was only a contributing factor in the German surrender. In 1918 the German civilian population was far less controlled and less terrified by the secret police than it is at the present time. A substantial degree of democracy existed. The Germans were offered an easy peace based on Wilson's Fourteen Points and the primary condition was the establishment of a new form of government. Only after the military had ceased fighting that the force of civilian influence came to the support of the peace movement.

IV AIR RAIDS

An estimate based on British experience and on a statement by Dr. Ley places number of Germans who had by early autumn lost their homes through bombing at 5,250,000 to 6,000,000. Between 4 and 8 million have been evacuated from bombed or threatened cities. If added to these numbers are those whose work or living has been seriously affected, perhaps a fifth of the entire civilian population is seriously affected. For millions these effects mean a major disruption in their accustomed way of living, real hardship from shortages of food and water and lack of adequate quarters; impaired health and prolonged anxiety. Already in 1939-40 stomach ulcers were three times as common as in 1937-38. Typhoid has increased four fold since the war began, dysentery has doubled, and the number of deaths from dysentery has increased three fold.

V Critical Class Groups. a) Urban Middle Class. Many of this class shows signs of losing its self reliance and of developing a pensioner's mentality. They feel that the nation owes them, if not a living, at least very special consideration. Yet they have a great stake in a German victory. They remember that defeat in 1918 brought a runaway inflation and will probably do the same again. b) Labor. The class whose interests conflict most directly with the long range purposes of the Nazi regime. The workers are more and more resentful at the thought of the rights they have lost. c) Peasantry. Agricultural classes have suffered relatively little - almost totally immersed in their own work and private concerns. Ruling Groups. The nucleus of the Party: men from the middle class who were the storm troopers before 1933, in the main between 35 and 55 years old. They accept the line that there can be no turning back. Their interpretation that

SECRET

Lupis 81111 1111 1111

Germanis is literally accepted. Reports indicate that the industrialists realize that Germany cannot win the war.. Pessimism among factory workers noted.

VI CRITICAL AGE AND SEX GROUPS. Youth: young people stand up better than their elders to shocks of war on home front, but morale not good. Many of the young people have become sceptical and tired of political indoctrination. On the whole the morale of women is lower than that of men, particularly in bombed regions. Strongly expressed in letters taken on German soldiers.

VII CRITICAL REGIONS (a) Western Germany, war weariness and low spirits (b) Southern Germany & Austria. Bavaria always more of a Nazi stronghold than Berlin. In Austria Nazism probably had as large a following in 1938 in proportion to population as it did in Germany in 1933, but morale in Austria is very bad. Some talk of separatist movement in Bavaria. War has brought a certain amount of friction between South and North Germans. Considerable resentment particularly in Austria.

CONCLUSION. Desire for peace at any price is not yet general. Combination of patriotism, feeling for Germany higher than the Party and fear of the consequences of defeat keeps most Germans behind the war effort; defeatism is nevertheless spreading.

United States

SECRET

Equals British **SECRET** & **SECRET**

INFORMATION

ROUTING SHEET


SECRETOriginator via SecretariatDate 2/24/44

Addressee

Date Rec'd

Subject German Capabilities and Intentions
in Western Europe

To	Room No.	Date		Initials	Comments
		Rec'd	Fwd'd		
Planning Group	Cent.	7/45	3/3		Indicate action desired or taken
Gen. Magruder	Cent.	5/3	3/1		
Mr. [illegible]	Assoc.				
Mr. [illegible]	9				
L.J. Feltwell	Adm.			P	
Mrs. G'Donnell	Adm.				



Top ↑



OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Germany 12,454
x R & A
x Situation

AMERICAN EMBASSY
LONDON

SECRET
O.S.S.

2 February 1944.

TO : Brigadier General William Donovan.
SUBJECT : German Capabilities and Intentions in
Western Europe.

1. Attached is the requested analysis of enemy
forces in Western Europe.

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick Jr.

Lyman Kirkpatrick,
1st Lt. A.U.S.

Warming Jones
Maynard
R & A
SI
Ken OD

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-2-

France and the Low Countries. Although many of these divisions are below full strength, and France is still being used by the Germans as an area for training and regrouping, it can be reasonably assumed that at least this number of divisions will be in Western Europe at the time of an Allied landing.

The general disposition of the German divisions at the present is as follows:

1. To oppose an Allied landing in southern France 7 divisions on the coast and three in reserve under the command of the 19th Army at Avignon.

2. To oppose an Allied landing from the Bay of Biscay or a thrust through Spain, 5 divisions in southwestern France under the command of the 1st Army at Bordeaux.

3. To oppose an Allied landing in the north in the area from Brittany to Den Helder in Holland 16 divisions in the coastal area plus 15 divisions in reserve under the command of the 7th Army at Le Mans and the 15th Army at Lille. Of these 31 divisions, 23 are infantry and 8 are armoured in whole or in part indicating a large proportion of mobile armoured reserves to be used to counter an Allied landing.

The present disposition of the German forces indicates that they expect the principal Allied landing to come in the north between Brittany and the Hook of Holland. This conclusion is further strengthened by the knowledge

/that

SECRET
O.S.S.

-3-

that the heaviest coastal defenses exist in Brittany, Belgium and Holland, with secondary lines prepared in all of these areas. The attached map indicates these defense lines. From the forces on the Mediterranean Coast of France the enemy either does not expect an Allied landing in this area, or due to commitments elsewhere is unable to dispose sufficient forces in this region. The forces in southeastern France would indicate that the Germans completely eliminate the possibility of an Allied landing from the Bay of Biscay or a thrust through Spain. The former belief is probably based on the knowledge that the Allies could not have land based air cover to any large degree if landing from the Bay of Biscay, and the latter upon the belief that should the Allies come through Spain there would be sufficient time to mobilize forces in southwestern France.

SECRET
O.S.S.


Map of the Battle of France, 1944


O. R. 5665


LOW COUNTRIES & FRANCE

SCALE: 1:250,000 OR 400 MILES TO 1 INCH
MILES 50 40 30 20 10 0 10 MILES

BLUE NUMBERS - INF. DIV.
BLUE LINES - DEFENSES
RED NUMBERS - DIVS. WITH ARMOR
RED LINES - POSSIBLE MOVEMENTS
OF ARMOR







Germany 12, 454

R.A.

x Situation

SECRET

R&A #1043

GERMAN SITUATION IN 1918 AND 1943

The following notes are prompted by a recent perusal of a small part of the voluminous publications of the Reichstag Committee of Inquiry on the causes of the German collapse of 1918. A more careful study of these materials with a view to preparing a summary and interpretation of the events of 1918 would be valuable. Meanwhile, this includes a tentative impression of the significance of those events for the present situation. The following points are briefly touched upon:

1. The decision to attack and the condition of the German army before the 1918 spring offensive.
2. The defeat of July 1918 and the decline of morale.
3. Official propaganda to offset the decline, and the counter-effect of the fourteen points.
4. Comparison of present conditions with 1918:
 - a. Germany's allies
 - b. Failure of the eastern offensive
 - c. Home front
 - d. Propaganda to bolster morale
5. Psychological warfare opportunities
 - a. Ineffectiveness of general principles
 - b. The Russian Free Germany tactic
 - c. The inappropriateness of "Unconditional Surrender"
 - d. Need for a specific Anglo-American program

- 2 -

SECRET1918 and 1943

The collapse of Germany in 1918 can throw light on what is now taking place in Europe, and rightly used, it can be of material assistance in developing a course of action which will shorten the war.

With the collapse of the Russian armies in 1917, Germany's position vis-a-vis the allies in the west became more favorable than it had been at any time since the early days of the war. Nevertheless because of the blockade and the inadequate economic organization of the vast territories under German control, the German high command realized that the central powers were in no position to wage a protracted war. Two additional factors reinforced this conviction, namely, Germany's precarious situation with regard to military manpower replacements, and the prospective arrival of Americans, on a continually increasing scale, in the western theater. These considerations led to the decision, taken late in 1917, that Germany's last opportunity to win the war lay in one last gigantic offensive in the west. All usable troops were transferred from the eastern theater, and the western forces were regrouped and trained for the attack. Forces facing each other along the western front were not far from equal, and the German high command underrated that decisive results could only be achieved by superior tactics and training. All the evidence goes to show that early in 1918, the German army by and large was in good fighting shape, superbly trained, and with the most advanced fighting doctrine of any army of the time.

- 3 -

SECRET

The German army was on the offensive for the better part of four months beginning on March 21. It came very close to accomplishing the goals which the high command had set for it. But in the end it decisively failed. The turning point came with the allied counter-attack in July. Thereafter, the German army and the home front alike progressively disintegrated; the high command knew that the game was up and the only remaining question was how to get the best peace terms possible.

It is significant that morale of the troops stood up well, in spite of inadequate provisioning and severe material hardships, until it became obvious that victory was unattainable. From that point the decline was rapid. Desertion, going over to the enemy, refusal to rejoin units after leave, slacking -- all these became common practices and contributed enormously to the already serious problem of personnel shortages. Naturally, the high command did what it could to combat this disintegration of morale. Only one type of propaganda could be used, and it was exploited to the full. The soldiers were told that in case of defeat the allies would annihilate Germany and ruin its economic life. Therefore, they must fight on, if necessary to the death. There is little doubt that this propaganda had its effect. But it was offset, at least in part, by the American propaganda of Wilson's fourteen points. The fourteen points were seized upon by elements in Germany anxious for an immediate end to the war in order to convince the German troops and people that further resistance was not the only alternative to the economic and political annihilation of the German nation. The American

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SECRET

statements of policy even had some effect in the high command itself, for when Germany finally asked for terms the request was addressed to Wilson who apparently was regarded as less hostile to Germany than the British or French. It may even have been this factor which prevented the war from lasting longer than it did; certainly there were still influential circles in the army and in civilian life (Rathenau, for example, was among them) who believed in the possibility of further resistance even in November.

It is not possible to be certain how far present conditions in Germany resemble those of 1918, nor just what stage of 1918 they resemble most closely. It may be suggested, however, that there are reasons for believing that we have already reached "July," and that the resemblance is close enough to be instructive.

Germany's allies began to fold up in August and September — the first armistice was signed with Bulgaria on September 29. Italy shows that a similar process is under way at present. There is no doubt that in both cases the effect on Germany was great. But much more important is the question whether German troops have yet become convinced of the inevitability of defeat as they were in July 1918. It seems quite possible that the turning point has also been reached in this respect. German prisoners of war, taken in the North African campaign, displayed good morale on the whole as would be expected if this comparison is valid. The reason was that they still believed in the possibility of victory. When asked how the victory was to be achieved, they almost without exception replied that a summer offensive in the east would finish Russia, and then Germany would be free

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SECRET

to turn its full attention to the west. This suggests the quite exceptional importance of the fighting in the east for the problem of morale. We do not know how large the German offensive in the Kursk sector, which was launched in early July, was intended to be. Probably the German soldiers did not either. But at any rate it was definitely offensive action, and it failed. Moreover, Russian counter-attacks developed into a full-scale offensive on a fairly wide front, and that offensive is meeting with great successes, quite comparable to the successes at and following Stalingrad last winter. It seems difficult to believe that this complete change in the aspect of the eastern campaign can be without a profound influence on the thinking of the German army. If the German high command has lost faith in eventual victory, as it did in July 1918, we may expect that the German rank and file is losing its will to suffer and fight for a lost cause, as they did in July and August and September and October 1918.

It is quite probable that the authorities in Germany at present have a much better grip on the home front than they did in 1918. The Nazi system of repression is more thorough and better organized than its predecessor; moreover, there is no question that the German people are much more adequately fed and clothed now than they were then. On the other side of the ledger, however, there is the factor of bombing which did not play a role in 1918. While home front morale may be somewhat better, and repression more effective than in 1918, it is not necessary to assume that the marginal difference is so wide as to be decisive in the face of a hopeless military outlook.

The further parallel is striking. It was pointed out above

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that the military authorities attempted to bolster the sagging morale of the army by stressing the inevitability of national annihilation in case of defeat. This is clearly the line of the (much more effective) propaganda of the Nazis at the present time. We may be sure that now, as then, it is doing more than anything else to keep the Germans going.

The foregoing analysis suggests that we are now in a position to hasten the end of the war by appropriate political policy more than at any time since it started. Roosevelt and Churchill have, to a degree, followed the lead of Wilson's fourteen points with the four freedoms and the Atlantic charter. But the German disillusionment with the fourteen points, in 1918 and after, has deprived this kind of general statement of principles of most of its effectiveness. The Russians, on the other hand, have been quick to take advantage of the new situation with the Free Germany manifesto. This manifesto must be regarded as a master stroke of psychological warfare. While informing the Germans of the impossibility of military success, it at the same time offers them an attractive alternative to national annihilation. This is precisely the way to counteract the propaganda of their own leaders and to hasten the disintegration of morale which has doubtless already set in. The characteristic of the Russian step which differentiates it from the 14 points or the four freedoms or the Atlantic charter is that it is specific in its relevance to the German people and tells them just how they can hope to extricate themselves from their present terrible dilemma.

Nothing that the Allied powers have put forward comes close to meeting this cardinal requirement of psychological warfare in the

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present stage of the war. On the other hand, the only specific statement of the Anglo-American leaders is very badly suited to the needs and opportunities of the moment. "Unconditional surrender" is not an aim that a German can become enthusiastic about or actively work for. Its content, for them, is entirely negative; it is perfectly compatible with what the Nazis tell them, namely, that their enemies mean to exterminate Germany as a nation. What is wanted is a positive goal for Germany which will dispel this fear and encourage German soldiers and civilians alike to revolt against their leaders and bring the war to an end.

It is no part of the purpose of this paper to suggest what that positive goal should be. Only it may be noted that in the long run we must have hopes for an independent Germany which is far superior, both for us and for the Germans, to what the Nazis have given them. If we could reduce those hopes to concrete form right now, we might shorten the war by as much as six months.

P.S.
13 August 1943

Top ↑

✓
12,256
Gormac

I believe you will find this memo of interest.
It was prepared by Miss Tarp of this office.
Please hand your to Langer & Shearson.

John Hughes

Feb 1972

Even No. rolls

Exposure is 1/25 @ f.6.3

12257.
Germany
SECRET

February 10, 1945 ✓

COMMITTEE FOR FREE GERMANY

The rapid pace of present developments in connection with the war in Germany justifies a revision and closer examination of the actual position and potentialities of the Committee for Free Germany operating in Russia.

It is the consensus of opinion in Soviet circles in this country that there has been no change in Moscow's attitude towards the Free Germany Committee. Soviet leaders continue to exploit this Committee and its activities primarily for psychological warfare objectives directed against Germany, and further envisage the possibility of using the Committee for certain post-war activities in Germany. The Committee also occasionally offers a useful trump card to the Soviets in connection with the game of international politics. Nevertheless, and contrary to the belief which is held by a number of press reporters and commentators in this country, the Russians are definitely opposed to the idea of establishing the Committee as a "Central Government" of Germany following the defeat of Hitler.

Our Soviet informants have stressed the fact that Soviet representatives in the United States are somewhat irked at the prominence given to the Committee in the American press during the past few weeks. In fact, there is a certain suspicion among them that

NOT TO BE ACCESSIONED

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parties inimical to the Soviet Union may be largely responsible for the circulation of recent reports on the Free Germany Committee.

The Soviet contention is that the Committee was created by the Soviet Government of its own accord to serve in its initial stages among German prisoners of war. Whereas much has been written and suggested in Great Britain and the United States for the re-education of the German people, without any actual efforts having been made toward propagating the democratic idea among German war prisoners, the Russians point out that they were the first to initiate such a re-education in their own prisoners camps. The Russians are emphatic in expressing satisfaction with the results which they have achieved through their own efforts.

Immediately after its establishment in 1943, and especially since September of that year, when the Union of German Officers became active, the broadcasts and pamphlets which were disseminated by the Committee contributed to a large extent in undermining the morale of both the Wehrmacht and the civilian population on the German home front. The underground activities of the Committee were channeled through Sweden, and the Russians claim that its appeal met with a certain favorable response among some sections of the German population. They contend that especially women are very active in Communist circles in Germany.

In illustrating the actual status of the Committee, Russian informants point out that the Committee never enjoyed the unreserved

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confidence of the leaders of the Kremlin. The first Committee was composed of twenty-eight members, fifteen of whom were selected among prisoners of war, the remaining thirteen being political leaders, mostly Communists, as in the case of Reiner, the Committee's President. The incorporation of the "Union of German Officers" in the Committee changed the proportion of the representation composing the Committee. Of a total of forty-three members, twenty-seven are prisoners of war, and the remaining sixteen represent German refugees, the majority of whom are Communists and include former Reichstag Deputies, authors, etc., who took refuge in Moscow before the war.

For the sake of propaganda, publicity is given more especially to high ranking officers and former members of the Nazi Party, while prominence is given to names such as those of Graf Von Einsiedeln, General Baudela, Major General Korf, Major General Lattmann, Colonel Van Hoven, for the purpose of impressing their countrymen in the armed forces.

Graf Von Einsiedeln, Hitler's great-grandson, conducts an incessant propaganda campaign by means of pamphlets, repeatedly dropped over German territory for the last two years.

General Von Baudela only joined the Committee in 1944. His name and rank have been exploited in every respect, but he is considered unreliable for Russian aims and is therefore closely observed.

It is pointed out, that General Walter Von Seydlitz is really the most representative figure and is considered the real leader of the officers' group. He is stated to have been sincerely "converted",

SECRET

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not to Communism, but to a pro-Russian policy which should form the pivot of Germany's future foreign policy.

Insofar as the actual activity of the Committee is concerned, it is conducted by non-military members, such as Weinert, Pieck, the former Union leader Acherann, Wibracht, and others. The latter act upon instructions of the Soviet Authorities and perform the functions of liaison officers between prisoners of war converted to the new political concept and the Moscow Government.

Another interesting development is the fact that two members of the clergy have also become active members of the Committee since 1943; one, the Catholic Priest Kaysner, a former Army Chaplain, the other, the Protestant Minister Schroeder. This inclusion, and their recent broadcasts, should not be construed however as having modified the basic political trend of the Committee itself.

High ranking German military prisoners have been useful to Russia not only for propaganda purposes, but also in connection with the conduct of military operations. The Soviets even admit that a number of German generals have actually lent their cooperation to the Russian General Staff in the present offensive. Although the Russians readily avail themselves of the services of German generals, they do not trust them beyond certain limits. All members of the Committee are closely watched and shadowed by the Secret Police Service and are confined in their movements.

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It appears that, in addition to the main purpose of the propaganda scheme which was aimed at the German Army, the Committee was intended to function prominently in the event of a collapse of the German military power giving to an invasion of the Reich. Various reports which have become available of late clearly indicate that the Committee, and more particularly Von Seydlitz and his group of influential officers, were intended to play an important part if Hitler's generals had surrendered. Although Stalin never fully counted on such a course of events, he wanted to be prepared for the day when the Reich's military leaders might revolt. In such a case, Von Seydlitz and his group would have been used as representatives of Germany in the course of negotiations. In anticipation of this possibility, Von Seydlitz attained the peak of his influence in July 1944. However, events subsequently took a different course. The Russians consider that it is now too late to speculate further in this above direction, and that it is no longer realistic to consider Von Seydlitz as a possible negotiator. They say:

"We no longer need Von Seydlitz. We are invading Germany and intend to occupy the entire German Reich in collaboration with the Allies, regardless of the attitude of the German Generals hereafter."

In reply to the question whether the Committee of Free Germany may not be a candidate for a new Federal Government in the defeated Reich, the Russians state that they are not at all convinced that Germany may find a central Government immediately following the Allied

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victory. They anticipate a period of military occupation during which the Reich will be governed by special agencies which will be set up by Russia, the United States and Great Britain, with France participating.

In connection with the early post-war situation in Germany, under Allied occupation, the Russians concede that they will present their own candidates, while Washington and London will introduce their respective delegates. The Russians add: "We do not look forward to any divergencies on this issue, as long as the United States and Great Britain do not back any special groups of Germans. We will not necessarily uphold only the Free Germany Committee, but any honest anti-Fascist elements who may be found either in Germany or abroad." However, the informants are of the opinion that such reliable groups are very scarce.

The Soviets distrust the German refugees now residing in London and Washington, and are generally opposed to German members of the Social Democratic Party. Insofar as the latter are concerned, the Russians claim that the "Vorstand" (Central Committee) of the German Social Democrats in London have followed a hostile attitude towards Russia. Their Chairman, Mr. Vogel, and Mr. E. Heine, another prominent refugee, have recently handed to various English Socialist leaders an unfavorable memorandum on foreign policy matters. In this memorandum, Mr. Vogel dealt with a campaign for the revision of the terms of the future Peace Treaty and with steps to be taken to

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Forestall the destruction of Germany. He also accused the Russians as the principal sponsors of a "harsh peace".

Similar mistrust is entertained by the Russians of Stampfer and Bagher, German Social Democratic leaders now residing in the United States. These two leaders are attacked on account of their specific utterances and the stand they have openly taken for a "strong Poland as a buffer state between Germany and Russia". They have also expressed opinions about a third war which will break out in the future between the USSR and her present Allies. Their strong anti-Russian sentiment is well known in Moscow. Finally, Russians fear that certain elements in the United States and Great Britain may have recourse to the above political German refugees for anti-Russian propaganda purposes. They hope, however, that some of the Social Democrats who have joined the Free Germany Committee in Moscow may be able to counter-act the influence abroad of Stampfer, Bagher, Vogel, Reine group.

Should the Allies present candidates with anti-Soviet tendencies, Moscow may use the Free Germany Committee for its own purposes. Consequently, this Committee will continue to enjoy Russian support during the months to come and will be held in reserve to meet any emergency.

It may be added, that Moscow also pins great hopes on the "Wehrmacht", a body of some 150,000 to 200,000 men who, under the leadership of carefully selected German officers, are being trained

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to take over the liberated territories of Germany. They will be charged with the maintenance of order, under the supervision of the Russian General Staff.

The situation affecting the status of the Committee of Free Germany deserves to be studied from another angle as well. Even in the event of the Committee being eliminated from functioning as a new Government of the Reich, Moscow intends to use the services of its members extensively during the period of Germany's military occupation. It is considered that the military administration of German occupied areas will require German officials to govern cities, towns and villages. Moscow does not make any bones about its intention to recruit members of the Committee, as well as "converted" Germans, who would be appointed governors, mayors, civil service officials, etc. Committee members will, of course, be instrumental in consolidating Russian influence in Germany both from a practical and ideological viewpoint.

An interesting development in Russian propaganda for the purpose of eradicating the influence of Nazism in Germany has been the preparation of special textbooks written by University professors, teachers and other intellectuals among the German prisoners of war. These are aimed at winning over the minds of the German people to a future new German-Soviet cooperation.

The Russians do not believe in a guerrilla warfare in Germany, in spite of the fact that they are fully aware of all the preparations

SECRET

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made by the Nazi leaders. Moscow will not hesitate to exploit all the means available to the Committee should it become necessary to prevent the German population from extending support to such guerrilla groups.

In the Soviets' estimation, the propaganda of the Free Germany Committee is the best equipped for creating the right psychological basis for an unconditional surrender among the German civilians. The broadcasts have recently adopted a new line; they no longer refer to the maintenance of the Wehrmacht or to the end of the war as the sole means of saving the rest of the Army from inevitable destruction, but they harp on the folly of fighting when the war is inseparably lost. The 1943/44 slogan: SAVE THE REICH AND ITS ARMY, is replaced by: SAVE THE COUNTRY AND THE LIVES AND HOMES OF ITS SOONS.

Top ↑

✓ 14 February 1945

General Donovan:

This is a side light on the Pearson article. The article itself is, as usual, a distortion even if any basis in fact exists. It is, however, possible that there was loose talk in connection with the 1943 discussion of the subject.

J. M.

John McGruder, Brig. Gen.
Deputy Director, OSS — Intelligence Service

Even No. rolls

Exposure is 1/25 @ f.6.3

SECRET

12 220A

*German
transformation
relation to
German Gov.*

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
630 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK 20, N. Y.




10 February 1945

Mr Richard Southgate
Office of Strategic Services
Washington DC

Dear Dick:

With further reference to our conversation this morning, I am enclosing the newspaper clipping and copies of the several letters and memoranda which you read. Perhaps at your convenience you may care to show this to General Magruder. He may be interested in re-reading Sherman's memorandum of 1943, in the light of present events, but my main reason in sending this material to you is that it may afford some further indication as to how certain secret documents get into circulation. Of course, we here don't know what officials in the State Department saw this memo and what dissemination may have been given to it there.

Sincerely,


John C. Hughes

NOT TO BE ACCESSIONED

FEB 8 1945

The Washington

Merry-Go-Round

By Drew Pearson

THE INSIDE STORY OF
NOW CERTAIN U. S. agencies
 were blocked in their effort to
 build up an Anti-Hitler Com-
 mittee of Germans to help de-
 feat the Nazis can now be told.
 It is especially significant in
 view of the Committee of 10,000
 Germans which the Russians
 have organized inside Russia, and
 whose broadcasts to the German
 people from Russia speeded the
 smothering advance of the Red
 Army across Poland.

The German Committee Inside
 Russia is headed by Field Mar-
 shal Friedrich von Paulus, for-
 mer commander at Stalingrad
 and by his deputy commander,
 Gen. Wilhelm von Seydlitz.
 Their broadcasts have told the
 Germans and especially the Ger-
 man generals that the Russians
 did not seek to destroy their fac-
 tories or their country, but only
 to throw off the yoke of the Hit-
 lers. They have also contacted
 many German generals and won
 over thousands of prisoners
 without firing a shot.

More than two years ago, Gen.
 William Donovan's Office of Stra-
 tegic Services started to do the
 same thing. They actually or-
 ganized an embryo committee of
 anti-Hitler Germans, headed by
 a minister in the old Weimar
 Cabinet, who also was a strong
 Catholic leader. (Broadcast in
 New England at Harvard.) Most
 of the German committee were
 Catholic, moderate or leftists,
 all strong anti-Hitlers.

However, a few weeks after
 the committee was started, the
 State Department heard about it
 and suddenly called a halt.
 OGC officials always respected
 the ban of Joseph Wilson, former
 Ambassador to Germany. In this
 Wilson, then a member of the
 OGC, had named himself right
 in German papers when he was
 Ambassador to Berlin and had
 taken an active part in the
 anti-Hitler group of the left.
 The OGC, however, had the
 right to name a member without
 naming him, and with strong

Catholic leaders of the left and
 center.

At any rate, the American
 move to work inside Germany
 through the Office of Strategic
 Services was stopped short in
 its tracks, while the Russians
 continued to build up their pow-
 erful German committee.

Psychological Warfare Stymied

MEANWHILE, however, the
 United States Army had set up
 its psychological warfare divi-
 sion, which was to spread propa-
 ganda inside Germany, though on
 a more modified scale. However,
 its work also has been stymied
 in many areas through the failure
 of old line Army men to under-
 stand the value of psychological
 warfare.

For instance, plans were drawn
 up for the psychological warfare
 Division to establish a German-
 language newspaper as soon as we
 took Aachen. Aachen was to be a
 rubber pig, providing experience
 for PWD in overseeing produc-
 tion of newspapers for the Ger-
 man population. When the city
 was taken, PWD immediately
 sent three men from Paris to
 survey the facilities in Aachen
 for presses, equipment, news-
 print and skilled personnel.

Then for nothing has been ac-
 complished. In fact, the divisional
 commander at Aachen has not yet
 permitted the PWD team inside
 the city. There were several
 weeks prior to the German break-
 through of December during
 which the newspaper could have
 been started. But nothing was ac-
 complished, and there has been no
 progress since. Result is that our
 forces will break into Germany
 and take over scores of German
 newspapers, with no part of the
 Army yet having had any experi-
 ence in directing a German news-
 paper.

Meanwhile, the Russians have
 built up an "Anti-Hitler" radio
 to set up a completely new German
 government with its own propa-
 ganda system, all operating un-
 der the direction of Moscow.

Handwritten notes:
~~Psych~~
 Camp
 Sherman

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
Washington DC

30 September 1948

Mr Irving H Sherman
35 East 76th Street
New York NY

Dear Mr Sherman:

With further reference to the proposal for a "Save Germany Group", the State Department representative on the Office of Strategic Services Planning Group was requested to lay the proposal before the appropriate State Department officials for the purpose of obtaining their advice.

The State Department has now replied that the proposal is out of the question on the grounds of current policy which is refraining from any action which might be construed as an imitation of the Free Germany Committee formed in Moscow and, in any event, disapproves any action until the forthcoming tri-partite conference.

Accordingly, your proposal will be laid on the table by the OSS Planning Group.

Again may I express the Group's appreciation of your interest.

(SGD) JAMES C ROGERS
Chairman, OSS Planning Group

c
o
p
y
SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON DC

27 September 1946

Mr Irving F Sherman
35 East 76th Street
New York NY

Dear Mr Sherman:

You may recall that on 8 August you submitted to Mr Hugh R Wilson a proposal concerning a "Save Germany Group". This was submitted by Mr Wilson to the Office of Strategic Services Planning Group which considered the matter and referred it to the Psychological Warfare Planning Staff for consideration of its panel on Germany. This panel recently reported as follows:

"1. The proposal is essentially a propaganda operation and therefore concerns OWI.

"2. Any proposal such as this runs the risk of appearing to be a counter-move in reply to the Russian sponsored 'Free Germany Committee'. Although any such intention is explicitly disclaimed in the proposal it was felt by the Panel that no action should be undertaken which might be open to such an interpretation.

"3. The suggestion that OWI be permitted to make more liberal use of Germans in broadcast to Germany was approved in principle. It was generally felt, however, that such a program would appear extremely weak in comparison with the program of the 'Free Germany Committee'. A group representing a wide variety of political convictions should have no common denominator of appeal which could be expected to make an impression upon the German people. Such a program could be effective only if the State Department were to clarify its policy with reference to post-war Germany."

The OSS Planning Group is inclined to agree with the first two and part of the third conclusions, but still has the subject under consideration.

Your interest is thoroughly appreciated, and you will be kept informed of the final action taken.

Very sincerely,

(SGD) JAMES G ROGERS

Chairman, OSS Planning Group

SECRET

August 8, 1946

MEMORANDUM

TO: MR HUGH A WILSON
FROM: IRVING M SHERMAN

I am attaching a memorandum on the subject of which I spoke with you when I was last in Washington, and trust you will find it of interest.

If there is anything further you would like me to do in this connection, please know that I am at your service.

My first instinct was to name this "Committee for German Freedom", or "Committee for German Liberation", but the more I thought about it, the less I liked it. Firstly, the Russians and the French now have Committees, with names not dissimilar. Secondly, I am not sure that the average German cares very much about being free or liberated. Accordingly, the best name that I could find was "Save Germany Group".

This, however, raises a problem in translation. A literal translation would necessitate the use of the German word "retten", which has a connotation that may not altogether appeal. It is used more in a sense of saving someone from drowning, or dragging someone up from the gutter. "Restoration des Vaterlandes Gruppe" is a phrase which historically should carry weight with the average German.

I.M.S.

NOT TO BE ACCESSIONED

August 3, 1943

EAST GERMAN GROUP(Restoration des Vaterlandes Gruppe)

Any attempt to influence the German people requires a special kind of approach in view of the methodical orderliness of the German Mind. The German is always "German". His history has disciplined him to do as he is told and, consequently, he is an unusually good citizen. He is sentimental, but not emotional, and any attempt to influence him must proceed on highly logical lines.

Approaches to him can be infinitely more successfully if they are made by Germans. We must not forget the laborious steps which the National Socialists went through in 1933 to get German citizenship for Hitler. The fact that he was not a German was a mental hurdle for many Germans, which the National Socialists knew had to be surmounted.

The National Socialist Government was something which the average German could accept, even though there were many aspects of National Socialism which the average German accepted only with reluctance. It was "legally" constituted, it operated within the framework of the law, and often went to absurd extremes to make "legal" its actions. As long as things went well on balance, the German was not too unhappy, but now that things have seriously gone wrong for him, he can be made receptive to suggestions for radical conduct.

The German is not easily converted to disloyalty to his Government. An invitation from the enemy to join a particular course of action, would encounter serious obstacles in the German mind, but an appeal from free Germans urging the same course of action, would find much more sympathetic reception. In this case, the German is working with Germans, and that is something he can logically accept.

Unfortunately, the Russians announced a "National Committee of Free Germans" while the thoughts herein indicated were being developed. The obvious aim of the benefits of surprise may be hampered, there are still many essential advantages between what the Russians have done and what is here proposed.

2.

I urge serious consideration be given to the formation of a Save Germany Group, made up of eight or ten outstanding German refugees. I would prefer it be called a "Group", rather than a "Committee", to distinguish it from the French and Russian Committees recently formed. "Save Germany" would portray to the Germans that disaster is impending.

This Group should be constituted by the outstanding representatives available in each particular category of German society, so that any German can find in this Group a representation for what he would like to find. There should be no Jews represented in this Group. The Group should be made up of a prominent Catholic, a Protestant, Deutsch Nationals, Social Democrat, Communist, with representation, perhaps, for one or two other groups, if suitable representatives can be found. We should select the most outstanding refugees available in these categories, in the light of the influence their names are likely to carry with the Germans and the extent to which they are likely to lend themselves for our purposes.

An individual like Dr. Bruening, for instance, is useless for this type of project. He will not do all that we ask of him, and for that he would be prepared to do, he will undoubtedly want a quid pro quo in the way of commitments and promises. Our Group should be made up of best names available of people to whom we need make no serious promises and who will cooperate solely on the basis of a common desire to overthrow National Socialism.

This Group will not be a Government-in-Exile. It will be clearly indicated that it makes no pretense of being the basis for any future Government. This Group will be the mouthpiece for important NS work. It is probable that collateral opportunities would result for SI and SO.

A tentative list of suggested candidates, and alternatives, follows. These individuals are all in either the United States or Canada. It might be well to have that certain refugees in England might be better suited than some here suggested, and this possibility is being explored.

3.

1. Hermann Haasehning - President Danzig Senate - Ex-Nazi.
 Dr. F. Wilhelm Sellman - Minister of Interior under Stresemann.

2. Freiherr Wolfgang von & zu Putlitz - German Foreign Office
 Hans Von Nentig

3. Dr. Hans Simons - Son of President of Reichsgerichtshof
 Kurt Meisler

4. Dr. Karl Spiesker - Catholic
 Annette Kolb - Catholic

5. Dr. Paul Tillich - Protestant

6. Kurt Brenner - Mayor of Altona - Prominent Social Democrat
 Thomas Mann

7. Dr. Moritz Bismarck - Reichsbanner - Police President of
 Magdeburg

8. Walter Maria Graf - Communist

Historisch. Mann + Bismarck

Our Group will come to the Germans as free Germans, who will announce their decision to return to Germany at the earliest opportunity and who have united themselves in this Group with no duress and of their own volition. They will point out to the Germans that the war is lost, the army is at their frontiers, that nothing they were told or promised has materialized, and that they are being sacrificed by Hitler for time. Time for what? The end is clear. There is still time now to save countless lives and much of what is left. As matters now stand, it has been necessary to consider all Germans as alike and as equally guilty. There is still time for individuals to save themselves and assure for themselves their deserved place in what is to follow. They will direct repeated appeals to the Army, pointing out that they already have the weapons, they have the tradition and the obligation, which the world has long expected they would fulfill.

This Group will operate from a country contiguous to Germany, preferably Hungary or Austria, but, if necessary, Italy or Czechoslovakia. The Germans will be invited by the Group to desert, join the German National Socialist opposition, and earn their place in the New Germany by making themselves useful. We, not the Group, will process the arrivals. The Common frontier will make this and subsequent communications easier. A neutral country, such as Switzerland, would undoubtedly refuse to allow itself to be used for such purposes, nor is it ideally suited to our needs.

The German people will be influenced more by broadcasts and appeals from this German group, operating from what is friendly territory, than by foreign broadcasts and appeals from the enemy. There has always been an inarticulate opposition in Germany, ineffective because there was no effective medium available and legal through which it could function.

This Group will operate behind the United Nations' front lines, under the protection of the American and United Nations' armies, which will, of course, make it necessary for this project to receive the approval of the General Staffs.

OSR Form No. 1004

TOP SECRET

12, 220

Gentry

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7 February 1945

MEMORANDUM OF INFORMATION
FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:SUBJECT: A German Appraisal of the Free Germany Committee.

The following appraisal of the Soviet-sponsored Free Germany Committee has been given the OSS representative in Bern by a member of the 20 July conspiracy against Hitler who recently escaped from Germany to Switzerland. Source belonged to the older and more conservative group among the plotters which favored a peace arrangement with the Western Allies, in contrast to the pro-Soviet policy adopted by the younger group which claimed to be in contact with the Free Germany Committee.

Source is convinced that the Soviets will come to Germany with a carefully assembled and thoroughly indoctrinated group of Germans which will probably include von Paulus, von Seydlitz, and other leaders of the Free Germany Committee and of the Union of German Officers. In view of probable Anglo-American opposition to establishing this group as the German Government, the Soviets will probably use it only in their zone of occupation. Since this will be the only comparable organization of Germans

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and since it will enjoy the advantages of long-term publicity and the prestige of Soviet backing, this group increasingly will be regarded by the German people as the Government of Germany. Initially, of course, it may be set up as a committee and follow a course parallel to that of the Lublin Committee.

Source believes the Anglo-Americans have only three alternatives: (1) to accept the Free Germany Committee as the new German Government, (2) to set up one or probably two rival committees, one in the British and one in the American zone of occupation, or (3) to organize jointly with the Soviets some type of German committee which will be subject to the Allied occupation authorities. This jointly-sponsored committee, as successor to the present German regime, would assist in transacting current affairs with the understanding that final authority rests solely with the military occupation. Such a committee, source declares, might be composed largely of technical men, who are experts in their respective fields of finance, transportation, food rationing and distribution, public works, labor relations and police. It would presumably include some of the Free Germany group. Source believes that unless the Anglo-Americans enter

TOP SECRET

- 3 -

TOP SECRET

Germany with some such plan as this, something like the Free Germany Committee will eventually be imposed.

The OSS representative in Bern reports that certain German diplomats who are not too compromised as Nazis are expecting either that they will shortly be asked to join the Free Germany Committee in Moscow or that the Committee will send its own representatives to Switzerland and endeavor to infiltrate the German diplomatic and consular establishment there.

(The OSS representative believes that while a committee of such German political refugees as Bruesing, Wirth, Braun, and Treckmann would be undesirable, efforts might be made in Switzerland, France and other countries, quietly and without formality, to select certain individual Germans who have maintained close contact with Germany and who would be suitable to advise on certain phases of German affairs and who possibly might serve on such technical administrative committees as any occupying authority would find essential. The OSS representative believes that there are several potential candidates now in Switzerland.)

William J. Donovan
Director

Bern Cable #4909 (Breakers) - 2/5/45.

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ADDRESS TO: <i>TOP, Sec State</i>		ACCESSION DATE: <i>8 Feb. 45</i>	
DOCUMENT DATE: <i>2 Feb. 45</i>		OFFICE OR BRANCH: <i>DD</i>	
DOCUMENT NO.: <i>10, 22</i>	COPY NO.:	LOGGED BY: <i>Dr. J. L.</i>	
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...and the ...

7 February 1945

TOP SECRET

Miss Grace Tully
The White House

Dear Grace:

I believe the President will be interested in the enclosed memorandum, an appraisal of the Moscow Free Germany Committee by a member of the 20 July conspiracy against Hitler. Will you kindly see that it reaches his desk? Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan
Director

TOP SECRET

7 February 1945

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following appraisal of the Soviet-sponsored Free Germany Committee has been given the OSS representative in Bern by a member of the 20 July conspiracy against Hitler who recently escaped from Germany to Switzerland. Source belonged to the older and more conservative group among the plotters which favored a peace arrangement with the Western Allies, in contrast to the pro-Soviet policy adopted by the younger group which claimed to be in contact with the Free Germany Committee.

Source is convinced that the Soviets will come to Germany with a carefully assembled and thoroughly indoctrinated group of Germans which will probably include von Paulus, von Mehlitz, and other leaders of the Free Germany Committee and of the Union of German Officers. In view of probable Anglo-American opposition to establishing this group as the German Government, the Soviets will probably use it only in their time of desperation. Since this will be the only comparable organization of Germans and since it will enjoy the advantages of long-term publicity and the prestige of Soviet backing,

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this group increasingly will be regarded by the German people as the Government of Germany. Initially, of course, it may be set up as a committee and follow a course parallel to that of the Lublin Committee.

Source believes the Anglo-Americans have only three alternatives: (1) to accept the Free Germany Committee as the new German Government, (2) to set up one or probably two rival committees, one in the British and one in the American zone of occupation, or (3) to organize jointly with the Soviets some type of German committee which will be subject to the Allied occupation authorities. This jointly-sponsored committee, as successor to the present German regime, would assist in transacting current affairs with the understanding that final authority rests solely with the military occupation. Such a committee, source declares, might be composed largely of technical men who are experts in their respective fields of finance, transportation, food rationing and distribution, public works, labor relations and police. It would presumably include some of the Free Germany group. Source believes that unless the Anglo-Americans enter Germany with some such plan as this, something like the Free Germany Committee will eventually be imposed.

TOP SECRET

- 3 -

TOP SECRET

The OGB representative in Bern reports that certain German diplomats who are not too compromised as Nazis are expecting either that they will shortly be asked to join the Free Germany Committee in Moscow or that the Committee will send its own representatives to Switzerland and endeavor to infiltrate the German diplomatic and consular establishment there.

In the event that you find merit in the above appreciation, we are in a position through our representative in Switzerland to prepare to select certain individual Germans who have maintained close contact with Germany and who would be competent to advise on certain phases of German affairs. This is especially true of source, who over a period of more than ten years has been in close touch with prominent Wehrmacht and German civilian personalities and has sought to persuade them to overthrow the Hitler regime.

William J. Donovan
Director

Bern Cable #4909 (BREAKING) - 2/5/45.

TOP SECRET

January 12, 1945

TOP SECRET

7 February 1945

DETS 560

Honorable James C. Dunn
Assistant Secretary of State
Department of State

Dear Jimmy:

I think the Secretary will be interested in the enclosed memorandum, which is an appraisal of the Moscow Free Germany Committee by a member of the 20 July conspiracy against Hitler. Will you be good enough to see that it reaches his desk? Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan
Director

Enclosure.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

7 February 1945

DOTS 500

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

The following appraisal of the Soviet-sponsored Free Germany Committee has been given the OSS representative in Bern by a member of the 20 July conspiracy against Hitler who recently escaped from Germany to Switzerland. Source belonged to the elder and more conservative group among the plotters which favored a peace arrangement with the Western Allies, in contrast to the pro-Soviet policy adopted by the younger group which claimed to be in contact with the Free Germany Committee.

Source is convinced that the Soviets will come to Germany with a carefully assembled and thoroughly indoctrinated group of Germans which will probably include von Paulus, von Seydlitz, and other leaders of the Free Germany Committee and of the Union of German Officers. In view of probable Anglo-American opposition to establishing this group as the German Government, the Soviets will probably use it only in their zone of occupation. Since this will be the only comparable organization of Germans and since it will enjoy the advantages of long-term publicity and the prestige of Soviet backing, this group

TOP SECRET

- 2 -

TOP SECRET

increasingly will be regarded by the German people as the Government of Germany. Initially, of course, it may be set up as a committee and follow a course parallel to that of the Lublin Committee.

Source believes the Anglo-Americans have only three alternatives: (1) to accept the Free Germany Committee as the new German Government, (2) to set up one or probably two rival committees, one in the British and one in the American zone of occupation, or (3) to organize jointly with the Soviets some type of German committee which will be subject to the Allied occupation authorities. This jointly-sponsored committee, as successor to the present German regime, would assist in transacting current affairs with the understanding that final authority rests solely with the military occupation. Such a committee, source declares, might be composed largely of technical men, who are experts in their respective fields of finance, transportation, food rationing and distribution, public works, labor relations and police. It would presumably include some of the Free Germany Group. Source believes that unless the Anglo-Americans enter Germany with some such plan as this, something like the Free Germany Committee will eventually be imposed.

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- 3 -

TOP SECRET

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In the event that you find merit in the above appreciation, we are in a position, through our representative in Switzerland, to prepare to select certain individual Germans who have maintained close contact with Germany and who would be competent to advise on certain phases of German affairs. This is especially true of source, who over a period of more than ten years has been in close touch with prominent Wehrmacht and German civilian personalities and has sought to persuade them to overthrow the Hitler regime.

William J. Donovan
Director

Bern Cable #4909 (BREAKERS) - 2/5/45.

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OCS Form 2282

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P. L. MAYER

Accession No.

Date Rec'd SA **FEB 7 1945**...

To	Room No.	Date		Officer's Initials	Comments
		Rec'd	Exp'd		
1. MR. SHEPHERSON	1212			<i>WJ</i>	You might care to have this in hand in case you discuss the whole problem with W.P.D. 7-II #
2. <i>Chase</i>	<i>Room</i>			<i>WJD</i>	
3. Mr. <i>Seaton</i>	1212				I understand you are reading these volumes. This note by Mayer might be of interest to you. <i>WJ</i>
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in To column.

A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.

Routing designations should be used in To column.

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Action indicated or action taken should be indicated in Comments column.

Routing sheet should always be returned to Registry.

The officer's signature has separate sheet.

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Whitney H. Shepardson
 FROM : Ferdinand L. Mayer
 SUBJECT: 512's narrative

DATE: February 5, 1945

I have read three of the six sections of 512's narrative, namely "The Thirtieth of June", "The Fritsch-Blomberg Crisis" and "The Guilt of the Generals". I chose these three first as the most timely, in view of my feeling that there is a strong possibility that Stalin will impose a Free German Committee as the Provisional Government of Germany, which Committee would be largely dominated by German generals.

The three sections convey a very definite impression of the German military with special regard to the senior officers. Their record as disclosed by this narrative and as supported by 512's comments prior to July 20th and his present observations in this respect all combine to give the strong impression that "the generals" whether captured or to be captured by the Russians would be pliable to Stalin's will. This impression is further supported by the knowledge we have that the German military as a whole have been for many years very sympathetically inclined toward their Russian colleagues. This would be all the more strengthened in view of the amazing Russian victories.

If you trust 512 both as to his judgment and statements, then his narrative would seem to forbode an unfortunate state of affairs should the Russians put across a provisional German government largely dominated by "generals".

F.L.M.

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2. Mr. C. L. ...	[Signature]	7/6	4:00	CSC	7/6	1945		
3. Mr. ...	[Signature]	6/2	6:55	WJD	7/6	1945		
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OBS
Form 89 (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 5 February 1945

FROM

BERN, SWITZERLAND

TO

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

PRIORITY

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IN 3501

FOR ACTION

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FOR INFORMATION

DIRECTOR(3), SECRETARIAT(4)
MACGRUDER(5), X-2(6)

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4409. Bern to Washington.

4409. Bern to London.

4409. Bern to Paris.

REMARKS. Carib from 110. Information: Forgan and 140.

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Answering your #3057 (OUT 2782) inquiring re 512's estimate of Russian Free German Committee and its probable use. 512 is convinced that Russians will come to Germany with carefully assembled and thoroughly indoctrinated group of Germans probably including Paulus, Seydlitz et al. If they can succeed in putting this over as the government of Germany they will do so but more likely, in view of probably American and British opposition, they will at first merely use this in Russian zone. However, as this will be the only German organization and as it will profit from its long advertisement and prestige of Russian backing, it will more and more be looked to as the government of Germany since USA and Britain will have nothing comparable. It may, of course, be initially set up as a committee and procedure followed similar to that in case of Lublin Committee.

512 believes we have only 3 alternatives: 1). Accept Russian German Committee; 2). Set up rival committee or probably 2 rival committees in respective Anglo-Saxon zones, or 3). Organize jointly with Russians some type of German committee which is subject to Allied occupation authorities and will assist in transacting current affairs as successor to German government on the understanding, of course, that final authority rests solely with military occupation. Such committee might be largely of technical men, experts in their respective fields such as finance, transportation, food rationing and distribution, public works, labor relations, police and the like but we would probably have to accept some of the Paulus, Seydlitz crowd.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

FROM

TO DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

REF. NO.

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16-30201-1 GPO

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512 feels, and I agree, that if we go into Germany without any plans along this 3rd line, something like the Seydlitz committee will eventually be imposed on us.

512 stresses importance, particularly from our viewpoint as regards South America, of controlling German Foreign representation. He believes that if this is properly handled we might be able to infiltrate and break up entire Nazi espionage ring in South America.

Certain German diplomats here who are not too compromised as Nazis are expecting early summons to adhere to Seydlitz committee or alternatively that Seydlitz committee will send its own people here and endeavor to infiltrate German diplomatic, consular establishment.

Some weeks ago 476, at invitation of General Sibert, G-2, 12th AG, visited 12th AG and later London and SHAEP and with my backing presented plan for getting together small group of high anti-Nazi German Officers, whom he interviewed in France and England, to advise on certain phases of German matters and methods of penetrating GOW. This group was not to have any political functions and was to work secretly. This plan which I consider constructive has apparently died in SHAEP, or, at least, I have heard nothing further about it, possibly owing to Gen. Betts' illness as he had matter in hand.

While agreeing that we should not set up German committee of political refugees such as Bruning, Wirth, Braun, Treviranus et al, I feel we should prepare quietly and without formality in Switzerland, France and elsewhere certain individual Germans who have maintained close contact with Germany and who would be suitable to advise on certain phases German matters and possibly serve as technical administrative committees which any occupying authorities in Germany will find absolutely essential. I have several candidates here including 512 who was slated for high post if the July 20th affair had succeeded. If we do nothing of this nature, the ready made Russian German committee may monopolize the field.

TOP SECRET

TSR:2370 5 Feb 45

Copy #3

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WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT

12, 22 5

THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON

February 5, 1945

✓

My dear Lieutenant Putzell:

Thank you for your letter of February 2nd with which you enclosed a confidential memorandum on the July 20th German coup d'etat. I appreciate your forwarding this information to me.

Sincerely yours,

H. M. Hawthorne

Lt. (j.g.) E. J. Putzell, Jr.,
Assistant Executive Officer,
Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D.C.

11 20
 x File in ...
 x A 200, ...
 x Russia
 x Moscow ...

29 January 1945

Honorable Henry Morgenthau, Jr.
 The Secretary of the Treasury
 Treasury Department
 Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

In response to your request we hand you
 herewith a memorandum on the "Free German Committee"
 which has been established in Russia. We trust that
 it contains the information which you desire.

If you have any further questions con-
 cerning this matter we will be glad to attempt to
 answer them for you.

Respectfully yours,

E. J. Putzell, Jr.
 Lt. (j.g.), USNR
 Asst. Executive Officer

Enclosure

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

12, 2, 43
SECRET
See memo 7

MEMORANDUM ON THE FREE GERMANY COMMITTEE

The Free Germany Committee and the affiliated Union of German Officers were formed under Soviet auspices in the summer of 1943 as a political warfare weapon designed to disrupt the German war effort. The establishment of the Committee was preceded by at least two abortive attempts to create an organization of Germans who would advocate the overthrow of the Hitler regime. On 8 October the "First Conference of German Prisoner-of-War Privates and Non-Commissioned Officers in the Soviet Union" was held at "Camp No. 58", under the chairmanship of Walter Ulbricht, a former Communist member of the Reichstag. Over a year later a "National Peace Conference" was reported by Communist sources to have been held in "a Rhenish city" during December 1942.

The "Conference" is reported to have produced a manifesto which in several important respects was similar to the manifesto adopted by the Free Germany Committee some six months later.

With the German Communist Erich Wehnert as president,

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the opening sessions of the Free Germany Committee were held on 12 and 13 July 1943. According to Weinert the formation of the Committee was delayed by the difficulties of (1) convincing German prisoners that "Hitler alone was guilty of the war", and (2) reaching an understanding between the war prisoners and the German Communist exiles. The Soviet victory at Stalingrad in February 1943, Weinert indicated, served to dispel these difficulties. The inaugural meetings chose a Committee of 38 under Weinert's presidency. Major Karl Hatz and Lt. Count Heinrich von Einsiedel, a grandson of Bismarck, were named vice-presidents. Later, when the German Officers Union was formed, Colonel General von Seydlitz, Lieutenant General Edler von Daniels, and Lance Corporal Kammbecker were added to the list of vice-presidents.

On 11 and 12 September, according to Tass, over one hundred delegates from five prisoner-of-war camps met to organize the German Officers Union, under General von Seydlitz as president, which immediately "endorsed the program of the Free Germany National Committee" and decided to join it. Some 23 senior officers (majors to generals) and 64 other officers appear to have been members at that time.

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The Committee's manifesto emphasizing the blackness of the German military and political position stated that the time was not too late to save something of Germany, if the Hitlerite leadership were overthrown and the war brought to an end. If these conditions were met, the Committee promised an independent, democratic, and truly national strong government; civil rights; and a free economy based on private property, trade unionism, and social legislation. The remainder of the platform was expressed in largely rhetorical and ambiguous terms, presumably to appeal to as many Germans as possible. Revolutionary implications were contained in the statement that the future German democracy "will have nothing in common with the helpless Weimar regime" and in the exhortation to organize "fighting groups at the enterprises, in the villages, in the labor camps and in the universities". However, these implications were imprecise enough to appeal to Communists, Social Democrats, and left-wing Nazis alike. The appeal to German nationalism was similarly phrased.

The manifesto of the German Officers Union closely paralleled that of the Committee, but contained sharper condemnations of Hitler's military bungling and amateurism. It

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appealed to "the leaders of the troops, Generals and officers of our armed forces" to take heed from Stalingrad and save Germany.

After promulgating their manifestoes, the two organizations began to broadcast a series of appeals to the German people and armed forces which have continued to the present time with a virtually unchanged propaganda line. These broadcasts have distinguished between the Nazis and their supporters on the one hand, and the non-Nazi population. They have emphasized that the overthrow of the Hitler regime remains the only possibility for Germany's salvation. They have stressed that only the Nazis will be punished, not the whole German people.

The operations of the Free Germany Committee have been steadily expanded since its inception. Broadcasts have been supplemented by the activities of Free Germany Front Delegates who have arranged for the distribution of leaflets, loudspeaker broadcasts, and in certain cases appear to have established contact with German commanders and arranged for their surrender to Soviet troops.

The Committee in Moscow has either directly or indirectly inspired the formation of affiliates in occupied,

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liberated, or neutral countries, one of the most important of which appears to be the CALPO (Comite Allemagne Libre Pour L'Ouest).

This Eastern branch of the Committee is reported to have been organized under Communist auspices in November 1943 by German officers and soldiers in France. With headquarters in Paris and branches in Toulouse and Marseille, CALPO seems to have about 2000 members, including representatives of most anti-Nazi German political groups. It has been concentrating its activities on breaking down German soldier morale. Other Free Germany units have been established in London, Stockholm, and Mexico City.

The growth of Free Germany has provoked increasing Nazi reaction. During the Committee's first year the Nazi press and radio made very few references to its existence, but Nazi leadership in confidential memoranda revealed anxiety as to the political capabilities of the Committee as early as January 1944. This concern centered upon the competition which the Committee offered as a rival for the support of the German people and as a foundation for German national hopes for the future. The Nazis recognized that this rival might encourage

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the German people to regard the Soviet Union not as the agent of permanent revolution but as a friendly powerful neighbor demanding a friendly foreign policy from an independent Germany. The Nazis waited, however, until July 1944 to launch an intensive campaign of counter-propaganda, presumably because they were reluctant to give the Committee publicity.

Three events in July stirred the Nazis to run greater risks: (a) the surrender of the encircled German 4th Army on the Eastern Front which, through the efforts of the Committee, brought the Commanding General and 16 other general officers into Free Germany ranks; (b) the 20 July putsch against the Hitler regime; and (c) the approach of the Red Army to the German frontiers, which elicited an appeal from the Committee for the formation of People's Committees on German soil in East Prussia.

These events precipitated a general Nazi campaign against the Free Germany movement. This campaign carefully avoided any statement which might recognize the Committee as a rival, and characterized the Committee as a "bluff" on the part of the Soviet Union, created for the purposes of propaganda and the disintegration of Germany. Adherents to the

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movement were characterized as traitors, and General von Seydlitz was condemned to death in absentia for treason.

Evidence on the reception of the Free Germany movement in Germany indicates a reason for Nazi fears. Free Germany cells designed for action in a post-Nazi Germany reportedly have been formed both in the Wehrmacht and on the home-front. The officers corps appears to have been influenced by Free Germany more than the enlisted men or the junior officers. This is probably because the officer corps knows more about Free Germany and is a distinct social group with a tradition and political ambitions. Prisoner-of-war interrogations disclose that an increasing number of officers, under the influence of illustrious names like Seydlitz and Paulus, consider that Free Germany offers them the only opportunity for a national future. These interrogations have also shown the officer corps to be particularly susceptible to any program, like that of the Free Germany Committee, which calls for the assumption of authority with the declared aim of avoiding revolutionary change.

Among German civilians the Free Germany movement appears to have received the greatest response from the polit-

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SECRET

ically conscious working classes. The Free Germany movement inside Germany consists at the core in a coalition, formed in May 1944, of three underground workers' parties -- the Social Democrats, the Communists, and the Socialist Workers -- called the "Unity Front from Pieck to Seydlitz" (Pieck, head of the German Communist Party, is a leader of the Committee in Moscow). This coalition, in which the three parties retain their organizational identity, has adopted a platform which is drawn from the manifesto of the Moscow Committee, but is somewhat more vague as regards a future political program. Though the Unity Front is reportedly engaged in restricted sabotage, its primary function is to maintain an organized nucleus for later action. Existing communications between locals cells are too irregular to permit extensive positive action. The Front has declared itself ready to cooperate with the Allied occupation, chiefly by assuming administrative authority under military government, and states that it intends to defer the formulation of definite political policies until permitted to do so by MG.

As a weapon of psychological warfare, Free Germany appears to have made significant progress towards its basic aim of disrupting the German war machine, promoting surrender

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and revealing to the German people a better alternative to a fight to the bitter end. By making its program sufficiently vague to appeal to the most divergent German social groups, it apparently has built up a following inside and outside Germany.

27 January 1945

SECRET

*Lead
Framing*

File

See →

The enclosed memorandum on war aims deals not with their content, but the importance, effect and advisable procedure of their early publication. It attempts to throw some new light especially on the significance of such publication on the internal situation in Germany. The views put forward are the result of careful discussions among a small group of Germans with scholarly, publicist and political background.

The urge which they have felt in these critical weeks to put on record their view of the war situation is rooted in a sense of responsibility for a better European and world order. They are not actuated by any motives of propaganda or special pleading. Loyal to Germany's ultimate good as part of a fair international order the authors are one in the belief that this end requires the downfall of Hitler. Much, however, as this end is agreed on all over the world, the means of bringing it about are often at variance with realities in Germany itself. The authors feel that their own familiarity with domestic conditions and forces in Germany -- confirmed by all reliable reports from that country -- places on them a particular duty to contribute on their part to clarifying the ominous uncertainties of this war.

At the same time they feel that having put their warnings on record during this perilous drift of world opinion into the same passions of war which deadlocked all progress twenty years ago, they should not again attempt to put forward ideas on whose undistorted preservation a later revival of our common Western standards may rest, while during the present destructive phase they might be mistaken for and discredited as "propaganda".

If, however, the suggested line of approach would be followed up in personal contacts which by nature of the present situation would have to be of a private and confidential character, the authors declare their readiness to work out considered opinions on any of the specific points which could only be touched upon in this more general memorandum.

MEMORANDUM

From the very start, and, indeed, before the outbreak of this war, public discussion all over the world has focused on the order of things which may eventually emerge from the struggle between Germany and the Allied Powers. The principal issues of the peace programs emanating from this discussion can already be plainly discerned.

Most proposals published hitherto seem to take an Allied victory for granted. The possibility of a stalemate through mutual exhaustion has scarcely been contemplated, while the possibility of a German victory is generally ignored.

The relative merits of these predictions shall not be discussed here. Ever since Wilson proclaimed that there should be "no victors and no vanquished", effort has not been lacking to dissociate the task of making an enduring peace in people's minds from the military outcome.

It is the purpose of the following memorandum to suggest from a new angle that, whichever way hostilities may come to an end, it will prove of inestimable value if the Allies -- even at this early stage -- have put on public record, in clear and unmistakable terms, the kind of peace for which they are fighting. Timely clarification of definite war aims, in this sense, must be regarded as not only extremely helpful, but, in fact, indispensable in order to bring this war to a desirable conclusion.

- 2 -

In arriving at this conviction we recognize that there are two fundamentally opposite premises:

(a) One school of thought starts from the proposition that Germany has now given final proof of her inability to live on equal terms with other European States. Consequently it considers it imperative to weaken Germany beyond hope of recovery and, with that end in view, to break her up into several parts. Only thus could all future attempts at political and military concentration be frustrated from the start. Even the Versailles treaty had not been sufficiently drastic to achieve this. A really crushing peace treaty must, therefore, be drawn up this time.

To this end, they either advocate unmitigated severity towards Germany and uncompromisingly self-interested protection of their territories from further German aggression, or they plead for a "more constructive" solution to these problems. They argue that the creative side of the German national character would be given sufficient chance of development if their interests were confined to industrial and cultural fields. This could be achieved by depriving the Germans of every possible lever and hope of political initiative abroad. A certain emotional compensation for Germany's former political status, according to this view, could be found in exploiting the antagonism latent between her northern and southern parts. There would be no danger for the rest of Europe if the States south of the Main were permitted to form a union including Austria, if not

- 3 -

the Rhineland. Such a union might well be economically successful and might in time develop a national consciousness sufficient to offset moves towards a restoration of German unity.

(b) In direct contrast to this, the other school of thought starts from the proposition that the Versailles treaty and especially the spirit of its application were too harsh, and that the present war is its natural outcome. That treaty has brought to power the aggressive forces in Germany, as such a peace settlement might have done in any other self-respecting nation. A future settlement, then, would have to avoid all stimuli to a repetition of the aftermath of Versailles. Germany, in their view, should be granted a fair basis for national existence. Measures which might rekindle her persecution complex and supply new material for demagogues must be avoided. These critics of the Versailles treaty consider the breaking up of Germany, under whatever circumstances, as disastrous to the future peace of Europe. Never, in the long run, would the German people submit to this forced partition. This group would demand a radical departure from all experiments based on the old conception of "power politics". They consider Europe, and Germany within Europe, as ripe for an attempt at other methods, taking into more adequate account the underlying economic and social factors. They regard as a dangerous dogma the view that this war of 1939, following on previous outbreaks ever since 1864, proves the perpetual bellicosity of the German. The period since the Treaty of Versailles must, in their opinion, be regarded as

- 4 -

an abnormal state of affairs which was bound to result in wholly extraordinary reactions, such as the submission of Germany to an extremist government. There are, in this view, sufficient reliable elements in the German make-up to warrant an attempt to form a new order in Europe in cooperation with a liberated Germany, provided that she is not made a victim of new grievances, and thereby again driven into channels of irrational escape.

The Allied Governments, and each Government which will participate directly or indirectly in any eventual settlement, must decide between the merits of these two points of view before they can on their part approach the problem of peace terms.

If the theory is accepted that Germany is bound to remain a nefarious element in the European family of nations, any proclamation of war aims on this basis can only do harm. Such an act could only contribute to the prolongation of the war. Even though the German people are increasingly opposed to the National-Socialist Government and embittered by its policies, it is clear that only a negligible minority of Germans will deny their support even to the present regime, if the preservation of the German nation is at stake.

* * * * *

Next, if not all, considerations, on the other hand, support an early declaration of the Allied peace aims, if a departure from the Treaty of Versailles and its philosophy could

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be envisaged. The practical purpose in proclaiming the Allied peace program would be:

- (1) to finish the war quickly;
- (2) to reduce actual and potential friction in Europe to a minimum by a negotiated peace;
- (3) to set moving machinery for European cooperation.

The extreme importance of a timely clarification of war aims derives not merely from the fact that it would reassure and consolidate opposition in Germany and thereby contribute to the discrediting and undoing of Nazi domination. It is of vital importance also for the future internal situation within the Allied states themselves. All experiences of the last war substantiate the likelihood that this internal factor will form a cause of acute anxiety for all belligerent governments once hostilities are ended.

* * * * *

Looking at it from an international point of view there would be a distinctly favourable reaction in Germany to the proclamation of reasonable and definite peace aims, provided that this proclamation will be convincing.

The Nazi Government has so far effectively kept the German people from realizing the reasons that made the Allies go to war. Should it prove possible to dispel the view hitherto prevailing in Germany, that the Allies are fighting to crush a young and rising nation whatever its leadership, this would be a tremendous step ahead.

The attempt to disentangle past history offers little

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prospect of clarification. However, the vision of a constructive and fair peace, as the pledged aim of Allied war efforts, could substantially disprove the Nazi explanation why war became necessary. The realization of Hitler's incapacity to conclude such a desirable peace would intensify the deep discontent which is growing in Germany, caused by physical distress and the spectacle of Nazi mismanagement.

The working classes in Germany especially are certain to break through their present attitude of reserve, which is partly due to their defeat in 1933, and also to the fact that they see no practical alternative to the present international deadlock. If a way out were to emerge clearly from the present maze of domestic and foreign propaganda which envelops them, their grievances against the Nazi regime will be felt to be no longer tolerable and, in so far as such discontent cannot be vented in the heavily policed factory yards and military ranks, it will find an even more impressive outlet in the home and, through the women, in the streets. It must be realized that the German proletariat still retain in essence their international inclinations, even though the hopes of Communism have been shattered and discredited by the Hitler-Stalin pact. There are signs that even beyond this profound disillusionment all political creeds have lost their hold on people's minds -- a natural outcome of the Machiavellian cynicism of both Communist and Nazi policies. The political thinking of the German working man tends to be eminently "matter of fact" nowadays.

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The middle and lower strata of the German middle class are committed to follow any violent mass movement, whatever its origin. They are rapidly losing the new pride with which National Socialism had inflated them: concentration of Nazi power in recent times has proceeded at their expense, and they have lost all political initiative.

The propertied or otherwise privileged classes ("liberal" professions, especially university teachers) are struggling in silent, but desperate opposition to the regime which, however, contrives to retain their ultimate loyalty with the threat of national annihilation by the Allies, if all patriotic Germans do not stand together in this supreme moment of danger. The upper bourgeoisie in particular hope that eventually the army officers will take matters in hand and liberate them from their present yoke and from the threat of an effective Nazi-Bolshevik fraternization.

Up to now the attitude of the German officer corps towards the regime has not been uniform. The present High Command must be regarded as somewhat hypnotized by Hitler. But the likelihood of a change in this respect is the greater as pressure on responsible army opinion increases. The higher ranks are bound to revert to their previous conviction that Germany, in her present state on the military as well as the home front, should not be exposed to the stress of a major European war. Their primary concern, naturally, will now be to bring this war to a satisfactory conclusion, but they will be

- 8 -

all the more disposed towards an equitable peace if opinion is crystallized on the fact that Hitler had forced this conflict and is precluding its honourable and reasonable settlement by his headstrong disregard of the rational and responsible elements in the state.

Taking Germany as a whole, the following can be stated with certainty: Hitler came into power by promising the destruction of Communism to all who still had something to lose, and by promising the restoration of Germany's greatness without war. In August 1939 Hitler finally destroyed these two fundamentals of his power. His rule is now supported merely by the direct necessity of the German people to back the regime in its war against the alleged intention of the Allied Powers to destroy Germany once more. While Hitler's two promises have been blatantly broken, this last fear still holds the majority of Germans in the thrall of Nazi war measures so long as they appear to be the only means to national survival. The realization that continued National Socialist control is the chief obstacle to peaceful survival will of necessity bring a profound change and an overwhelming sense of having been betrayed by Hitler. If the prospect appears that this government may be removed and simultaneously a tolerable position for Germany in a new Europe could be secured, this realization would provide the German people with a psychological pre-requisite without which the instinct of national preservation must outrule even the most passionate urge to liberate themselves.

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If, on the other hand, the German people -- groping for some bearable alternative to Hitler -- are met with continued vagueness and intransigence from the "Western powers", their desperate hopes are bound to turn eastwards once more. The ensuing resurgence of popular unrest forms as yet a remoter possibility than might be taken as the obvious immediate implication of the Nazi-Soviet threat. But ultimately the nightmare of another crushing peace settlement and its keenly remembered humiliations must drive the Germans into close union with Russia as the only remaining alternative. And it is difficult to see how the revolutionary developments following such a change of attitude within Germany could be confined to the frontiers of that country.

* * * * *

In their own states, too, the Allied Governments now in power must anticipate profound psychological changes if this war goes on.

They have a vital interest in guiding these changes in order to preclude unexpected and undesirable outbreaks at the end, or even before the end, of this struggle. The British Prime Minister has recognized this necessity in his speech of October 12th. He emphasized the fact that the Europe emerging from the present conflict will be very different from the Europe we know now. This does not merely mean territorial changes and the like. Mr. Chamberlain must have been thinking also of the inevitable and profound alterations in the inner political temper of the belligerent peoples and the incalculable effect of this on the life of the state.

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The Governments, both in Paris and in London, have from the very start of this war realized that the mood of their peoples differed profoundly from that hitherto observed in wars which had to be fought by popular armies. The people this time were not carried away into a frenzy of passion. Their attitudes remained wholly rational. All observers have stated this with amazement. Consciously or unconsciously, the speeches of Daladier as well as of Chamberlain, communicating to the people the Government's decision to fight, have respected this mood. Neither have used the terms, "Glory", "Prestige", or "National Grandeur", as the primary motivation for the necessity of such a grave step. As distinct from any such general appeal, they have concentrated their arguments on the interests of every individual Frenchman or Britisher, his way of life, his personal liberty, and his desire for an undisturbed existence.

These arguments, too, are the cause of the common man's readiness to fight for England and France; it is neither enthusiasm, revengefulness or greed which drive him to do so. It is in the interests of both Allied Governments to support this attitude. There is no reason to intensify the conduct of war by replacing these motives with those propaganda slogans which were customary in previous wars. But it is necessary to sustain this rational and deliberate attitude by supplying it with a clear objective, the emotional as well as rational appeal of which justifies the terrible sacrifices which are demanded. It is imperative to tell the people not only why they were forced to fight, but moreover

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what they are fighting for.

The permanence of what has here been characterized as a rational attitude is not to be relied upon. The enormous efforts which war imposes on the people even now increase their irritability and the violence of their reactions. If popular passions get beyond control, grave dangers in the nature of those hinted at by the British Premier are inevitable.

There is a definite threat that on both sides popular opinion may lay this war to governmental failure and denounce it as "their" war. Hitler may have wanted it, but the other cabinets did not successfully prevent his having his way. The popular fury -- as after 1914-1918 -- may well direct itself against certain political systems, or, indeed, against government as such: a kind of semi-religious revival with chaotic social consequences may surge up, and revolutionary tendencies, already latent, may manifest themselves in a more drastic and destructive form the longer this war lasts. Governments will only lend substance to their former dealings and their present authority if they rally public opinion in good time around a peace program which meets with sufficiently broad approval to serve as a safety valve. They will otherwise become victims of the catastrophic events, which any realist must foresee, and will be blamed for having embarked on a course of destruction without the vision of a tolerable future in which their successors will base their claim to power.

If one has to count on an increase in the elements of passion in popular thinking, it becomes imperative to canalize

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these forces into constructive channels. They are dangerous, but they also have the advantage of permitting a radical re-molding of ideas. The present Governments have no better means to crystallize popular emotions than to proclaim the goal of a peace which is just and constructive and worth fighting for.

It may be remarked in passing that nationalism of the kind which finds its most extreme expression in Nazidom has been distinctly on the down-grade in Europe for some time. This assertion may seem paradoxical. But it must not be doubted that the same cool reasonableness which prevails on the Allied side is also present in the German popular attitude towards this war. Even Hitler, in deference to this, had to present the decision to fight as an act of generally shared deliberation. He had to let the war "slide in by the back door". The regime was acutely conscious of the fact that the onslaught on Poland was unpopular, as certainly the extension of hostilities to the West was dreaded by the German masses.

Almost imperceptibly, the whole complex of national prestige, has lost its hold on the peoples of Europe. For this reason a definite move towards European cooperation will be much easier than it was after the last war.

If, therefore, the Allied Governments decided upon the necessity of a peace of reconciliation with Germany, they would not only be able to deal with their own critical internal problems after the war, but they will also find the necessary material for building a stable and cooperative future for Europe.

* * * * *

- 13 -

The technique of an early proclamation of Allied peace aims certainly presents formidable difficulties. Its communication to the people of Germany is but one of the smallest among them.

The procedure herein advocated has been applied before. Woodrow Wilson published his Fourteen Points on January 22, 1918. His action turned against itself in the latter course of events, and now it forms one of the strongest impediments to a successful repetition of such action in the present war.

And yet, this unparalleled and high-minded initiative on the part of the President of the United States had been perfectly right as a guiding principle and might, if properly followed up, have set the standard for a lasting democratic peace. It had its effect, under even less favourable internal conditions in Germany, for the duration of the war. The Fourteen Points, without any doubt, spurred the unleashing of democratic forces in Germany. Their unfortunate later effect was due to mistakes which must and can be avoided this time.

Germany has felt herself betrayed by what followed after the Fourteen Points. This feeling is sincere. When the first confirmed news about the later stipulations of Versailles, at the end of February 1919, reached Berlin, the German nation stood aghast.

It is evident that this later perversion of President Wilson's honest intentions, as expressed in the text and commentaries of his Fourteen Points is at present being successfully

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used by the Nazi Government to convince the German people that another betrayal is at the back of all peace proposals.

The fundamental question therefore arises: How can the diffidence, which any stipulation advanced by the Allies at present is bound to meet in Germany, be modified or even avoided?

The best means lies in the nature of the proposal itself, in the practical and unequivocal character of its terms. The European future must appear as the result of common sense reasoning, not of lofty ideals. The latter approach is blocked by past disillusionment but the former will strike a powerful chord of consent.

It follows that a maximum of precision is necessary. It will certainly not be possible to be exhaustive on all points, because a full understanding between the Allied Governments cannot be expected. But it should be possible, for instance, to state certain maximum concessions which are going to be asked of the German people or to assure that their territorial status of 1933 shall be disrupted under no circumstances.

Certain minimum commitments on the Allied side should be subjected to equally careful consideration, not only regarding economic concessions which the Allies should be prepared to make for a constructive peace, but also regarding the actual conditions and forces which would enable Germany to participate in a co-operative European future.

Any peace based on the outcome of military victory would mean abandonment of Europe's common traditions in sharp discrimina-

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tion against one or some of her great peoples. The natural consequence would be continued tension between the powerful and the helpless which, according to the laws of history, would again resolve itself in new catastrophes.

It will not be attempted to even sketch in this limited context the material adjustments which would have to be made in Europe's political and economic structure. The necessity of relinquishing some, especially of the economic attributes of national sovereignty is rightly emerging as one of the chief problems. The contribution from both sides will have to be substantial, but even larger sacrifices, if made on the basis of negotiation, must be considered as infinitely preferable to the indefinite toll of life and treasure which a drifting on of the European catastrophe will necessitate.

Granted that the Allies do not intend to partition Germany, her own contribution must consist first and foremost in the abandonment of her present political leadership. But this is clearly not enough, because there must be assurance also that the Germany which may emerge after the downfall of Hitler will be an honest and effective partner to such a peace. The question, how this function of Germany can be made to work in terms of her social, economic and political structure, must be answered separately. Germany must be able to satisfy the desire of the European peoples as a whole that another war amongst them is ruled out as a possibility.

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This is not a victor's peace, but conditions worked out on such a basis of negotiation would restore to Europe tranquillity and potential well-being, and they would answer the inherent trend of her people's aspirations.

America's tremendous authority in helping to decide the character of a future European and world peace could, in our view, be asserted in various effective ways.

The momentous increase of diplomatic influence now at the disposal of the United States all over the world is one of the most significant results of the first two months of the war. The manner in which this influence could be used, lies outside the range and competence of the authors of this memorandum. But if it were felt all over Europe, in the Allied countries as well as in Germany, that the authority of the United States is backing the effort of devising a fair and durable peace settlement, this would be a most substantial aid in setting people's minds to work in constructive directions. And this, in our view, would be achieved most effectively by American diplomatic insistence on a timely and explicit pledge of the Allies to a rational war aim.

The early publication of war aims has been frequently urged by various quarters in the Allied countries and foreshadowed in a general manner by several governmental speeches.

To be fully convincing, however, such a proclamation would have to be enhanced by some specific pledge which would bring it home to the German people that peace will be negotiated on this and no other basis.

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It is obviously out of the question that the American Government could attach their guarantee to such an Allied promise, though this would certainly be the most convincing assurance available in present-day world politics. Isolationist forces would oppose this guarantee, though it might afford an excellent opportunity to define the character and content of America's peace policy and its fundamental attitude towards the war in Europe. Yet the United States will probably not wish to be implicated to the extent of a guarantee which might put them in the position of having to enforce certain peace conditions.

If then, it is impossible to grant such a measure of American participation, it might still be feasible to bring the moral weight of this country to bear upon the European situation by eliciting some solemn promise of the Allied governments, addressed to the American people and its government, that they will fight for and stick by their declared war aims. This would not, in case of default, imply the enforcement of their stipulations by America, but would leave the way open for later constructive influence on the European situation.

Beyond this diplomatic measure which it may be considered feasible to administer to the present state of European bewilderment and indecision, America is already preparing for an even broader and far-reaching contribution to the future peace. The British Ambassador to the United States has pointed out in a recent speech (New York, October 29th) that, not being involved in the immediate applications of warfare, America may find herself

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in a better position than any of the belligerents in the task of defining the fundamentals of a lasting peace.

America, not divided as we are by social and national boundaries, may well raise the standard of all peace discussion above our complex prejudices of the past, provide a foundation for personal contact, mutual information and confidence and extend her sympathy to the constructive elements even of those countries, which in their present frame are considered the chief disturbers of peace. Such understanding especially, if ever there is to be a permanent settlement in our view constitutes a crying need at a time which is increasingly obscured by propaganda and indiscriminating war passion. Contacts, which link up the domestic potentialities in Germany with sound judgment of the international situation, seem to us prerequisites for a peace built on the firm basis of the actual popular conditions and not on formulas which breed future maladjustment and conflict. It may be possible, before the conflict has become too passionate for America not only to insist on a responsible declaration of war aims but to help substantially in clarifying those profound and comprehensive political adjustments which will really contrive to rule out war amongst the Western Nations.

- 18 -

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See also Study Group
re: German

S. Aufhauser
 87-42 Elmhurst Avenue
 Elmhurst, Long Island
 New York.

September 7, 1942

Colonel Wm. J. Donovan,
 Director, Office of Strategic Services
 25th & E Streets, N.W.
 Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Donovan:

In accordance with the intentions of Mr. Donald M. Nelson, Mr. Henry M. Paynter, Director, United Nations News Division has asked us to inform you about the aims of the "German Democratic Study Group". Enclosed, please, find a statement of policy of this group.

In addition, we beg to inform you that one of our sub-committees is at present doing radio research work. Two participants of our group are already doing practical radio work (short wave to Germany). - Other sub-committees are concerned with problems as to the transitional and the post-war periods.

Beyond this, our group might be able to assist the United Nations in carrying out psychological warfare. The group comprises experts in various fields, most of them having held leading positions in their respective domains such as administration, justice, labor movement, economics, education, police, army, public welfare, press and radio. We have likewise in our midst leading personalities of the Protestant and Catholic Opposition. At your request, we would gladly provide you with more details.

Sincerely yours,

S. Aufhauser
 S. Aufhauser
 a former member of
 the German Reichstag

H. W. Baerensprung
 H. W. Baerensprung
 formerly: Chief of
 Police of Magdeburg

German Democratic Study Group

The German Democratic Study Group consists of a number of individual study commissions which are dealing with the European post war problems. It is not an "organization" and has no permanent members. Emigrants interested in discussions of economic and social questions, demobilization, educational reconstruction, transitional period and organization of peace gather in informal meetings. The study group, up to now, has drawn the interests of all democratic anti-Nazis regardless of their political, social or religious affiliations. In this unique way it was possible, that members of heterogeneous political groups found a common and neutral floor to contribute with all their forces at their disposal to the defeat of Nazism. Because of this possibility to form single study groups according to the interests and knowledge of the participants, and because of the still remaining contacts with the Nazi opposition inside Germany and the democratic forces in the United States which some of the participants have, these consider themselves especially qualified to take part in the political warfare waged against Nazi Germany.

The participants of the German Democratic Study Group believe that they can fulfill the following three tasks within the framework of the political conduct of the war:

- (1) They wish to help strengthen the opposition within Germany by participating in the political propaganda directed toward Germany and thus help shorten the war. Since the participants of the German Democratic Study Group represent every stratum of the German population, they are in an especially good position to observe the inner political development within that country. Their experience and understanding can increase the effectiveness of political propaganda considerably.
 - (2) They wish to aid in the preparations which are being made towards the solution of the transition problems which will present themselves with the overthrow of the Nazi dictatorship. What occurs during this period in the social, economic and cultural sphere will determine the entire later development. The participants of the German Democratic Study Group have experts in all the respective spheres.
 - (3) The participants of the German Democratic Study Group wish to aid in the drawing up of plans for the reconstruction of Germany and Europe after the war which will create the political, economic and social guarantees necessary to prevent Germany from plunging the world into a new war.
- Not only Hitler and Nazism must be overthrown, but the roots of German militarism must be destroyed if a new Europe founded on the principles of freedom, democracy, and justice, and collective security is to be built up. From the complete military disarmament of Germany can be a

- 2 -

guarantee against further one-sided aggression only, if one-sided military rearmament is impeded by international economic collaboration. To bring this problem closer to a solution, the participants of the German Democratic Study Group are preparing considerations for the integration of Germany into the international and European economic organizations on a basis which will insure the peaceful development of German economy and prevent the possibility of new military aggression.

The participants of the German Democratic Study Group place special emphasis upon the working out of directives for the re-orientation of the German people and the entire re-organization of the education of the German youth, as they consider that no political or economic guarantees can be permanently effective unless the German people's essential desire for peace is restored.

The participants of the German Democratic Study Group wish to prepare the spiritual pre-requisites for enabling the German people to rebuild Germany in the true spirit of democracy and thus make its contribution to the permanent preservation of world peace.

German Democratic Study Group
X Aufhäuser
X Darschuping

September 8, 1942

My dear Madam Secretary:

I am much obliged to you for your kindness in transmitting, under date of September 5, 1942, the communication from Messrs. Aufhäuser and Darschuping relative to the activities of the German Democratic Study Group.

Very sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan

The Honorable

The Secretary of Labor

JWD:EM

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

September 5, 1942

X Aufhauser


X Bagley

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
Office of the Coordinator of Information
25th and E Streets
Washington, D. C.

My dear Colonel Donovan:


I am referring to you for such attention
as you may feel it warrants, the attached communi-
cation from S. Aufhauser of Elmhurst, New York.

Sincerely yours,




Attachment

S. Aufhauser
87-42 Elmhurst Ave.
Elmhurst, L.I., N.Y.



German Dem. Study
Group
Aufhauser
x h m p m

Miss Frances Perkins
Secretary of Labor
Washington, DC.



Dear Miss Perkins:

You are supposed to be interested in the activities of the German Democratic Study Group.

We, therefore, beg to submit to you the enclosed statement about the aims of our group.

We would be happy to get an opportunity to participate in the common fight against Nazism and Fascism.

We are perfectly willing and ready to convey to you any further information.

Very truly yours,

S. Aufhauser
S. Aufhauser

a former member of
the German Reichstag

Horst W. Baerensprung
Horst W. Baerensprung

formerly: Chief of
Police of Magdeburg

German Democratic Study Group

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The participants of the German Democratic Study Group believe that they can fulfill the following three tasks within the framework of the political combat of the war:


- (1) They wish to help strengthen the opposition within Germany by participating in the political propaganda directed toward Germany and thus help shorten the war. Since the participants of the German Democratic Study Group represent every stratum of the German population they are in an especially good position to observe the inner political development within that country. Their experience and understanding can increase the effectiveness of political propaganda considerably.
 - (2) They wish to aid in the preparations which are being made towards the solution of the transition problems which will present themselves with the overthrow of the Nazi dictatorship. What occurs during this period in the social, economic and cultural sphere will determine the entire later development. The participants of the German Democratic Study Group have experts in all the respective spheres.
 - (3) The participants of the German Democratic Study Group wish to aid in the drawing up of plans for the reconstruction of Germany and Europe after the war which will avert the political, economic and social conditions necessary to prevent Germany from plunging the world into a new war.
- Not only Hitler and Nazism must be overthrown, but the roots of German militarism must be destroyed if a new Europe founded on the principles of freedom, democracy, and justice, and collective security is to be built up. Even the complete military disarmament of Germany can be a guarantee against further one-sided aggression only, if one-sided

- 2 -

military resurgence is impeded by international economic collaboration. In bring this problem closer to a solution, the participants of the German Democratic Study Group are preparing considerations for the integration of Germany into the international and European economic organizations on a basis which will insure the peaceful development of German economy and prevent the possibility of new military aggression.

The participants of the German Democratic Study Group place special emphasis upon the working out of directives for the re-orientation of the German people and the entire re-organization of the education of the German youth, as they consider that no political or economic guarantees can be permanently effective unless the German people's essential desire for peace is restored.

The participants of the German Democratic Study Group wish to prepare the spiritual pre-requisites for enabling the German people to rebuild Germany in the true spirit of democracy and thus make its contribution to the permanent preservation of world peace.



Gorn... 7-
CONFIDENTIAL

X Aug 11

September 4, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL DONOVAN:

Information in the files of the Foreign Nationalities Branch of the O.S.S. fully corroborates Dr. Dorn's remarks about the German Study Group. A few observations and citations from this material will help to demonstrate the soundness of his conclusions.

Siegfried Aufhaeuser, formerly one of the outstanding leaders of the Trade Union movement in Germany and a Social Democrat member of the Reichstag, and Horst Baerensprung, descended from a military family of the Prussian nobility and a former Police President of Magdeburg, are both members of the Association of Free Germans in New York. Since this organization is a small and relatively homogeneous group, the following remarks about it, quoted from a recently prepared study of this Branch, have more than a passing significance.

"Further evidence of the strong nationalism of this group (the Association of Free Germans) may be found in other opinions held by leaders of the group. Dr. Grzesinski is reported to have said in private conversation that while the Association of Free Germans would necessarily pay lip-service to whatever program the United States

CONFIDENTIAL

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Government approved of, it would nonetheless continue to work for a strong Germany that would be free of foreign domination and interference. According to equally reliable reports, Horst Baerensprung, at the time he was negotiating with the Canadian Government for the formation of a Free German Legion, said that if he should fail in the attempt and Otto Strasser, former confederate of Hitler, should succeed, he would be willing to join forces with Strasser."

Another statement, which may be quoted as underscoring the same point, comes from one of the leaders of the Association, another Social Democrat:

"Whatever the victorious nations would like to do with Germany and the Germans after this war and finally will do... (a.o. they may torture the German people with foreign garrisons, with god only knows what kind of experimental education and controls)... the German territory as such will not be wiped off the map and the eighty millions of German people living on this territory will remain and will feel themselves so much more as a national-folk, especially the more it will be tried to tear them apart and to have them educated by foreigners with foreign methods." (Italics ours).

Although this is an extreme statement, it may be assumed that it reflects to a large degree the prevailing

CONFIDENTIAL

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attitudes of the Association, and would find a sympathetic echo in any group sponsored by members of the Association such as the Study Group in question. It should be noted that the above quotation illustrates: (1) the highly opinionated position of certain Social Democrats on precisely the questions of "inner political development," and "the solution of the transition problems" which the prospectus of the Study Group declares as among its chief interests; and (2) the duplicity practised by many of the same men and, officially, by the Association of Free Germans: i.e. while the Association insists it does not favor the inclusion of Austria in a post-war Germany, the eighty-million figure mentioned in the above quotation can only have reference to a German nation that does include Austria.

Furthermore, it is known that the German political refugees in general and the Social Democrats in particular are in violent disagreement over almost all the important post-war problems, especially those concerning unilateral disarmament and measures for foreign control of German political and economic life. It is doubtless for this reason that the letter-head of the Association of Free Germans is constantly changing, showing new withdrawals and replacements.

In short, from all the evidence available to this

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Branch one can reasonably conclude that a German Democratic Study Group, if dominated by the Social-Democrats and especially if granted any kind of official or semi-official recognition, would quite probably end by lobbying for the aggressive convictions of the Association of Free Germans. If, on the other hand, the Group accepted members from all circles of the German emigration (and at the moment almost all circles at least claim to be convinced democrats), one could be reasonably sure that, like the Goldsmith Group, it would be torn by the most violent dissension and animosity.

John C. Wiley



2

FOREIGN NATIONALITIES BR.
IN OUT

SEP 29 38 AM
SEP. 1, 1942
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN WILEY:

Will you let me have your
opinion on this?

W. J. D.

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of

German

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Washington, D. C.

REPLY TO:
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
25TH AND E STREETS, N. W.

August 31, 1942

To: Colonel Donovan
From: William L. Langer

I am returning to you the letter from the German Democratic Study Group together with its attachment. I referred this whole matter to Mr. Dorn, Chief of our Central European Section, and have just received from him a memorandum commenting not too favorably on the whole organization.

It seems to me that it might be well to get John Wiley's opinion on this matter before proceeding further.

William L. Langer
William L. Langer
Director of Research

Attachments

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

August 28, 1942

From: Walter L. Dorn
 To: Dr. William L. Langor

I am returning the attached memorandum to you with the following comments:

1. Before this German Democratic Study Group is given official approval the recent study written in the Foreign Nationalities Branch of O.S.S. should be consulted.

2. The notion of a German Study Group was first proposed by Dr. Staudinger of the New School of Social Research. Theoretically, there could be no better means of counteracting the inter-factional strife among the members of the German Emigration than such a non-political organization which would unite all of them in support of our war effort. Whether this particular group is best fitted to take charge I am unable to say. In the light of my own information corroborated by the study sponsored in the Foreign Nationalities Branch of O.S.S., I cannot suppress certain grave doubts. This group claims to represent emigres of all classes. I understand there have been exclusions.

3. This group lays claim to possess "contacts with the Nazi opposition inside Germany". I doubt this very much.

4. The former party affiliations of the gentlemen who signed the letter to General Smoot are apparent. From what I have learned from other sources it appears that this group could safely assume the title Social Democratic Study Group, though they would violently protest against being so called.

5. I feel that it would be best to wait and see what the members of the group propose and what position they take on crucial problems such as unilateral disarmament before any official relations with them be opened.

MEMORANDUM


August 27, 1942

To: Mr. Dorn

From: William L. Lanier

There is attached a statement regarding the German Democratic Study Group, together with a letter addressed to Col. Donovan by J. Aufhauser and Horst W. Baerensprung.

Please let me have your comments on this, and return the file to me.


William L. Lanier
Director of Research

Attachments

S. Aufhauser
87-42 Elmhurst Ave.
Elmhurst, L.I., N.Y.

August 17, 1942.

Mr. William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
25 and E Street, NW.
Washington, DC.



Dear Mr. Donovan:

You are supposed to be interested in the activities of the German Democratic Study Group.

We, therefore, beg to submit to you the enclosed statement about the aims of our group.

We would be happy to get an opportunity to participate in the common fight against Nazism and Fascism.

We are perfectly willing and ready to convey to you any further information.

Very truly yours,

S. Aufhauser
S. Aufhauser
a former member of
the German Reichstag

Horst W. Bacrensprung
Horst W. Bacrensprung
formerly: Chief of
Police of Magdeburg

German Democratic Study Group

The German Democratic Study Group consists of a number of individual study commissions which are dealing with the European post war problems. It is not an "organization" and has no permanent members. Persons interested in discussions of economic and social questions, demobilization, educational reconstruction, transitional period and organization of peace gather in informal meetings. The study group, up to now, has drawn the interests of all democratic anti-Nazi sympathizers of their political, social or religious affiliations. In this unique way it was possible that members of heterogeneous political groups found a common and neutral floor to contribute with all their forces at their disposal to the defeat of Nazism. Because of this possibility to form single study groups according to the interests and knowledge of the participants, and because of the still remaining contacts with the Nazi opposition inside Germany and the democratic forces in the United States which some of the participants have, these consider themselves especially qualified to take part in the political warfare waged against Nazi Germany.

The participants of the German Democratic Study Group believe that they can fulfill the following three tasks within the framework of the political conduct of the war:

- (1) They wish to help strengthen the opposition within Germany by participating in the political propaganda directed toward Germany and thus help shorten the war. Since the participants of the German Democratic Study Group represent every stratum of the German population, they are in an especially good position to observe the inner political development within that country. Their experience and understanding can increase the effectiveness of political propaganda considerably.
- (2) They wish to aid in the preparations which are being made towards the solution of the transition problems which will present themselves with the overthrow of the Nazi dictatorship. What occurs during this period in the political, economic and cultural sphere will determine the entire later development. The participants of the German Democratic Study Group have experts in all the respective spheres.
- (3) The participants of the German Democratic Study Group wish to aid in the drawing up of plans for the reconstruction of Germany and Europe after the war which will ensure the political, economic and social guarantees necessary to prevent Germany from plunging the world into a new war.

Not only Hitler and Hatten must be overthrown, but the roots of German militarism must be destroyed if a new Europe founded on the principles of freedom, democracy, and justice, and collective security is to be built up. Even the complete military disarmament of Germany can be a

- 2 -

guarantee against further one-sided aggression only, if one-sided military recruitment is impeded by international economic collaboration. To bring this problem closer to a solution, the participants of the German Democratic Study Group are preparing considerations for the integration of Germany into the international and European economic organizations on a basis which will insure the peaceful development of German economy and prevent the possibility of new military aggression.

The participants of the German Democratic Study Group place special emphasis upon the working out of directives for the re-orientation of the German people and the entire re-organization of the education of the German youth, as they consider that no political or economic guarantees can be permanently effective unless the German people's essential desire for peace is restored.

The participants of the German Democratic Study Group wish to prepare the spiritual pre-requisites for enabling the German people to rebuild Germany in the true spirit of democracy and thus make its contribution to the permanent preservation of world peace.



GERMAN ARMY AND THE NAZI PARTY

To appreciate fully the relationship between the Nazi Party and the German General Staff it is necessary to understand the position which the Army has held, and the political influence which it has exercised, in Prussia, and later in the German Empire.

"We shall wait in vain for the awakening in our country of that public spirit which the English and French and other peoples possess. If we do not initiate them in setting for our military leaders certain bounds and limitations which they must not disregard." When Baron von Stein wrote these words over a hundred years ago, the new military machine with which Gneisenau and Scharnhorst had evaded the military provisions of the Treaty of Tilsit, and greatly contributed to the overthrow of Napoleon, was seeking its life for the political domination in Prussia. Though, since the days of Frederick the Great, the influence of the Prussian Army had been strong, it was not until the formation of the German Great General Staff was created in 1864 that it reached that unassailable position which, with two exceptions, it continued to occupy for over a century.

The great military leaders of the liberation period, Gneisenau, Gneisenau, and Scharnhorst, though showing different views on foreign policy, loyally supported Stein and Hardenberg in their policy of reform. But, with them, began the opposition of the vacillating monarch, Frederick William III; yet Stein was aware of the danger to the monarchy and Government if the control of the military machine should at some future time fall into less capable hands than those of his colleagues.

Three

It was for this reason that he sought to confine the position of the army within certain limits and limitations - the army having captured the nebulous and "usually" patriotism generated by the activities of the ~~Prussians~~ and there was a danger that a dominant school of thought would arise, convinced that true patriotism could only be expressed through the medium of militarism.

At one moment only in the later history of Royal Prussia did the civil Government and the army preserve the delimitation of their respective functions. Under Wilhelm I, the Chancellor, the Minister of War, and the Chief of the General Staff worked together in harmonious accord in all essentials, and it was assumed that when Bismarck, Roon, and Moltke were agreed upon a policy, the agreement of the King would also be forthcoming.

This close collaboration, though it spelled destruction for the monarch of Prussia, raised that country from the status of a similar vassal of Austria to that of Prussian later and among the German states, and finally to the controlling position of Imperial power. The four worked together as colleagues and not as rivals, and it is impossible, for example, to conceive of any of the three Ministers treating the old King with that frank hostility which on occasion the Emperor Constantine noted out to his guests during the period of the Bismarck-Bismarck Controversies of 1871-73, in the course of which the Emperor Constantine usurped the prerogatives not only of the Reichstag and the Military Cabinet, but of the Emperor himself. Under Wilhelm I, it was for the army to win victories, the Chancellor to govern, and the King to rule, and during this period each performed his function with excellent results - for Germany.

THIS...

This was the first exception to the rule of the domination of the army. The second was that brief period in 1918-1919, when the military caste were discredited, the authority of the generals ineffective, and the army in a state of disintegration. Deprived of its Emperor, the army had lost the symbol to which its singular loyalty had always been pledged. Its leadership was in the dust, it owed allegiance to no man, and its power and numbers had been shattered by defeat and the crushing terms of the Armistice. It was within the power of German Social Democracy at that time to confine the military leadership of Germany within the bounds which Stein had sought so zealously to impose a hundred years before; that it failed to do so was due partly to its own ineptitude, and partly to the skill of the military caste who insisted that the military clauses in the Treaty of Peace were so humiliating that it was incumbent upon every German patriot to encompass their evasion.

By the end of 1919, the army which Hindenburg and Ludendorff had brought home from France had been reduced to the figure prescribed by the terms of the Armistice. The chaotic condition of the country made it impossible for those discharged to be absorbed into civilian life, and they swelled the ranks of the starving unemployed, rickety the country in bands, and ripe for any mischief. From these grew up the Free Corps, these privately armed and organized armies formed to protect the Eastern Frontiers, to crush the insipient communist plagues which threatened in many parts of the country, and to keep alive some semblance of the old military spirit.

Meanwhile each of the old army officers as could bring themselves to follow the example of Hindenburg and Ludendorff, and co-operate with, rather than serve,

the Republic, grouped themselves around the Ministry of Defence, Goebbels, and convinced him of the need of building up a strong force from the stable elements which remained of the Imperial Army. There were men amongst the Social Democrats and the Centre who saw the danger of this move, and urged passionately that the new army should be a purely republican guard, and a force drawn from elements essentially antagonistic to the former regime.

Goebbels's view, however, prevailed; when a new Reichswehr was constituted it was largely recruited from members of the Free Corps and volunteers who had seen war service, and with this force the second Communist revolt of March 1919 was effectively suppressed. This feat earned the respect of Eisinger and Goebbels, and the latter used his influence with Goebbels to have Goebbels, by far the ablest of Germany's executive officers, appointed General Commanding the new army.

But the danger of creating the new army from the old soon became apparent. It was one thing to crush a Communist revolt, but a very different one to operate against the remainder of the Free Corps and the army troops under Eisinger, who joined the Party. "There can be no question of setting the Reichswehr to fight these people," Goebbels declared to Goebbels. "You force a battle at the Brandenburger Tor between troops who a year and a half ago were fighting side by side to shoulder against the enemy!" The Party Government was defeated by the general strike of the workers and the threat of a march on Berlin by bands of armed men. Throughout that fateful week the Reichswehr preserved a silent and, in some sense, a very conspicuous neutrality. It was not a very creditable episode in its history.

In the reconstruction of the Government which

Continued...

removed the Putsch, Kozak retired to his post as Provincial Resident, to be succeeded as Minister of Defence by Gerasimov, and Gruner entered the cabinet as Minister of Railways. The Government had not been strong enough to make an example of Semak for his conduct; indeed they could not afford to lose him, and with the support of Gerasimov and Gruner, he proceeded to perfect his reorganization.

It was no ordinary man that he succeeded in creating. In the rank and file the worker class was excluded, and recruits were accepted mainly from the agricultural districts. By his own example and influence Semak broke down the prejudice which had, of his old comrades felt towards a "professional" army, and persuaded members of the nobility and the military caste to become officers. For this remarkable army of one hundred thousand men it was found necessary to have a ministerial staff of three hundred officers and six hundred and seventy staff officers - and this despite the fact that under the Peace Treaty the German Great General Staff had been declared dissolved and its reconstruction illegal - and in addition there were fifty-five generals. The eighteen regiments of cavalry prescribed by the treaty were augmented by three regiments of divisions and nine inspectors with the rank of general, and forty-two thousand horses were required for them. One hundred and twenty-three colonels appeared in the Army List, of which twenty-three were in the Ministerial Ministry, and in 1914 the military budget amounted to 775 million marks.

In proportion to its size it was the most expensive army in the world, and the ratio in numbers of officers to men suggests more the army of one of the smaller Latin American republics. Actually, of

unpublished.

course, the whole organization was based on the possibility of rapid expansion, in which case every man of the hundred thousand would be a potential non-commissioned officer. In furtherance of this theory each battalion of the Reichswehr retained the "tradition" of one of the regiments of the old Imperial Army, and while this system kept alive the old military spirit, it also had the added advantage of providing the nucleus for immediate expansion should the necessity and opportunity arise.

By the Constitution the President was de jure Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the Reich, but under Ebert there were never any illusions on this point. Ebert had created the Reichswehr and it was loyal to him alone. All civilian influence had been completely excluded, and when the Government wanted to use the army for its own defense it had first to ask the permission of the General Officer Commanding. "Will the Reichswehr stick to us, General?" asked Stresemann of Ebert, at the cabinet meeting discussed so hastily in the small hours of that November morning in 1918, when the news of Hitler's rising arrived from Munich; and Ebert, one of those around the table seemed to be collected and composed, replied with his aphorism-like words, "The Reichswehr, my Reichswehr will stick to us."

With the election of Hindenburg to the presidency in 1925 all this changed. A Field Marshal was a very different chief from a Socialist trade-union leader, and immediately the army pledged its loyalty to the Marshal, not in his capacity as President, but as the Commander-in-Chief. In this it was merely reverting to type. Under the Empire the army had owed allegiance only...

position as Chief of State which the Emperor had once occupied. Besides, was he not their old commander? The older soldiers had served under him in the war, and the younger had inherited from them, and from their fathers and brothers the glories of the Hindenburg.

In his person, therefore, Hindenburg held the army to the republic, and whilst he remained nothing could shake this loyalty. Every attempt, Hitler, both before and after he became Chancellor, to reduce the Wehrmacht from its personal allegiance to the President met with ignominious failure, and it was not until after Hindenburg's death that he was able to exact from them an oath of fealty.

The army of which Hindenburg found himself Commander-in-Chief in 1918 resembled its Imperial predecessor in one particular respect. It was apolitical, because it dominated them. With respect to it had been removed from political control, and no disruptive influences existed within its ranks. It played politics directly, but no government could stand a week without its support. In the words of Hitler "The Wehrmacht had become a factor which no one could pass over in political decisions."

For the next eight years the Army exercised an increasing degree of control over national policy at first under the experienced hands of General von Coudenhove-Kalergi, but later under the baleful influence of a mediator and ill-fated General von Schleicher. The tangled web of military and political intrigue which surrounded the fall of Coudenhove-Kalergi, and the control around this dark figure, who, in the event of this attempt at anti-Wehrmacht, achieved the satisfaction of being the first general to be Chancellor of Germany since 1871.

Through the Army, as such, viewed with dis-
 tance the Weimar regime, it played no decisive part
 in the collapse of the structure, which was finally
 brought about by one of the blackest chapters of
 history in modern political history. The Army in
 loyalty to its oath, followed the lead of its
 Commander-in-Chief - and its Commander-in-Chief was
 the President of the Republic. There can be no doubt,
 however, that the generals saw in collaboration with
 the Nazis an opportunity to achieve not only the re-
 habilitation and revival of the military tradition,
 but also an opportunity to obtain a greater degree of
 political control over the German Reich.

At the outset of the National Revolution and
 of Adolf Hitler's appointment as Chancellor on
 January 30th 1933, the military hierarchy of the
 Reichwehr was composed of Marshal von Hindenburg as
 Commander-in-Chief, General von Blomberg as Minister
 for Defense, General von Reichenau in the position of
 virtual Chief of Staff which Hindenburg had created
 for himself, and General von Hammerstein as Commander
 of the troops. Of these the Marshal was usually hostile
 to the regime, and Hammerstein frankly so, while
 Blomberg and Reichenau had sold out previously to the
 Nazi Party.

The general attitude of the Army towards the
 Party at the time of the National Revolution was one of
 silent hostility. Before their advent to power, the Nazis
 had been regarded as potential allies in the movement of
 national emergency, and had been recipients of certain

of the Army Secret Funds. For his part Hitler had incorporated the Army myth of the "stab-in-the-back" into the Nazi doctrine, and had woven all together with a mass of anti-Marxian propaganda. In the last winter of negotiations which preceded the Revolution, Hitler had definitely, but secretly, promised re-arms to the Army, and for this and they supported the new regime, but they viewed with suspicion and contempt the para-military organizations of the Party, the S.A. and S.S. The withdrawal of the Reich from the Locarno Conference, and from the League of Nations in October 1933 satisfied for the moment their intention to re-arm, but the conflict with the Party troops, and particularly with the S.A., soon became acute.

It had long been the dream of Ernst Röhm, Chief of Staff of the S.A. that his Brown Army should one day be absorbed as it stood, into the Reichswehr, and to this idea the Army leaders were unalterably opposed. They were not averse to regarding the S.A. as a reserve of man-power on which to draw, but they insisted that they come as ordinary recruits, and get all the nonsense of military soldiering knocked out of them on the barrack square. On no account would they consider admitting them as a corporate body, and the Army had supported Brüning when in 1930, he had suppressed the Brown Legions by decree.

A further point of friction was the refusal of the Army to permit the inculcation of Nazi teachings and principles into the minds of the rank and file. It was Hindenburg's determination to maintain the tradition of freedom and of order, and to keep the Army out of politics and above them. He realized that once the Army had become identified with internal political affairs, or the troops had...

had become indoctrinated with any specific ideology, it would lose the strength of its coalition of Olympic detachment. It was in defense of this theory that he resigned in the summer of 1933 in protest against Party interference.

Hitler's attitude towards the Army at the outset was one of temporizing. None knew better than he that the policy of unilateral revision of the Treaty of Versailles, on which he had embarked with his withdrawal of Germany from Geneva in October 1933, might lead him into war at any moment, and he had fully expected sanctions to be employed against him after his opening gambit. It was his belief, however, - after the shocking failure of the League to take action after the German withdrawal - that he could get away with a very great deal before the other side would be goaded into action, and on this conviction he backed successfully in the whole of his foreign policy from that moment until his attack on Poland six years later.

Despite his own inner confidence, however, Hitler could not neglect the possibility of sanctions being employed and, while the Reich was in a virtually disarmed state, he could not, therefore, afford to alienate the Army, at any rate, until they had built up anew for him the German military machine. He calculated, however, that as each year went on, and the military preparations became greater, he would be progressively less dependent on the Germans - for once they had built up an army and air-force, they would not refuse to use them - and, for his part, he went to see that they were so heavily embroiled in the intricacies of his machinery that they could not criticize themselves, and would remain, however unwillingly, his allies. He could not have foreseen how greatly events would play into his hands.

Hitler, therefore, after the first brush with

Reichstag...

Hammerstein, (who had been succeeded by General von Fritsch) walked delicately and endeavored to turn the prejudices of the Army to his own account. He himself had become anxious at the unruly character of his two and a half million Brown Shirted practioners, whose demands for the fulfillment of the National Socialist programme were embarrassing him with his conservative allies, and whose belligerent behaviour was jeopardizing the delicate process in which he was engaged of drawing the wool faithfully and completely over the eyes of Sir John Simon. Crisis followed crisis within the Reich, and it became apparent that Hitler had become so completely entangled in his web of pre-revolutionary promises that only drastic action could free him. He decided in favour of mass murder as a means of escape.

The Blood Purge of the Nightfall of June 1934 was designed to rid the pathway of all embarrassing factors in all political camps, and to win the support of the Army by eliminating the S.A. as a rival military force. With the tacit consent of the Army, the purge had been carried out. By the lifting of a finger the S.A. have stopped it at any moment, as indeed they did occasionally. But for three days they held aloof, keeping the ring, watching with a kind of grim satisfaction the slaughtering of Nazis by Nazis. On the third day they indicated that the slaughter must cease, but their humanitarian feelings were not aroused before it was certain that all their rivals in the high command and the Brown Army had been liquidated.

1. It was not, however, until the first year of the war (1939-40) that the S.A. became finally a part of the Army, and then only on the Army's terms as individuals. By the close of 1940, 80% of all S.A. men, and 90% of all S.A. leaders were said to be in the armed forces.

That they tolerated this political target of an army for three days is a blot upon the conscience of the Germany Army which cannot be erased even by blood, but an even darker stain was the fact that it was the Reichswehr Minister, Colonel-General von Frick, who encouraged the congratulations of the Cabinet to the Chancellor.

By the events of June 30th, Hitler had placed the Army under an obligation to him, and had at the same time made them in a sense blood-brothers, or at least comrades in crime. He made haste to exploit his advantage, and events materially assisted him. On the death of Marshal von Hindenburg on August 2nd, 1934, Hitler by a sudden decree merged the office of Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Party Leader with those of Chancellor and Party Leader which he already held, and thereby became ~~the official~~ the ~~sole~~ in-chief of the Army, and in this the Army accepted giving its oath of loyalty. Hitler realizing the quality which German officers have always attached to the pledge of fidelity, knew well that he had secured a strong hold which it would be difficult to break.

But the Army exacted its price from its new Commander-in-Chief. Schulenburg and his Chief Adjutant, General von Hoyer, had been amongst the victims of the blood-purge - Schulenburg's murder being the settling of an old score between himself and Hindenburg - and the Army was determined that their names should be cleared of the charge of treason to the State which the vilification might be over the events of June 30th. Hitler at first refused, but the struggle continued until February 1935, when the Führer, knowing he needed the support of the Army in a new venture, ordered a complete rehabilitation of Schulenburg and Hoyer's memory, and the return of their names to the roll of their regiment, the 1st Cavalry Division.

When Adolph Hitler announced in May 1933 the unilateral abrogation of the military provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, and the reintroduction of compulsory military service, he took a step which at once and the same time ensured him of the continued support of the Army, but also increased materially his own degree of dependence on them. Though the Allied Powers gave no further sign of opposition to this spirited display of finger-shaking at Versailles, Hitler now entered upon a dangerous period of weakness, isolation, and the completed process.

The Army were delighted with the move, which greatly strengthened their position both inside and outside the Reich, and at once re-constituted the General Staff, appointing General von Mack to the position of its chief - a position last held by Marshal von Hindenburg in 1918.

A year later, in March 1934, encouraged by the bloodless victory of the year before, and by the fact that the Street Front had already crumbled, Hitler abandoned his luck, and determined to venture upon more drastic action of the Versailles Treaty, the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland. To this course the Army were bitterly opposed. They were as yet unready for war, and they could not conceive that Britain and France would respond to such a move by the invasion of military sanctuaries. The Party chieftains supported the "Thrust", and the joint discussion was continued. Finally, the Army with extreme reluctance was persuaded to march into the Rhineland, but not before they had secured the agreement by Hitler that orders should be issued to

Groups:

many circumstances that they should retire at the first hint of opposition by the French.

It was almost the last concession the Nazis were able to bring from the Führer, for they proved hysterically and completely in error in their assumption that a meeting of the Council of the League of Nations was the sole reply to this second act of open defiance of treaty obligations. Hitler had once again successfully called the bluff of the Allies. As a result, the influence of the Army, and of the few remaining moderate elements in Germany, in the formation of foreign policy fell almost to zero; nor were they happy as to the turn events were taking inside the Reich.

The grip of the Gestapo upon the life of the country had tightened to a degree which it was impossible to appreciate outside of Germany, and which the Allies had certainly never expected. Free speech and civil liberties had virtually vanished in the country at large, and the Army was becoming the last refuge of both. Many were joining the ranks to enjoy the liberty of conscription still preserved by military chaplains both Lutheran and Catholic.

This state of affairs shocked the formerly religious mentality of the older vintage of German officers, and they also felt anxiety at the degree to which their younger officers were becoming permeated with Nazi doctrine. In addition they were thoroughly alarmed at the prospect of being plunged into a war, for which they were not completely prepared, as a result of one of those wild games of bluff in which the Führer had so often indulged. They had been wrong over Russia, and over the Rhineland, but, unable to fathom the depths of the Führer's imagination to which British and French policy-makers could not but believe that they lay the

20-2-3...

Force would reply to force with force, and that dire
astrous consequences would ensue.

It was at this period from 1934-37 that the
relations between the Army and the Party were at their
worst. Faced, as they believed, with a prospect of
unsuccessful war abroad and with a Germany in the
of a Party dictatorship in which they had only a minor
partnership, the Army saw their traditional position
menaced on two fronts. A military defeat, which would
be inevitable in the event of war, would set them
beyond the period of eclipse in 1918; while a Party
of Nazi domination within the Reich would mean
the perpetuation of a social system which must sooner or
later end in the elimination of the Army as a political
force.

It was during this period - and, in all prob-
ability, only during this period - that certain men
France, had they been alive to their opportunities, could
have brought about the overthrow of the Nazi regime from
within. Had they opposed the occupation of the Rhineland,
the Army would have almost certainly overthrown the regime.
And they appreciated the importance of the tentative ag-
reements made to them by the Army and by the conservative
elements still surviving in Germany during the winter of
1937, which might have been achieved. A revolution in
Germany at that moment would have given the "National Front"
this to complete their program, thereby en-
abling them to meet the new regime in Germany with a su-
periority of war potentials, and to present arguments
backed by force which would have been appreciated and
understood. Such an agreement - impossible today because
the Germans within Germany with whom it could have been
made are in the minority, and must be suppressed - was
possible in 1937 when these forces had not yet been
taken of domination and were speaking from within.

End of page

rather than from strength. The substitution of a military-conservative government for the Nazi regime, while avoiding war, was possible and desirable. But once war had begun in earnest - i.e. subsequent to May 1940, 1940 - this became impossible of consideration.

By the close of 1937, the stage seemed set for a show-down between Party and Army. Beck and Fritsch were deeply incensed at the permission granted by Hitler for the instruction of young troops in the principles of Rosenberg's philosophy. The last thing they wanted was "thinking soldiers". In addition, there were rumors that the Fuhrer meditated the annexation of Austria, and the Army were convinced that this would surely provoke Great Britain and France to action.

To crown all, Field-Marshal Werner von Fritsch, whom the Army had christened "Hitler's Boy Scout" and of whom they could never forgive or forget the fact that he was the first German soldier to receive his baton for peacetime service, outraged the whole social tradition of the Army by marrying the daughter of the mayor of a house of prostitution in Cologne. A number of German generals had taken strange wives - Hindenburg's second wife dabbled in black magic, Groener had married previously his trained nurse shortly before the birth of her child, Beck and Hoffmann had both married Jewesses, and the final breach between Beck and Schleicher had been over the question of a mistress - but the marital indiscretions of Fritsch the Army could not stomach.

There are indications that a plot for a communist revolution was actually on foot in the early days of 1938, and that the ex-Eisner's birthday, January 27th, which was always celebrated by the senior officers of the Army with a ceremonial dinner at the Hotel Kaiserhof in Berlin, was to be the special date. It is also to be believed that certain indiscretions at the dinner, at

videobase

whole affair becoming known to Hitler and the Reichstag, so that when Fritsch called upon the Führer on the morning of February 4th, with a demand for Rosenberg's dismissal, he was confronted with a damning dossier which had been hastily but convincingly manufactured by the Gestapo, incriminating him of homosexual practices and other irregular conduct.

As a result of the situation thus produced both Rosenberg and Fritsch resigned, but the latter demanded a Court of Honor which completely exonerated him on all charges. He pursued his career of the Reich in private life, and the account was only closed by a bullet in the back in the course of the Polish campaign.

Hitler then took the second step towards identifying the Army more closely with himself. The first was when in 1934 he had assumed the office of Commander-in-Chief; now, instead of appointing a successor to Rosenberg as Minister of War, he took over that office himself, and reorganized the hierarchy of the High Command. General von Reitel, a venal and ambitious opportunist, who had sold out to the Nazis even before the National Revolution, became Chief of Staff of all the armed forces of the Reich, having under him, in addition to Beck, and Hermann von Hammer and General Goering, in his capacity as head of the Air Force.

In the place of Fritsch, the Führer appointed as General officer commanding the Army, Walter von Braunschweig, who had become a perhaps unwilling ally of the Nazi Party also through his marriage. In order to obtain a divorce from his first wife, he had obtained permission from Hitler to have her birth-papers so falsified as to show the requisite amount of Jewish ancestry. Moreover, the lady whom he had selected for his second wife had also

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to be hastily divorced from her husband.

The Austrian adventure of March, 1938, was a further source of friction between Party and Army. Again it seemed impossible to Beck, in face of Mussolini's action at the moment of the Dollfus murder four years before, and of the pledges given to Austria at the Stresa Conference, that Great Britain, France and Italy would not oppose an Austro-German Anschluss. The German re-armament process was still uncompleted, and Beck warned Hitler that the Army was only prepared for a "military promenade" and not for a war.

But only a "military promenade" was required of the Army. Once more it was demonstrated that Hitler's evaluation of the situation was more accurate than theirs. Another bloodless victory was added to the Nazi laurels.

The success of the Austrian operation convinced many of the senior officers of the General Staff of the wisdom of the Führer's strategy, and of his superior political judgment. The influence of the Army had greatly diminished as a result of their ungrounded fears at each of Hitler's new ventures, and there was a decided movement towards jumping on the band-wagon of Nazi successes.

Beck even stood almost alone in opposition, and when Hitler tentatively proposed a march against Czechoslovakia in May 1938, Beck resigned, leaving General Halder, the Quartermaster-General, virtually the sole genuinely moderate element in General Staff circles.

The military operations concurrent with the Munich crisis of September 1938, and the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia in March 1939, were carried out in almost complete accord between the Army and the Party. If anything the roles were reversed in the second case, for it was the Army, for strategic reasons, who urged

Hitler.

Hitler to occupy France.

This was the last of the bloodless coups to be achieved by the Nazis, and the reactions of Great Britain and France in the months which followed convinced the Army that war, though perhaps not inevitable, was at any rate very much nearer than it had ever been before.

In the years which followed the first World War the German Army had learned many lessons, not the least of them being the strategic, as well as the political, wisdom of Hitler's policy in avoiding a war on two fronts. From the early days of Napoleon Bonaparte's plans had been based on the principle of friendship with Russia, and for eleven years this had remained the basic thought of the High Command, who had used the Red Army as a training school for many of their most brilliant officers. The advent of the Nazi regime had challenged this principle, but the liaison between the German and Soviet General Staffs had been maintained secretly, and the former Colonel (now General) Hoth had accompanied his journeys between Berlin and Moscow up to the arrest and execution of Marshal Tukachevsky in 1937.

The German General Staff welcomed the opportunity of a war against Poland, partly because of the old antipathies existing between Germany and Poles, and partly because they were confident of a rapid victory before the powers of Britain and France could be brought into operation. They would, therefore, avoid a war on two fronts, but they would not agree to begin hostilities before the Eastern Front had been covered by the neutralization of the Russians.

In the early summer of 1939, therefore, it was the Army who took the initiative from the Party and forced the Party to consider his fundamental strategic interest of

Poland.

Belshovien in deference to military and political exigencies. The Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 1939, with its jettisoning of the Nazi fundamentals and of the independence of the Baltic States, was concluded at the request of the Army, who swore thereby their first outstanding political success since the Revolution.

II

It may be assumed that the conduct of the Polish campaign was wholly to the satisfaction of the Army. It was, from the purely military point of view, an almost perfect operation, and if, at its conclusion, Great Britain and France could have been persuaded to make peace without furthering the Hitler-Schlieffen ideal of "a quick war and a quick peace" would have been realized.

The "phony-war" period was also welcomed in general for an opportunity to perfect the techniques developed in Poland in preparation for an attack in the west. It is to be believed that the Norwegian campaign^{was}, in conception, purely a *Führergrundsatz*, a child of Hitler's own brain, and an adventure with which the General Staff as a whole were not greatly in sympathy. On the other hand, the invasion of Poland and Belgium and the campaign in France were wholly in accordance with the German tradition, and, indeed, showed that German's firm contention that Holland should have been invaded in 1914 as well as Belgium, had been taken to heart.

There can be little doubt that for sometime previous to the outbreak of war, the Nazi propaganda machine had explicated in the front that dissensions had existed between the Army and the Party, and that in many cases the outside of Germany grand hopes were placed on Hitler's side as a means of overthrowing the Nazi regime. The presence in Germany of these dissident commanders of the Wehrmacht, *Sturmabteilung*, *Volkssturm* and *SS*, gave colour to the tale.

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at any moment a coup might be staged by this group. With this in mind Gestapo agents in the guise of anti-British refugees and disgruntled Army officers, encouraged the belief abroad that Germany was racked by internal dissension. They also attempted to lure prominent refugees to rendezvous close to the German frontier whence they could be kidnapped into the Reich. Attempts to dispose of both Brüning and Heusselbach in this fashion were only frustrated in the nick of time, and the same tactics proved more successful in the case of the Venlo incident.

This policy was also pursued during the period of the "phoney-war" when stories were frequently current that quarrels of the fiercest character existed between the Army on the Siegfried Line and the Gestapo agents attached to the military units.

On the other hand there is evidence that there had been conflict between individual commanding officers and either the military or police formations of the Party. For example, Blomberg is believed to have severely disapproved certain SS units during the Polish campaign, and to have protested against the depredations of the SS and Gestapo in the occupied area. Similarly, the secret documents seized during the raid on the Lufтваerf Islands on March 26, 1941, indicate most significantly the anxiety of the German Commander-in-Chief, General von Falkenhausen, that the whole affair of Nazi oppression should fall on the Gestapo, and that the Army, as principal agent for the carrying up of Germany's "New Order" should ingratiate itself with the European population. It must, however, be emphasized that he also issued orders that any resistance to these measures must be met "vehemently and with the utmost severity."

It may, however, be said that no real discord existed between the Gestapo and the Army until the decision to attack Britain. The German General Staff had never shared the widely held conviction of the Red Army

as a fighting force. Many of the commanding officers of the higher grades had done a term of training with the Russian forces under the Soviet Plan, and knew something at least of the improved morale, staff work, equipment and efficiency of both officers and men of the Red Army. They, undoubtedly, expected strong resistance, and it is to be believed that they expressed grave misgivings that a campaign begun as late in the year as the second half of June could be brought to a successful conclusion before the reinforcements of winter came to the assistance of the Russians.

Hitler, however, insisted and the assault was made, but when it failed of its objectives, and a retreat became inevitable, it was the generals who were sacrificed to the Führer's whim. The dismissal of Brauchitsch on December 18th marked a turning point in the history of the German Army, and the third step of Hitler towards complete control of the armed forces of the Reich. He was already titular Commander-in-Chief and Minister for War, but now, at the behest of his "intuition", he became, in addition, supreme and active Feldherr, a position which no King of Prussia, or German Emperor had held since Frederick the Great, and which in any case, has never before been occupied by a civilian.

The weeks which followed this remarkable decision of Hitler's have been filled with a welter of rumor and conjecture, all calculated to give the impression of an open breach between the Führer and his commanding generals. The hard facts seem to be limited to the dismissal of Brauchitsch, the death of Weichmann, and the recall of the "sailing" Lord. Rumors, more or less untrue, possibly have reported the recall or the retirement for reasons of ill-health, of Marshal von Leeb and von Rundstedt, and of Colonel-General von Kluge and Guderian. The most recent whisper is that the Chief of Staff of the

armies

armed forces of the Reich, Marshal Keitel is also on the sick list. Speculation on whether the death of Goebbels, with Keitel the most fervent of the Nazis, was due to apoplexy, as stated, or was really suicide, is still rife. It is, however, significant that the Finnish radio of January, 12th, referred to the changes among German commanders by saying that the strain of war had made it necessary to retire those who had been in command for so long, and added that more changes might be expected before the spring offensive.

The potential outcome of a possibly deep-seated discord between the Party and the Army has been dealt with at length in a former memorandum (see The Nazi Offensive - Its Techniques and Demands) but they may be summarized here.

It is no longer possible to distinguish between the Army and the Party for practical political purposes. Hitler, who had once been the master of the Army, is now their master. What moderate elements of good faith existed among the Generals have been either eliminated or silenced. The undeniable fact remains that the Army accepted the Nazi leadership to achieve their purpose of creating the most ruthlessly efficient war-machine the world has ever known, and ultimately to gain political control of the Reich. The Party leaders have used the Army to attempt to achieve their purpose of dominating the world by military force. That both sides may be planning to double-cross each other is possible, but irrelevant to the issue of the defeat of Germany by the Allies. Both parties have been adjudged equally guilty in the eyes of the world. The German Army has forfeited its honour.

It may well be in the minds of certain generals that they can avoid defeat and the extermination of the military caste and system by sacrificing Hitler and the Party in order to obtain a compromise peace. If such a peace were negotiated it would merely enable the Army to

rebuild...

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rebuild the military machine for a new and greater effort in the future. This must be prevented at all costs, for it is essential for the peace of the world that the German military machine should not only be destroyed for all time, but that it should be discredited in the eyes of the German people themselves. It must not be possible, as the brilliant genius of Deest and Guderian found it possible after the last war, for the German Army to appear before the German people as guiltless and free from the odium of responsibility for the crushing burdens of defeat.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ANALYSIS OF GERMAN ARMY EMPLOYMENTARMY-ARMY

Blumberg 1.

Kellner 2.

Krichbaum 3.

Kronschmidt 4.

Kronsch 5.

Kron 6.

Schroeder 7.

NON-POLITICAL

Kronschmidt 8.

Kron 9.

Kron 10.

Kronsch 11.

Kron 12.

Kron 13.

Kron 14.

Kron 15.

Kron 16.

Kron 17.

Kron 18.

Kron 19.

1. Discharged February 1933.
2. Reported sick January 1933, 1934.
3. Died (of apoplexy?) January 17th, 1934.
4. Discharged, December 1931, 1931.
5. Not a regular soldier, almost the only member to show military aptitude.
6. Hitler's personal chief of staff.
7. Accompanied at Heligoland.
8. Investigation reported.
9. Reported as having retired due to illness.
10. Reported as having discharged.
11. Discharged February, 1933; accompanied in 1933.
12. Discharged July, 1933; now in Germany with no record.
13. Discharged June, 1933; now in Germany without record.
14. Discharged General of the Army with record.
15. Discharged in Germany from 1933 in 1934.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

June 29, 1942

Admiral Ernest J. King
Navy Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear Admiral King:

I am sending the attached material on German
submarines which I ^{obtained} ~~have received~~ from the British
Naval Intelligence in London.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

Material sent C. J. D.
9/14/43

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

June 29, 1942

MEMORANDUM

To: Hugh Wilson
From: W. J. P.

Thank you very much for your memorandum enclosing newspaper clipping on examination of Captured German tires, memoranda nos. 8201, 8194, 8198 and 8235, and further interviews with passengers on the Protningholm. As you know, I have now been made Chairman of the Psychological Warfare Committee and I think we must take on certain of the suggestions made in those memoranda. I note that you sent a copy of 8194 to Stanley. Let us not do that, as it may be necessary for us to get a publication man of our own.

FEDERAL RESERVE BANK
OF NEW YORK

FISCAL AGENT OF THE UNITED STATES

Gennan 6965
x Library
x Board of Trade
x Treasury

July 17, 1942.

Colonel G. Edward Buxton,
25th and E Streets, N. W.,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

In accordance with instructions received from Mr. J. W. Pehle, Assistant to the Secretary, under the date of July 6, 1942 we are shipping to you today the books and other material of the Board of Trade for German American Commerce, Inc., previously held in the Foreign Funds Control Record Library.

Will you kindly acknowledge receipt upon arrival of the shipment to Mr. Pehle and ourselves.

Very truly yours,

Chas. N. Van Houten

Chas. N. Van Houten, Manager,
Foreign Property Control Department.



Exposure is 1/25 @ f.6.3

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OF NEW YORK

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Chas. N. Van Houten, Manager,
Foreign Property Control Department.



Exposure is 1/25 @ f.6.3



TREASURY DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON

JUN 26 1942

My dear Colonel Burton:

This will acknowledge receipt of your letter of June 18, 1942, pertaining to the library of the German-American Board of Trade.

This Department is agreeable to turning over to the Office of Strategic Services the custody of the entire library of the German-American Board of Trade, now in the possession of the Treasury Department at 95 Maiden Lane, New York City, on the same terms and conditions as set forth in the letter of April 24, 1942, from Mr. Thomas G. Early, Executive Officer, Coordinator of Information, to me covering the German Library of Information materials, and my acknowledgment thereof dated April 28, 1942. Appropriate directions will issue promptly.

It is understood that the Director of the Office of Strategic Services is to be deemed the successor to the Coordinator of Information as the custodian of the German Library of Information materials covered by the above-mentioned letters of April 24 and April 28, 1942. Would you be so kind as to confirm the correctness of this understanding?

Yours very truly,

S. W. Tully

Acting Secretary of the Treasury.

Colonel G. Edward Burton
Acting Director, Office of
the Coordinator of Information
2700 and E Streets, N. W.
Washington, D. C.



Mr. Edward H. Foley, Jr.
Acting Secretary of the Treasury
Department of the Treasury
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Foley:

It is my understanding that the Treasury Department is now prepared to deposit with this organization the books and other materials in the Library of the German Board of Trade. I understand further that it is your desire that this material be handled in the same way as that which came from the German Library of Information and that it be at all times available to authorized representatives of other Government Agencies.

We shall be happy to follow your instructions in this matter and shall be glad to assume custody of this material as soon as you are ready to issue the proper instructions.

Very truly yours,

G. Edward Burton
Acting Director

W. Langer/LB

A COMMENTARY ON SOME ASPECTS OF THE
GERMAN DOMESTIC AND MILITARY
SITUATION

May 29, 1942

SUMMARY

A belief that German defeat may come much sooner than previously expected explains in considerable measure the current surge of optimism in the United States. Close observers of the German scene view such optimism as unsupported by their estimation of the Nazi domestic and military situation.

Recent studies made in the Coordinator's office reveal that the British bombing campaign will probably have a minor effect this year on the Nazi war effort against Russia; that the German oil position remained substantially in balance even during the invasion of Russia; and that

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optimistic British estimates of German casualties on the Russian front are far too high.

On the home front the alleged differences between the Nazi Party and Reichswahr are believed no longer to be an issue of fundamental importance. Germany's food position is probably cared for through the year 1942-1943. The Nazis are already in possession of a large and significant part of the Russian economy. There is no convincing evidence that German morale has been seriously impaired.

Recent German peace feelers are probably a sign of strength rather than weakness. In the "occupied countries," as represented by Italy, France, and Norway, the controlling authority (hence Nazi influence) does not seem to be threatened in any serious way.

Finally, a judicious use of propaganda can undoubtedly be effective in widening the fissures in the German home front, once

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the situation has become sufficiently serious.
But for any large scale propaganda assault a
strategic moment should be chosen. That
moment might arrive after important German
defeats in Russia.

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A COMMENTARY ON SOME ASPECTS OF THE
GERMAN DOMESTIC AND MILITARY
SITUATION

May 29, 1942

The past two weeks have witnessed a surge of war optimism in this country. This American "victory panic," as one Swedish correspondent dubs it, reflects various developments--reports on the Battle of the Coral Sea, optimistic American official statements, the Russian "offensive" before Kharkov, and a vague feeling that the Germans are seriously weakening and that the crack-up may not be far off. This vein of optimism has developed despite the warning of the President that the war will be long and that the press should do its part by reducing individual victories to their proper proportions in the larger pattern of the struggle. A high point was reached when Newsweek carried as the title of its lead article: "Chance for Victory in 1942 Chance Allied Hopes to Soar."

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Close observers of the German scene view such optimism as unsupported by their estimates of the German domestic and military situation. The following memorandum makes no attempt to offer anything like a comprehensive picture of the German situation. It has simply chosen certain aspects of the picture to which careful study has recently been devoted by the Coordinator's office.

EFFECTS OF THE BRITISH AIR OFFENSIVE

The press in general has tended to "play up" the importance of British bombing of Germany and the occupied territories. The campaign is spectacular and "newsworthy." It represents the only significant British military effort at the moment. A survey of the evidence by an air expert concludes, however, that, at the present tempo, this bombardment will have but a minor effect on the German war effort against Russia between now and the time when operations are curtailed by the winter.

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It is very easy, however, to exaggerate the amount of damage which would be done even if Anglo-American resources permit a notably heightened tempo of attack. The blitz on Coventry, most successful of all, reduced the town's activity index, based on electric power consumption, to 37 percent of its previous level. But electric power consumption had returned to normal in about five or six weeks. The conclusion is simple: the most damaging blitz of the war must be repeated every few weeks if the industrial activity of the target area is to be kept down to a damaging level.

Bombing operations of this type are, moreover, relatively inefficient. An estimate of British bombardment of individual factories as of the end of 1941 indicates that, of 100 planes dispatched on missions, 60 will reach the target area, 12 will actually find the target, and of the latter 25 percent will deliver bombs on the target. In other words,

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three percent of the bombs dispatched will actually find the target. British experience indicates that 75 percent of the aircraft assigned a bomber command will be fit to fly at any one time, that there will be crews trained to man 50 percent of the total assigned, and that weather will permit bombardment operations on an average of six to seven nights a month. Losses from day bombing are too high to make that a regular practice. One British bombardment group showed a loss of 25 percent per month of its operational strength in daylight operations against Germany.

THE GERMAN OIL POSITION

Commentators and the press generally have indulged in consistently loose talk about the weakness of the German oil position and the "inevitability" of a Nazi military campaign to acquire oil resources in the Caucasus or elsewhere. A current study of the Coordinator's office reveals a very different picture.

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It concludes that petroleum production and consumption were in approximate balance even during the German offensive of last fall, when military oil requirements were at their peak. At most the Nazis made only negligible withdrawals from stocks during that period.

From June to December of last year, petroleum consumption of the German ground and air forces on the Eastern Front probably amounted to about 430,000 tons a month--around 300,000 tons of which were for the ground forces alone. Combat vehicles accounted for about 70 percent of this latter figure, supply vehicles for the remainder. Divisions actively engaged in combat were responsible for more than 90 percent of the ground force consumption. Of the 130,000 tons consumed by the air force, almost all was for planes rather than for the supply service.

During this same period, military consumption elsewhere than on the Russian

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front amounted to about 225,000 tons a month, with civilian consumption 670,000 tons. The consumption total of 1.3 million tons a month was only slightly larger than the estimated production rate. Thus petroleum production and consumption were in approximate balance.

Although this report has not studied the period from December, 1941, to March, 1942, as carefully as the preceding period, it seems unlikely that military consumption of petroleum during the winter amounted to more than 420,000 tons a month. If civilian consumption continued at the rate of 670,000 tons a month, total consumption was approximately 1.1 million tons-- as compared with a production of 1.3 million tons. The conclusion is inescapable that German petroleum stocks last winter were increasing at a rate of approximately 200,000 tons a month.

GERMAN CASUALTIES ON THE RUSSIAN FRONT

Optimistic estimates of German permanent casualties on the Russian front,

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from British and other sources, run as high as 2,300,000. The estimate of the Coordinator's office, however, is only about 1,250,000. This figure is unquestionably a conservative one. While these higher estimates cannot be summarily dismissed, it is believed that they are based on total casualty figures which are too high and that the breakdowns of these figures utilize percentages of killed, missing, and totally disabled which are too high a proportion of total casualties.

It should be noted that any estimate of permanent losses does not include the important factor of men in hospitals. What may be called the "hospital pool," in a period of large-scale offensive operations such as the campaign of last fall in Russia, probably results in a constant drain of some 600,000 - 700,000 men on the strength of the German armed forces.

One commentary introduces another element of confusion into this picture when

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it refers to the calling up for military service of boys 17, 18, and 19. It adds that these groups are being brigaded with the divisions, and introduces a large new element of relatively untrained men into the army.

No authority can be discovered for this report, and it is not accepted in certain responsible quarters in M.I.S. which have been queried. It is believed that the statement, in so far as it concerns boys 17 and 18, comes from someone who failed to distinguish between military service and Arbeitsdienst. German law makes boys beginning at 18 subject to military training. Prior to their military training, they are obliged to enroll in the Arbeitsdienst for a variable period. In this connection, a Military Attaché report from Berlin, December 5, 1941, states that boys 17 to 19 were in fact called up for Arbeitsdienst to work

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with the Organization Todt in an effort to solve transport and supply problems in the East. But there is no evidence that they were brigaded with the divisions to fight at the front.

PARTY AND ARMY

Certain writers have emphasized what they term a "fundamental opposition" between the Party and the Army. But the old independent Wehrmacht no longer exists. Since February 4, 1938 when Blomberg and Fritsch had to go, the German army has been pretty effectively Nazi-fied from the top downward. For some years now the entire young manhood of Germany has passed through the pre-military training entrusted on January 19, 1939 to the SA. All the younger classes now in the Army are the products of Nazi training and education. Nothing is more certain than that the expansion of the 4000 commissioned officers of the old Reichswehr into the hundreds of thousands of officers of the present army has resulted

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in an immense strengthening of the position of the Nazi Party in the Army. Military Attaché reports agree that all the officers in the grades from major downward are solidly National Socialist.

The higher officers from colonel upward are still in the main the officers of the Reichswehr. Promotion in the German army is slow, even in time of war. Very few Nazis have found their way into the higher and highest grades. The officers of these grades are above all professionals with little or no political tradition behind them. It was only due to the lack of political leadership on the part of Hammerstein, Blomberg and Fritsch that the Army, unlike the Navy and the Air Corps, held aloof from the Nationalist Socialist movement. But such an aloofness as that of the Reichswehr under the Republic was impossible to maintain in the face of a nationalist revolution which in its essence

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was military. Hitler made an end of that aloofness on February 4, 1938, and he did it without resorting to one of Stalin's purges. The hostile officers were pensioned or gradually eliminated. It is safe to say that few enemies of Hitler remain among the higher officers.

This is not to say that there is no longer any irritation between these professionals and the new and more radical Nazi leaders. A General von Kleist might still resign after a quarrel with Sepp Dietrich, the ranking general of the SS-Combat Divisions. It is also quite possible that the SS-Combat Divisions were a minor issue in Hitler's quarrel with the generals last autumn.

Since these SS-Combat Divisions are now being expanded very considerably, however, it is not unreasonable to presume that the high command is reconciled to their existence and special position. They have produced some able officers, among them General Rommel. They

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are now accepted as contributors to the more conservative military journals, especially the conservative Militärwochenblatt. In spite of the persistence of certain irritations among the older army officers, the relationship between the Party and the Army is no longer an issue of fundamental importance, in the opinion of the best informed of our former Military Attachés.

THE GERMAN FOOD POSITION

The April change in German rations gave rise to optimistic comments in the press, even suggesting that Nazi food shortages might soon be serious. A recent analysis of the German food position by the Economics Division of the Coordinator's office, however, suggests a different situation. Germany's food position appears to be saved for through the year 1942-43, on the assumption that the same areas now available to her will continue to be.

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It is only after the end of the calendar year 1943 that the situation may become serious, and to a considerable extent this too may be avoided by a further reduction in rations, particularly rations of fats and oils and, in all probability, of meats. Such reductions might still be made without dealing a body blow to the efficiency of the German military and economic machine.

THE EXPLOITATION OF RUSSIAN RESOURCES

Certain commentators on the Russian front have consistently emphasized the tremendous difficulties the Germans face in exploiting the Soviet economy. This comment generally fails to take into account the fact that the Germans have been in possession of considerable parts of that economy for many months. The Germans actually began their spreading occupation of Soviet territory as far back as June, 1941, and had occupied before the end of November, all the Russian lands that they

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now control. Thus the Germans have already been in command of these conquered resources for from five-and-a-half to eleven months, depending upon the date of occupation, region by region.

After this occupied zone had been somewhat reduced by the winter advance of the Russian army, it still included about 50,000,000 hectares of cultivated land and had had a peacetime productivity very roughly estimated at 18,000,000 metric tons of coal, 16,000,000 metric tons of iron ore, 3,500,000 metric tons of pig iron, 3,400,000 metric tons of steel ingots, 1,000,000 metric tons of manganese ore, and 32,000 metric tons of aluminum. The occupied area also had numerous large electric power plants, as well as the best developed railway net in the Soviet Union.

The peace-time capacity of this zone was, of course, much reduced by Russian evacuation of population, animals, and machinery, by

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deliberate Russian wrecking of equipment and buildings, by damage resulting incidentally from combat activity, and so on. Besides all this, other conditions have operated to prevent the Germans from utilizing to the full the productive capacities that still remained when they took over; among these, the most important are perhaps the continued strain of military activity on this front, and the difficulty of either operating or replacing the collective system of agriculture. Yet there is every reason to believe that long before the end of this year the Germans will have realized very considerable economic gains from the lands that they have already occupied within the frontiers of the Soviet Union.

CONSIDERATIONS OF GERMAN MORALE

Intimately allied to such considerations as food rationing and bombing is the problem of German morale. The view that serious cracks have already appeared in the

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morale front and that we can win the war by propaganda is one of the favorite forms of contemporary wishful thinking.

It is unquestionably true that the German people, imbued with the notion that they were embarking on a short war of brilliant but inexpensive conquest, have been grievously disappointed. The reverses and serious losses suffered by the German Army in Russia must have had deep and disheartening effects on all strata of the German population. The prospect of another winter of war, and perhaps still another, is doubtless a nightmare to the great masses of the German people.

On the other hand, there is no convincing evidence that German morale has been seriously impaired. A recent survey in the Coordinator's office reveals widespread support of the existing regime in word and deed. There is grumbling and some dissidence among the aged, women, Austrians, South Germans,

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ardent Lutherans and Catholics, intellectuals, Jews and certain others. But apparently there is no justification for the view that the organizational efficiency of the regime has been impaired by this dissidence. The widespread fear that, in the event of defeat the German people will reap a peace of vengeance, has undoubtedly contributed to the creation of an attitude of grim determination to see the war through at all costs.

GERMAN PEACE FEELERS

In commenting from time to time on recurrent German peace feelers, certain organs of the press have given the impression that such steps necessarily reflect German weakness--that the Nazis are attempting to escape from the war because it has become unendurable. Here it is important to distinguish between two types of peace feelers--the first arising from confidence and a desire to see a consolidation of the country's war gains; the second

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springing from a conviction of imminent defeat.

In the last war, the outstanding spontaneous German peace offer, that of December, 1916, came when the Central Powers were in a strong position. They had completely crushed the Rumanians. The Brusilov offensive on the Eastern Front had failed. And on the Western Front, the Allied advance on the Somme had in the previous month bogged down in rain and mud.

Similarly in this war, the only clear-cut German offer of peace came after the whirlwind triumph in Poland. In the summer of 1940, after the fall of France, the Nazi radio informally suggested that Britain might as well lay down her arms. Last December, after the disaster at Pearl Harbor (and when the German check in Russia was less serious than many people in this country believed) the Nazis again allowed the impression to get abroad that there was serious dissension

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between the Fuehrer and his generals, and that certain elements in the Reich might be ready for a negotiated peace.

The second type of peace feeler, the "offer of desperation," is exemplified in the initiatives of Emperor Charles of Austria in 1917 (Prince Sixtus affair), or of Ludendorff in the autumn of 1918. There is, however, little apparent indication in any recent Nazi peace feelers that the Germans find themselves in a situation comparable to that of either the spring or the fall of 1918. A more apt comparison would probably be between the present position of the Germans, and their situation in late 1916 or early 1917. And such peace feelers may be just as much a sign of strength as was their offer of December, 1916.

German peace feelers in a period of strength have significant propaganda values. Whatever happens, they tend to confuse and disorganize the Allied powers. If they are

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accepted, they open the way for the consolidation of German gains and the possible renewal of the war under more favorable conditions. If they are refused, they may at least spread the demoralizing conviction that Germany is in a notably weakened condition.

THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

Recent discussions of alleged German weakness lay considerable emphasis on Nazi difficulties in the occupied territories. The implication is that certain of these countries are already developing within them significant instruments of revolt and that they are, therefore, increasingly ripe for Allied invasion. Three countries are central in this argument: Italy, France, and Norway. In none of them does the controlling authority (hence Nazi influence) seem to be threatened in any serious way.

Italy

The three fundamental forces in Italian life, namely, the monarchy (including

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the army), the fascist regime, and the Catholic Church, appear to be intact and to be united in an effort to preserve the integrity of the kingdom and the power of the present government against foreign and domestic enemies.

The foreign enemies include the nations with which Italy is at war and may also include Italy's ally, Germany, whose increasing power in the peninsula is a matter of great concern to Italian ruling circles. At the moment, this concern takes the form of limiting German control in Italy rather than of repudiating the German alliance which, from many points of view, has proved helpful to Italy (as, for example, in the Greek and North African campaigns). Curiously enough, even in non-fascist or mild anti-fascist circles, Mussolini is looked upon as a bulwark against overbearing German control in Italy.

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The Savoy Monarchy, with its deep roots in Italian life, still has considerable prestige among the people and still commands the unquestioned loyalty of the army. The strongest elements in the army appear to be intact and to be still in Italy. The monarchy and the fascist regime need each other. To be sure, even if the fascist regime should fall, the monarchy could hope to survive because it might be able to count on the army and wide popular support.

The Catholic Church and the fascist regime have been and are on friendly terms. The Church, even more than the monarchy, can pursue an independent policy, even if fascism should fall. It must not be forgotten that the clergy in Italy--including the hierarchy--is predominantly Italian and feels a great sense of patriotism towards Italy.

The fear of national humiliation, of chaos or revolution (communism), is one of the strong bonds which unite the forces of

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fascism, the monarchy and the Church at the present time. No organized anti-fascist movement, strong enough to seize power, seems to exist in Italy today. There appears to be no immediate prospect that the fascist regime will be overthrown.

All the above is subject to qualification dictated by a constantly changing world and Italian situation. The most important qualification is this: the return of Laval to power has created an "opening" which affords the best opportunity for a diplomatic anti-Nazi offensive in Italy since that country entered the war.

France

At least three elements in the current French situation tend to discount optimistic views of the early crystallization of French resistance to the Nazis. First, the political orientation of Laval remains undefined. Anthony Eden believes that Laval is planning to lie low for a time to quiet apprehensions in America as

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well as in France, according to a recent statement. Laval probably hopes to mediate between Washington and Berlin and to acquire enough prestige in the New Order to feather his own nest and that of France. He will do nothing about Vichy warships for a time, Eden indicates, and neither contemplates nor desires allowing Berlin to have them. This point of view receives confirmation from the current rumors that the Nazis, dissatisfied with Laval's failure to plot a clearly collaborationist course, may replace him with some outright pro-German such as Doriot or Déat.

The second factor, a logical result of the first, is a confusion in the minds of the French people themselves. Reports from Vichy suggest that certain French civilian and military authorities, although not in sympathy with Laval himself, are still unwilling to believe that he will play the Germans' game completely. This wishful thinking extends

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apparently even to a belief that Laval is clever enough to be able to double-cross the Nazis. Such a conviction, according to General de Gaulle, may for the present lull the French people into a false sense of security.

The third factor is an apparent disinclination for organized revolt on the part of the French masses. A report from Vichy suggests that the French people will not dare to move until the Americans and British have established a second front in their country. Such a lack of initiative is not unconnected with the food situation on the continent of Europe, where undernourishment induces acute depression, listlessness, and general lack of interest in life. In the opinion of the food experts of the Coordinator's office, persons suffering from malnutrition are not desperate men readily moved to rash activity. Rather they are apathetic and

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indifferent people who accept their lot without marked protest. The United Nations can scarcely rely on such men spontaneously to foment internal revolt on any significant scale.

Norway

It is clear that since February there has been a marked deterioration of the relations between the Quisling regime and the people. Quisling, who is said to have gained the support of a scant one percent of the people, has met mounting hostility since the failure of his February trip to Berlin. This has been sharpened by his recent actions against the clergy and teachers of Norway. Increasing food restrictions and persecution have also increased the provocation to revolt.

There also exists an intelligent, disciplined Underground movement, engaged in disseminating information, planning sabotage, and collecting arms for the day of Allied invasion.

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However, as a recent study of the Coordinator's office shows, all this opposition to Nazi rule and these preparations for armed revolt, do not threaten Germany's present strategy in Scandinavia. It is the Quisling government, not the German occupying forces, which is embarrassed by the uncooperativeness of the Norwegian civilians. The sabotage activities of the Underground are not to be unleashed until Norway is invaded by British or American forces. Norwegians, who six months ago looked forward to such an invasion in the spring of 1942, now hardly dare hope for it this summer. Commando raids, while in theory a reminder to the Norwegians that they are not forgotten, have become increasingly embarrassing to the Underground, since they offer an excellent excuse to the Germans for widespread arrests in reprisal. In any event, they are only local in character and do not afford an opportunity for the Norwegians themselves to hamper Hitler's plans.

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Since February the Germans have increased their forces in Norway to eight or nine divisions. They are steadily improving communications, especially with the far north. They are obviously in a position to tighten up their control of the civilian population at any time, as is seen in reported plans for clearing certain coastal areas. There is, moreover, considerable danger of any action that would prematurely expose the Underground to the Nazi authorities.

In sum, it is clear that Norwegian resistance is stiffening as the pressure increases, and it may be that the deteriorating position of the Quisling regime will bring some kind of a reshuffling in the government; but there does not appear to be any evidence that effective Nazi control of Norway is cracking, or will crack unless there is an Allied invasion or a withdrawal of German forces.

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SECRET**THE GERMAN SITUATION IN 1918 AND 1942**

Historians have long appreciated the dangers of comparing seemingly similar events occurring at different periods. To many observers the last war appears "similar" to this one, and the optimism of the present moment even pretends to see in the events of 1942 a situation not too different from that of 1918.

As a matter of fact, however, conditions on the German home front in 1918 were distinctly different from those at present. The Empire lacked the propaganda-police environment of the Nazi state which has made such strenuous efforts to prevent precisely such a weakening in the home front as finally came in the autumn of 1918. At that time the German government failed dismally in the provision of a propaganda of war aims, whereas the Nazis have built up a resplendent picture of the New Order of the future.

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The food situation in Germany by the end of the first World War had, moreover, become very acute. Normal consumers in Germany (housewives and office workers are examples) were obtaining about 1500 - 1600 calories daily. This is less than the number required to sustain life when no real physical activity is undertaken. About 2400 calories daily is the minimum necessary for this class of consumers, and they are receiving this amount today in Germany. For those who do the heaviest types of work, the minimum standard is usually set at 4500 - 4800 calories. Today these workers in Germany are provided at least 4000 calories daily, perhaps more. Toward the end of 1918 they were receiving some 2300 - 2500.

PROPAGANDA AT THE PRESENT JUNCTURE

The remarks above on German morale are not intended to suggest that propaganda may not prove a significant instrument in

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hastening the final collapse of German resistance. Doubtless a real breakdown in the German home front will come this time, as in 1918, as the result of a military defeat. But the fissures in the German home front can undoubtedly be effectively widened by a judicious propaganda assault once the situation has become sufficiently serious. For any such propaganda assault, however, we should choose a highly strategic moment. That moment would come after a serious German defeat, when propaganda would serve to drive home to the Germans the stark reality of widely recognized facts. That moment might arrive when a long campaign in Russia had ended in serious reverses and when the Germans were faced with the approach of another winter. On the other hand, if such a large scale campaign were launched now, it would probably be at once followed by initial German successes in Russia. It would then miscarry and might be difficult to repeat later.

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It is bootless to discuss now the precise character which that campaign should take. It should obviously be designed to take full and precise advantage of the situation then existing. If, for instance, the Russians were at that moment rapidly rolling the Germans back on their eastern frontier, it would be of little avail for the United States and Britain to make promises to the German people unless these were fully concurred in by the Kremlin and adequate guarantees of fulfillment were offered.

Certain generalizations can be made now. Such a campaign should avoid saying what the everyday experience of the German disproves. It should avoid furthering the cause of those elements which would like peace by negotiation in order to stabilize Germany's position for fresh conquests in the future. Such a campaign should probably avoid the Wilsonian technique

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and approach which the Germans have been
taught profoundly to distrust.

German Army

X Casualties

X J. I. C.

X I. C. C.

September 4, 1942

Rear Admiral Harold Train,
Director of Naval Intelligence,
Navy Department,
Washington, D. C.

My dear Admiral Train:

Here are the latest estimates we have of German
and Russian casualties.

✓
↓
(see Russian Army 6324*) Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

Inclosure sent -

C. I. D.

9/14/42

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*Letter
Page 11
by Hank*

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I am apprised from a most secret source that the former German Minister to Lima forwarded through the Swiss Legation at Washington a letter to the Spanish Embassy at Lima, regarding certain boxes left on the dock at Callao. In order to give full protection to my source, I hope that there may be no revelation of the fact that knowledge of this letter has come into our possession.

I quote the letter herewith:

"It appears that the German Legation at Lima has been forced to leave behind in Callao upon their departure from Peru property of the German Government of high value, due to the intervention of the United States Legation. For some time there have been stored at the custom house in Callao eight boxes containing extremely valuable books of a scientific and literary character which were destined for presentation on the occasion of a book exhibit to be arranged in Lima. At the same custom house there was also a pouch declared as official diplomatic luggage which, at the time, had been taken away, in the port of Callao from Attache Halter of the German Legation in La Paz, who was travelling as official courier. In addition to the above there are about 35 packages containing German films which were

The Honorable

The Secretary of State.

-2-

 6771
SECRET
 ON DIN...

equally destined for the German Legation in Lima and which, for a certain length of time, have been held back at the German Post Office in Lima. Delivery of all these dispatches has been refused, in spite of frequent interventions on the part of the German Legation through the Peruvian Foreign Office.

"In reply to a written request of the German Legation a day before the sailing of the S.S. 'ACADIA', the Peruvian Government through Mr. Larabure Price, of the Protocol Division, verbally declared that this request had been fulfilled and that the respective articles were in the port ready to be loaded on the transport vessel.

"Upon inquiry on board the 'ACADIA' after its departure, the representative of the U.S. Department of State, Mr. H. C. Spruke, declared, however, to a representative of the German Legation, that everything had been unloaded and brought on shore again upon the intervention of the American Legation in Lima, inasmuch as 'There exists no provision in the international arrangements regarding exchange of diplomats covering the exchange of books and films'."

In connection with the foregoing, the former German Minister asks that the Spanish Embassy in charge of German interests at Lima, "take the necessary steps in order to have these precious articles shipped, if possible, with the second trip of the S.S. 'ACADIA', which it is assumed will leave Peru for the United States in the near future".

Your Department may find it of interest to note the very high value that the German Ambassador seems to attach to this material.

Sincerely yours,



WAW
 5/12/62

German Subject . . . 6139
 Kattak
 & England

May 9, 1942

MEMORANDUM

To: James P. Baxter, 3rd

From: W. J. D.

The following comes from an informant who has contacts in Switzerland, Norway and other European countries. I would want to know more about him before I would wholly accept what he says, but I thought you would like to see it in view of the statements on pages 12 and 13 of "The War This Week":

"It has been reported that Hitler expects to attack England as soon as weather conditions are favorable. This attack, to be led by Field Marshal von Rundstedt, will be made by approximately thirty-five divisions. General List, who has been in charge of the German Army in Norway, reputedly is to aid Field Marshal von Rundstedt. It was asserted that Hitler desires to occupy only a sector of about one hundred miles in Southern England.

"According to this source of information, the morale of the German troops is low and they are not anxious to engage in this battle. The informant stated that Hitler and the other officials of the Nazi Party are having difficulty with the Army leaders, and the report given to Hitler to deal primarily with the situation in Germany according to the informant, will bring revolution and Hitler's downfall.

-2-

"In view of these facts, the informant stated that now would be a good time for the United States Government to start a propaganda program claiming that this country is fighting Hitler and his Nazi gangsters but is not opposed to the enslaved German people. Radio broadcasts in connection with this program assertedly would demoralize German soldiers who are permitted to listen to enemy radios.

"The informant further advised that several of the civil groups in Germany are planning to place one Goerdeler as the civil head of Germany after Hitler is overthrown. Goerdeler, the informant continued, was formerly the burgomaster of Leipzig and reputedly hates Adolf Hitler. However, he has worked so long for the Hitler regime, the informant said, that he cannot be trusted. He has a long record of suppressing labor and carrying on other like activities and it was the informant's opinion that the German public in general would not support him."

It has been reported that Adolf HITLER and the German officials expect to attack England as soon as weather conditions are favorable. This attack, to be lead by Field Marshal von RUNSTEDT, will be made by approximately thirty-five divisions. General LISZT, who has been in charge of the German Army in Norway, reputedly is to aid Field Marshal von RUNSTEDT in his endeavor to conquer England. It was asserted that HITLER desires to occupy only a sector of about one hundred miles in Southern England.

According to this source of information, the morale of the German troops is low and they are not anxious to engage in this battle. The informant stated that HITLER and the other officials of the Nazi Party are having difficulty with the Army leaders, and the recent power given to HITLER to deal summarily with every individual in Germany according to the informant, will bring revolution and HITLER's downfall.

In view of these facts, the informant stated that now would be a good time for the United States Government to start a propaganda program claiming that this country is fighting HITLER and his Nazi gangsters but is not opposed to the enslaved German people. Radio broadcasts in connection with this program assertedly would demoralize German soldiers who are permitted to listen to enemy radios.

The informant further advised that several of the civil groups in Germany are planning to place one GOERDELER as the civil head of Germany after HITLER is overthrown. GOERDELER, the informant continued, was formerly the burgomaster of Leipzig and reputedly hates Adolf HITLER. However, he has worked so long for the HITLER regime, the informant said, that he cannot be trusted. He has a long record of suppressing labor and carrying on other like activities and it was the informant's opinion that the German public in general would not support him.

Notes: Source reports that informant of above claims to have contacts in SWITZERLAND, NORWAY and other European countries. In the past he has furnished information which has proved reliable.

May 4th 1942.

Dear Bill:

Herewith the notes I promised you. They are, of course, entirely a personal expression of opinion, and have no relation to anyone other than myself.

It is grand that you are out and about again, and I shall look forward very much to my weekly visits to you in Washington.

Ever yours,

John

It would seem to be of primary importance that the United Nations should not be misled by the present Nazi peace offensive into believing that a break-down on the German home-front is imminent. Though there are indications that the internal situation in Germany is deteriorating, there does not appear to be sufficient evidence to warrant a comparison between 1940 and 1918. It must be remembered that the first signs of insubordination in the German army and navy occurred as early as July 1917, and that a general strike of considerable proportions, entailing the taking over of certain plants by the military, took place in January 1918.

Though these were indications of a growing war-weariness within Germany, ^{they} in no way presaged an immediate break-down, and, as we know, the war continued for nine months before the real collapse of Germany began. Even then it was assisted and influenced more by Bolshevik than Allied propaganda. As is well known, the virus of revolution was inculcated into Germany from the East rather than from the West where military defeat on "the Black Day of the German Army" (August 8) preceded the outbreak of the revolution by two and a half months.

The Outline of Operations contained in the Memorandum is in itself good, but it is essential that such an initiative should only be made after the United Nations have achieved some outstanding military success against

Germany...

(2)

Germany. In other words, it must be made from strength and not from weakness, and must follow rather than precede, or be substituted for, military offensives.

It is true to say that had this line of propaganda to Germany been followed consistently since September 1939, it might have met with success ere this. Now, however, it seems to be essential that the military defeat of Germany be achieved in no uncertain manner and that only when definite steps have been taken towards this can the campaign be usefully complemented by a peace offensive on the part of the United Nations.

To do so now might lead to a re-shuffle of political and military control in Germany which might deceive many into believing that a genuine change of heart has taken place.

Items 3, 4 & 6 of the Outline of Operations could, it would seem, be usefully undertaken now, as they merely serve to convince the Germans that they are on the losing side.

Finally, it is of the utmost importance to keep continually in the fore-part of our minds that in this war victory will only be complete if not only the Nazi Party but also the German Army is destroyed as an entity in German life.

This can only be achieved by a military victory of the United Nations. A victory so complete and indisputable that the German Army could never again take refuge behind

the...

(3)

the "Stab-in-the Back" alibi, and would be discredited forever in the eyes of the German people, by reason of its alliance with the Nazi Party.

A revolution in Germany at this moment, whether real or "phoney" would still leave the German Army intact as a military and political force. This would not spell victory for the United Nations.

May 4, 1942.
AMT

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: Hugh R. Wilson
TO: Colonel Donovan
SUBJECT: S.A. File #7329

DATE May 22, 1942

With reference to the German letter which I handed you some days ago concerning the conversation in Switzerland with von Twardowski, I append herewith file giving further information regarding him and regarding the source of this information.

However startling the information has been, if it arises from Dr. Wirth, there is no question of the sincerity with which he at least reports it.

H.R.W.
Attachment



SECRET

May 20, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. HUGH R. WILSON
FROM: MR. ALLEN DULLES

Referring to my recent memorandum enclosing the Swiss and German material furnished us confidentially by Paul Schwarz, you will recall that there was reference in this material to a man named von Twardowski.

For your information in this connection I enclose a memorandum furnished us with regard to Twardowski's identity. I am advised that the correspondent in Switzerland whose name was not given, was Wirth, ex-Chancellor of Germany.

The attached memorandum emanates from von Putlitz, who gives his own comment on the Schwarz material in his concluding paragraph.

A.W.D.



P.S. I have just heard that this same material came through in the Bermuda intercepts.



SECRET

Minister von Twardowski

This man comes from a German officer's family of Polish extraction. He himself was an officer (I think in the Navy) in the last war. After the last war, politically he became very left and joined the Foreign Office, not through the regular channels, but through his connection with the Social Democratic Party, which fact was always held against him by his colleagues. Immediately, he got a rather high position in the Press Department of the Republican Government where he served for many years. He was the protégé of Zechlin (A social democrat who for many years was Press Chief of the Foreign Office and then became a turn-coat and tried to become a Nazi, but they would have none of him and fired him from his position in Mexico. I hear that he is now attached to the German Legation in Lisbon.)

In about 1929 or 1930 Twardowski was appointed Counselor of the German Embassy in Moscow where in 1932 he was wounded in the hand in the attempted assassination of the German Ambassador to Russia, Nadolny, (he later served as assistant to Nadolny when Nadolny served on the German delegation to the disarmament conference in Geneva in 1933) Even this martyrdom did not save him from the wrath of the Nazis, and he had a very hard time to keep his position in the Foreign Office. In 1934 or 1935 he was sacked from Moscow and got a very minor position in the Culture Section of the Foreign Office. Up until the present time, as far as I know, he holds this same position.

I know that he was in London on some mission or other in July or August 1939. Twardowski's younger brother Hans Heinz von Twardowski has been living in Hollywood for three years and he has acted in many anti-Nazi pictures, particularly in CONFESSIONS OF A NAZI SPY. Twardowski himself went to see this picture clandestinely while he was in London.

Twardowski's daughter was married in about 1935 to a Swedish diplomat whom she met in Moscow, and whose name I do not remember.

In spite of the fact that he is in the German Foreign Office, he is not a Nazi himself and there may be some wishful thinking on the part of this report which depends on his evidence, but he is a steady, serious, intelligent man, and a competent observer. Besides, the very language of this report smells of the Foreign Office.

This report to me as a whole has within it so many internal evidences of its truthfulness, that I feel it must be given extraordinary credence.



5/13/42

S E C R E T

Germany -
SECRET *Pol. Sec. / Psychological*

March 4, 1942

**PLAN FOR POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
AGAINST GERMANY** *James V. Warburg*CHAPTER I**I. POLICY GOALS**

1. The aim of American policy as regards Germany is to bring about the military defeat of Germany.
2. To bring about the destruction of Hitler and Hitlerism.
3. To end the rule of the militarist class and the militaristic ideal in Germany.
4. To prepare the German people for some sort of participation in a peaceful world based upon justice and the freedom of the individual and a universal acceptance of orderly adjustment to change.

II. APPRECIATION

This plan is designed to cover political and psychological warfare against Germany for the next three to six months, during which time it will have to be revised from time to time in accordance with new developments.

During the immediate future it is to be expected that Germany and Japan will remain on the offensive in a military sense and that the initiative will only begin to pass into the hands of the United Nations toward the end of the summer. This means that German morale, which has undoubtedly been at its low for the war during the past three months, will tend to rise as

- 2 -

the spring offensives get under way. We are therefore dealing with a period during which we shall not have many major successful military actions to exploit, and during which the Nazi propaganda machine will in all probability have such actions to exploit in sustaining and building up the morale of the German people.

Germany has probably passed the peak of its military strength as well as of its industrial capacity. Germany is probably beginning to feel the pinch of shortages in some essential materials, such as oil. But the full force of the United Nations is not yet fully mobilized. The shortage of shipping and the long lines of communication to the various battle fronts render the strategic problems of the United Nations extremely difficult, and for these reasons Germany, although past her peak, is still capable of striking severe and damaging blows.

In one form or another the German effort in the next few months will undoubtedly be directed at oil - either through Southern Russia to the Caucasus, or through Asia-Minor to Iraq and Iran, or both. This offensive will have the two-fold purpose of supplying Germany's war machine with oil and of effecting a pincer movement in conjunction with the Japanese upon India and the whole Middle East.

Given these military circumstances, the prime essential of political and psychological warfare is that it

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assume the initiative and the offensive in spite of the fact that the enemy will hold the military initiative and offensive.

If this is done, it is perfectly possible to bring about a further deterioration of German morale in spite of the fact that German armies may be moving forward again rather than retreating. To do this during the coming period will require political action and not merely words.

III. PROPAGANDA OBJECTIVES

1. To convince the German people that the tide has turned against them - that in spite of their present successes, they are headed for inevitable defeat.
2. To convince the German people that even the victory promised them by the Nazis, were it to be attained, would be a Pyrrhic victory.
3. To convince the German people that the inevitable victory of the United Nations will not destroy them, as they are told it will, but will on the contrary bring them peace and hope for a decent future.
4. To demonstrate to the German people the significance of American strength and endurance in making their defeat certain.

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IV. TARGET

1. The German people, in spite of their being so practical and "efficient", are extremely susceptible to ideas. They are willing to believe in any idea, no matter how unrealistic, provided it happens to correspond to their emotional hopes and desires of the moment, and provided it can be made to fit into their exciting thought pattern. In the last war there were two outstanding examples of this susceptibility: First, the extraordinary impact upon the German people of Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points and the whole League of Nations idea; Second, the manner in which the Communist idea took hold of German soldiers and civilians. In this war and the period leading up to it there have already been several similar outstanding examples. Ludendorff and Hitler were able to sell the German people the "stab in the back" theory of their defeat in 1918. Hitler found them a ready prey for anti-Semitism and for the racial ideas of Rosenberg. Hitler was able to convince them that the Communists were their worst enemies, then their best friends, and then again their worst enemies, all within a period of three years.

It is clear that an idea to be attractive to the German people need not be logical. It needs only to provide them with an escape from the unpleasant reality of the moment. This is what our ideas must do.

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2. At the present moment the German people are unified by only one idea: the common fear of what will happen to them if they lose the war. This is not to say that the Germans have given up hope of victory; some of them have and some of them have not. But the Germans have ceased as a people to fight for something. They began the war unified by a desire to create Hitler's "New Order". They hoped to attain this goal without fighting, but they were willing to fight for it if necessary. They are now held together, not by the idea of creating the "New Order", although many Germans still believe in it, but by the hope of staving off a defeat which has been painted to them as synonymous with utter destruction. It is this unifying idea of what defeat would mean to the German people that we must destroy.

3. Although they are held together by fear of defeat, the German people are split by many rifts and cleavages. All these cleavages, whether social, economic, religious or regional can and should be exploited. For example, a wedge should be driven between the Nazis and the Army, between the Army and civilians, between the Army and political leadership, between the Church and the Nazis, between the Austrians and the Germans, between the Bavarians and the Prussians, between the young and the old, the rich and the poor. Projects for the exploitation of these and other cleavages should be developed.

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4. The most important cleavage to be exploited is, however, one which lies within each individual German. "Zwei Herzen schlagen sich in meiner Brust" (two hearts beat in my breast) is a profoundly true analysis. In one respect the average German is decent, God-fearing, law-abiding, hard-working, and gemütlich; in his other aspect he is full of insecurity, self-pity, and bullying aggression.

The German people have in the past followed a familiar cycle: they feel strong and prosperous, become blustering bullies, threaten their neighbors, get into a war, achieve brilliant victories, solidify all other people against them, and go down in defeat; then they become humble, work hard, begin to prosper, suffer from an extreme feeling of "nobody loves me", become more and more obsessed with self-pity, more and more ready to believe that they have been wronged, and so, before long, begin the cycle of blustering and bullying.

The German people recognize this pattern themselves. Being by nature mystical, they express it in the Wagnerian (Götterdämmerung) legend of victory followed by self-destruction. That is why, even during their greatest victories in 1940 and 1941, the German people remained apathetic.

The chief aim of our political and psychological warfare must be to widen the cleavage within every German: to show the blustering bully that his victories lead only to

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defeat, and to show the decent, God-fearing, law-abiding
German that his only hope lies not in the victory of Nazi
Germany, but in its destruction.

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CHAPTER II

I. POLITICAL OBJECTIVES

1. To gain an audience in Germany and to establish credibility of American news among Germans.
2. To destroy the fighting spirit of the German Army and its belief in its ultimate victory. This must be approached in three ways:
 - a. To make the Army itself realize that the tide has turned, that the Germans are from now on growing weaker while their enemies are growing stronger.
 - b. To arouse in the German Army a distrust of the political leadership, a fear of a collapse of the industrial machine at home, and apprehension as to what is going on on the home front.
 - c. To arouse distrust in the German Army of the wisdom and efficiency of the general staff.
3. To destroy the spirit of the German civilian population by:
 - a. Shaking its confidence in the invincibility of the German Army, and making it feel that the Army cannot possibly accomplish the task which it has been asked to do by the political leadership.
 - b. Making defeat seem inevitable, and therefore arousing the conviction that all this suffering and sacrifice is in vain - that the sooner defeat comes the better.

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c. Arousing distrust of the present leadership, and bringing about the conviction that since victory is impossible, peace too is impossible until Germany has a government with which its enemies will negotiate.

d. To stimulate factory workers to slow up in their work and if possible to commit acts of sabotage.

4. To divide Germany and her allies and to divide the allies of Germany amongst each other.

5. To demonstrate the strength and unity of the United Nations.

6. To demonstrate the failure of German political and psychological warfare in this country, and in the western hemisphere.

7. To promote among the German people a terror of the vengeance which will be taken upon the oppressors by the conquered peoples, and to direct this terror towards:

a. Suggesting to the factory workers that it might be well for them to make friends with some of the foreign labor employed in Germany.

b. To suggest to German occupying troops in foreign countries that it might be a good idea to be more considerate of the conquered peoples.

8. To arouse a fear among the German people that their money will lose its purchasing power, their savings be lost, and their life insurance policies become worthless.

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9. To arouse among all classes of Germans suspicion, fear, and hate of the Gestapo.

II. Themes to be used to accomplish these objectives.

1. Germany cannot win the war.

a. Initial German advantages of superior striking power, training, organization, and unity, as well as the German advantage of having accumulated materials have been lost.

b. The cardinal principles of German military leaders, past and present, have been violated. All these leaders have believed that in order to win, the Germans must fight a short, aggressive war, delivering a knockout blow with overwhelming force upon one enemy at a time. This was what Germany tried to do and failed.

c. The two-front war.

This nightmare of German strategists has come to pass. The Red Army has not been knocked out. There will continue to be a Russian front and additional fronts are developing in Africa, the Near East, in the Battle of the Atlantic, and in the Occupied Countries (Serbia).

In driving home the existence of a two-front war in the radio broadcasts, much can be done through the manner in which news is organized so that the German listeners will be made aware by every broadcast that Germany is fighting on more than one front, that we are preparing to send troops and equipment to more than one front, and that soon it will not be a two-front but a multi-front war.

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d. Weak Allies.

It was largely the weakness of Germany's allies in the last war which brought about her defeat. The treachery of Bulgaria in September 1918 opened the way to Allied victory. Austria Hungary collapsed and would have made a separate peace had the Allies been willing to make one. The same thing is happening today. Germany is receiving ineffective and half-hearted support from Slovakia, Hungary, and Croatia. Italy is nothing but a drain on Germany's resources. Finland may drop out of the war at any moment. Roumania may stab Germany in the back. Hungary and Roumania hate each other worse than either of them hates Russia. The Japanese are playing their own game. They are making use of the preoccupation of the other powers to snatch an empire for themselves. Asia for the Asiatics means that German trade will be excluded from whatever areas the Japanese conquer.

In our daily broadcasts this theme can be emphasized over and over again. There is almost daily news from Finland, almost daily evidence of friction between Hungary and Roumania. These stories present daily opportunities for a phrase or sentence recalling what happened in the last war, and sowing the seed of distrust and fear.

e. Prolonged War.

We do not need to tell the Germans that this is a long war. They know it. Their own propaganda has recently taken this line. We should take the line that we are preparing for a war of whatever length is necessary, but

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that we should not be surprised if the end came much sooner than expected. In 1917-1918 we prepared for a long war. We had not begun to exert our power when the Germans collapsed. Our preparations today are vastly greater than they were in 1918. Whether the war is long or short depends upon the Germans. We can stand a long war but we know they cannot.

In our radio broadcasts, German casualties should always be related to the available German manpower, which the Germans know cannot be replaced. News of German losses should be juxtaposed wherever possible with reports of vast numbers of American troops in training and American material being sent to supply vast new Russian armies which are being formed.

f. Germany's opponents, except Russia, are out of her reach.

Russia is so vast that it will be impossible for the Germans to deliver any knockout blow there even if they should drive the Russians back across the Volga.

No German soldier has been able to set foot on the British Isles, although Britain was almost unarmed in the beginning. Now Britain is a fortress impossible to storm. The United States is completely out of German reach, free to develop, untroubled by bombing raids or blackouts, the most enormous war machine ever assembled. Germany cannot attack us, but we can and will attack Germany at the proper time and in a lot of places.

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It is only a question of time until superior strength will force a decision against the Axis.

a. Growing shortage of transportation.

It is clear that the strain of war upon Europe's transportation is prodigious. Lack of petroleum and interference with sea-borne commerce has thrown increased pressure upon the railroads. The supply of railroad equipment is deteriorating rapidly. This situation is leading inevitably to the point where German armies, particularly in distant localities, can no longer be equipped and supplied. The same thing happened in the first World War. Today Germany is stretched out over a greater territory than it was then.

We should use in our broadcasts all available items about transportation difficulties. An army which fears for its supplies is half beaten. Many such items are furnished by the Germans themselves; in explaining that there is no shortage of coal and potatoes, they talk about the difficulties of transportation. Soon these difficulties will affect not only civilians. Wherever we can we should contrast transportation conditions in Europe with transportation here, working in items about our enormous and rapid freight movements, vast quantities of new equipment ordered by railroads, etc. A lot of this material is available.

b. Shortage of labor.

The shortage of labor within Germany is becoming acute. One workman out of every six or seven working within

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Germany itself is a foreigner - an enemy of the Third Reich. As time goes on and more and more foreign labor is impressed into service, the number of enemies within Germany will grow, until eventually Germany will depend almost entirely upon the enemies within her gates.

This is a theme which can be used continuously to arouse fear and suspicion of these foreign elements in the minds of the German civilians. What will these enemies within Germany do when the day of reckoning comes? What are they doing today in the way of slowing up and sabotaging the work which they are forced to do? Wouldn't it be well to make friends with some of these people?

1. America's strength.

In contrast with the gradual decay of the German Army and the German machinery of production, America has brought into the conflict the resources of an entire hemisphere. The United States brings with it the cooperation of twenty other American nations with a population of some 250 million people and a supply of foodstuffs, fuel, and raw materials greater than anything the Axis can ever hope to gain.

America has the largest and best organized mass production industries in the world. American industry produces and consumes approximately 50% of the world's strategic raw materials.

America is the last word in technical

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efficiency. It has 35,000 industrial laboratories, a machinery and machine tool production three and a half times that of the Continent of Europe. American methods and machinery are constantly improving. While the machinery of Europe is deteriorating and worn-out parts are not being replaced.

In our propaganda up to the present time we have been stressing the theme of American production, first as the Arsenal of Democracy and since Pearl Harbor as demonstrating America's part in the war.

From now on we should take a different line: -- we should use this theme only in connection with actual accomplishments. Future plans, future production, items "on order" should be mentioned only when it is possible to make them credible by association with similar things which have been accomplished.

Pictures and leaflets as well as broadcasts should be used to drive home this story. Ship-building should be stressed, particularly; the Germans know that once we have enough ships, their time has come.

J. The strength and unity of the United Nations.

All available material should be used to demonstrate the strength of each of the United Nations, as well as the effective cooperation between all of them. Unity of purpose in war and peace should be developed and stressed whenever possible.

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2. Germany cannot set up her "New Order".

The new economic and political order outlined by Hitler remains on paper. Germany cannot fight a long war in a beleaguered Europe and at the same time reorganize Europe's industry, trade, transportation, finance, education, agriculture, religion, art, and social habits. In order to do this Germany would have to overcome not only her enemies, but the resistance of the conquered peoples and even of her Allies.

a. Mass opposition of conquered peoples.

None of the conquered peoples can be depended upon for effective cooperation. They are all holding back expecting the Germans to do the hard work, to provide the equipment and supplies as well as the leadership. In many of the conquered countries the people are even resisting and openly sabotaging.

We should constantly use in our broadcasts stories of resistance and sabotage in the conquered countries. The purpose of using such stories is not so much to prove what has happened or is happening as continually to strike a note of terror concerning what will happen when the day of German defeat comes, unless the German people have previously disavowed and overthrown the Nazi regime.

b. Germany itself cannot carry the whole continent.

Everyone in Germany is strained to the utmost.

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Men, women, and children are laboring to the limit of their capacity. The standard of living is declining all over Europe. The accumulated supplies of clothing, utensils, tools, and machinery are wearing out. New agricultural equipment is not available for farmers. Reduced food supply is affecting health. Epidemics are on the increase.

c. Pretty soon Germany will be just as badly off as the conquered countries.

So far Germany has been able to bolster up her falling standard of living by looting the conquered countries. There is little to loot now. Malnutrition and starvation in many of the conquered countries will soon spread to Germany, and even if starvation does not actually reach Germany, the results of starvation in the rest of Europe will reach Germany. Epidemics of disease cannot be stopped at geographical frontiers.

We should stress censorship restrictions and travel restrictions between different parts of Germany, which will prove to the German people that the government itself is worried about this matter.

d. Fear of epidemics.

The fear of disease is a theme which should be woven into every possible broadcast. The Germans are not used to epidemics and have a very pronounced fear of them. The Army can be made to fear typhus not only for itself but

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for those at home, and the people at home can be made to fear epidemics not only for themselves and their children but for their husbands and sons at the front. In stressing this theme we should imply sympathy for those who suffer from epidemics and an eagerness to reach the day when the war will be over and American medical supplies, doctors, and nurses can help to restore health throughout Europe. Specific drug shortages should be played up.

e. Fear of depreciation of money.

The memory of 1923 and the fear that inflation will again destroy the purchasing power of money and wipe out savings and life insurance policies is strong in every German. There is a great deal of evidence in the German press to show that the government is worried about and constantly combating this fear. We should seek to stimulate this fear--to promote fear--buying of commodities, hoarding of commodities, resistance to buying government bonds, fear of government insurance policies, and the tendency to spend recklessly--all of which will impede the German war effort and undermine confidence in the regime.

In using this theme, care should be exercised concerning its possible effect upon other countries. It is recommended that special study be made of this matter.

3. Germany cannot achieve peace under her present leadership.

Hitler has been unable to achieve peace with the people he has conquered. Everywhere the Germans are only

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the hated masters. All the peoples of Europe are united in a deep, sullen resentment against them. Even sincerely well meant German efforts at conciliation have been rebuffed. The peoples of Europe do not want to be "civilized" in the German way.

Wherever the German armies have gone they have enlarged the area of military occupation, but no peace and understanding has followed in the trend of the armies. For this reason Germany must keep her armed forces scattered all over Europe. The more territory Germany conquers, the more garrisons of German troops will be needed to hold down the conquered areas. German troops are needed to garrison even her Allies - Italy and Finland. There is no possibility for the German soldiers ever to return home to their families until there is peace, and Hitler cannot make peace.

b. Just as Hitler cannot make peace with those he has conquered, he can never make peace with those who are fighting him.

The overwhelming mass of mankind loathes Hitler and his system. People everywhere know that the Nazi system means control by secret police, imprisonment at the will of Nazi officials, forced rationing, constant surveillance by block leaders and party Observers, enforced participation in party activities, and suppression of all rights of the individual.

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People throughout the world know that Hitler's word cannot be trusted. They do not believe that any treaties he might sign would have preeminence. They are united in the determination to keep on fighting until Hitler and Hitlerism are destroyed. Nothing that Hitler and the Nazis can do now will change world opinion.

c. The Nazi party has based its whole career on lies. Hitler built his party on lies. He admits it. The Nazis promised the working man a socialized state. They promised the business man and investor a capitalistic state.

They promised the farmers high prices for their products. They promised the city dwellers low food prices.

Hitler, the old front soldier, who knew how cruel war could be, promised the German people peace while he was planning for war. He prepared for war from the very instant he assumed power. The Nazis have thought and planned for nothing else.

When war came it was quite a different war from what they had promised. Hitler promised that Britain would fall in 1940. He promised that Russia would be destroyed in 1941. But victory now is further out of Hitler's reach than at any time since the war began. In fact, there is no possible end to the war except the complete defeat of the Nazi government and the establishment of some German government with which the world can come to an understanding - some government which keeps its promises both to its own people

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and to the outside world.

d. The Nazi system, even were it to succeed, would make the German people slaves even though they might be called the "Master Race". The Nazi system means the continuance of Gestapo spying, secret denunciations, sudden arrests and concentration camps. It means that children of farmers must become farmers and cannot marry in the cities. People will be forced to live where they are told to live just as they are now being drafted to be sent into the dreary wastes of Russia and Poland at the risk of their lives. Food rationing will remain in force. No one will be allowed to choose what work he does or what thoughts he thinks.

The German people have nothing to look forward to so long as the Nazi system continues except what they have now. A few party leaders will continue to exploit the people, live in luxury, and send their stolen gains outside of the country, thinking that thus they will be safe when the day of reckoning comes.

We should keep hammering by broadcast and all other means on the difference between life in Germany and life in a free country. For this purpose we should use particularly German American workers who can tell in their own words how they live in this country and why they want to free the Germans at home from the Nazi yoke. We should use also all available stories concerning graft and corruption in Germany and the export of capital by Nazi leaders.

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4. German consciousness of doom.

a. The Nazis have offended God by their presumption. They have provoked Fate by their insolence and the arrogant assumption of their own omniscience. They have rejected the wisdom of the past and incurred the bitter enmity of all the churches, labor groups, and cultural or scientific societies. They have laid aside every law, every code, rule, standard of conduct or moral scruple which have hitherto bound mankind.

Their punishment is sure to come, and with them will be punished all those who have connived at their evil doings.

This is an extremely powerful theme, difficult to handle, but psychologically one of the strongest weapons on our armory.

b. "Better an end with terror than terror without end."

No disaster could be worse for the German people than the continuation of this Nazi war, which is undermining the health, the morale, and the standard of living of all Germans - which is destroying the very fundamentals of German society. As this war continues, the end of European civilization is approaching. Europe is tearing itself to bits: education, religion, free thought, decent living - all the elements of human progress - are disappearing. The machinery for production and material well-being is being used up.

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If this war lasts many years there will be nothing left in Europe worth living for. Western civilization as we know it will continue to exist only in the British Commonwealth and the Western Hemisphere. This destruction of Europe will be the doing of the Nazis. The German people have their just grievances, but under Nazi leadership they have magnified these grievances into a cult of destruction. They are pulling down the temple of European civilization and destroying themselves.

This theme too is extremely powerful from the psychological point of view. It must be used with care, because the Germans have a strong self-destructive trend and cannot be talked out of it by being made aware of it. It is a theme which, if prematurely used, might provoke them into continuing the war just in order to pull down the temple. It can be used with great effect at a later date when we have done more than we have as yet to assure the Germans that their defeat does not mean their destruction.

5. Defeat of Nazi Germany means the destruction of the Nazi regime and of those who created it. It does not mean the destruction of the German people.

a. The only prospect of a tolerable future for the German people is through a peace made after the destruction of Hitler and Hitlerism. The sooner this happens, the more can be saved from the wreckage. The sooner this happens, the sooner it will be possible to rear a new generation of Germans whose health and spirit have not been permanently undermined.

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b. America will insist upon a just peace - a peace which guarantees to the German people, once they have cast aside their worship of brute force, the same freedoms which Americans desire for themselves and for their children. This peace will mean the resurrection of the true German culture. We shall make a just peace - not because we are tenderhearted - but because we know that only a just peace can be permanent. Some of the peoples of Europe whom Germany has conquered will wish to destroy Germany just as Germany has tried and is still trying to destroy them. We in America shall oppose that policy with all the force at our command because we know that he who seeks to destroy his neighbor only ends up by destroying himself, just as the Germans are destroying themselves today.

This is the theme which will destroy the one idea which today unifies the German people and maintains their resistance - the fear that defeat means their utter destruction. Every means at our disposal, all the thinking power at our disposal, should be concentrated on destroying this idea and upon making the Germans believe that we will stand between them and destruction once the Nazis and militarists have been thrown out and the German people give evidence of a sincere desire to behave themselves. This theme is of such central importance that a special study should be made to implement it.

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c. America is eager for the day when the war will be over and the process of rebuilding Europe can begin.

We are accumulating large supplies of food, clothing, and other necessary materials, of which we alone have a great surplus. America has a tradition of generosity. American Quakers fed German children almost until the beginning of the second war. At the end of the last war immense supplies of relief shipments were sent by America. America supplied the capital for rebuilding post-war Europe. We shall do this again in even greater measure, but we shall not make the mistake of supplying the capital with which Europe can rebuild its war machines.

This theme can be implemented not merely by words but by action. We can actually accumulate food and medical supplies. We can actually set up skeleton organizations for relief and reconstruction work in Europe. We can actually train Americans for foreign service in this field once the war is over. Naturally the stories of such action should be used as much as possible in order to create in the minds of the German people the definite expectation that the end of the war will mean an immediate attack upon the problems of malnutrition and bad health.

III. Integration of Plan for Immediate Use.

The strong possibility of a new German offensive in South Russia and/or the Near East plus Africa should dominate.

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We must lift out of our long range plan the following themes for current emphasis:

1. Two-front war. The coming offensive involves fresh German commitments on new fronts, adding to existing burdens, complexities, shortages, and dangers. This theme can be started at once.

2. Opponents out of reach. The coming offensive leads German armies ever further away from their chief enemies, the United States, Great Britain, and the central area of the Soviet Union which is the center of its power. It disperses German manpower and equipment over vast areas with meager resources, climatic obstacles, primitive transportation facilities, and has no attainable strategic goal. The German offensive, no matter how successful, will finally dissipate its strength in deserts, mountains, and wildernesses, far away from the centers of strength of the United Nations. This theme likewise can be started at once.

The following themes should begin when the German offensive begins and its direction is clear.

3. Fear of Diseases. The German armies will advance through backward regions, full of the accumulated filth and diseases of the centuries, where the population is saturated with venereal diseases, malaria, typhus, cholera, dysentery, sand fly fever, and even bubonic plague. This Near Eastern pest-hole has destroyed countless military expeditions in the past: Crusades, Frederick Barbarossa, the Romans, Alexander

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the Great, Napoleon. All efforts in the past to clean it up have failed. In World War I the commanding German general in the Near East, von der Goetz, and the commanding British general, Maude, both died of poison in the same house in Bagdad, two years apart.

4. Passive resistance and sabotage. Asia Minor, the Caucasus are filled with savage, hostile peoples, treacherous even in peace, barbarous in war. The women still practice mutilation of the wounded, the weak, and the stragglers. The area abounds in bandits, guerillas, snipers, traditionally living on plunder, utterly uncivilized and fierce to attack a stranger. Immense armies of occupation will be necessary to protect long supply lines. Most of the German soldiers who venture into this area will die there.

5. Impossibility of economic exploitation. This area is poor, can only support meager populations with low and primitive living standards. It does not produce the foods which Germans must have, neither potatoes, grain, or meat, except for a few scrubby goats, asses, and camels. The fabled oil resources are far away, easy of access only from the opposite direction, and will be destroyed before the Germans arrive - if they arrive (of Dniepropetrovsk and Baku oil fields). The pipe lines too will be destroyed.

6. Difficulties of transportation. Insurmountable transportation difficulties prevent Germany from bringing oil from the Caucasus, Iraq, and Iran, even should the

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fields be captured and eventually put into operation. Timber and minerals are scanty. Land transportation routes do not exist. Sea transportation is impossible because the Germans have no tankers and most of their shipping is tied up in the Baltic and North Atlantic. Shipping routes are subject to Allied attack from surface vessels, submarines, and the air. Only Italian shipping is available and this has a miserable record of accomplishment even on the short route to Libya.

7. The Spring offensive opens Germany to attack from the north.

The Germans will be able to shift troops from the North in Russia for a Southern drive, so long as weather conditions make an offensive impossible north of the Pripiet -- but so can Russia. Even if by a miracle German troops might join hands with the Japanese in India or the Middle East, that still could do nothing to bring supplies back to Germany or to effect the final outcome of the war. An offensive to the southeast forces the German army to wear itself out against fresh adversaries of little strategic importance and imperils the successful defense of the home lands of Europe against the inevitable attack of Britain and America. This attack will come - and come soon.

8. Defeat is the solution.

Eventual defeat in this war is gradually becoming

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the most tolerable solution for the German people, increased beyond endurance by new and unending dangers. Final victory is more remote than ever. And what would final victory mean were it to be attained? The perpetuation of the Gestapo and hunger rationing. Food lies in the Americas where mounting supplies in bursting warehouses await the day of Europe's reconstruction - but American food will never go to a Nazi dominated Europe. Every kilometer the Germans move to the East and South - every "victory" in their offensive - takes them nearer starvation, suffering, and death - and further away from peace. Relief will come to the German people only when peace and understanding are restored by the civilized peoples on both sides of the Atlantic.

IV. USE OF THIS PLAN.

When this plan has been approved by the Planning Board, it shall be given to the Regional Coordinator for Germany, who shall then, under the supervision of the Board, take the following steps:

1. He shall proceed at once to issue directives to the Operating Departments of the FIS at least once a week, oftener if it seems desirable. These directives should be short and should guide the Operating Departments in the use of current developments so as to implement the themes set forth in the plan wherever and whenever possible.

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2. Whenever Hitler makes a speech, or whenever there is an important new development, such as the story that Hitler will remain in Russia until the last Russian battalion is annihilated, the Regional Coordinator should immediately issue a special directive telling the Operating Departments in what way to exploit such an item. This should be done in consultation with the Planning Board.

3. He should propose to the Board projects for creating statements or events which would provide news needed to implement the themes stated in the plan.

4. He should develop specific projects for special efforts directed at particular groups within Germany, such as the Catholics, the Bavarians, or the factory-workers. Such projects should be carefully planned in advance to be carried out over a period of time.

5. He should prepare an alphabetically arranged glossary or index in which the Operating Departments can readily find an indication of how to use events or news items which may be expected to occur. For example:

Typhus - Arouse fear of German women for men at the front. Arouse fear of men at the front for relatives at home. If occurring in occupied countries other than Germany, arouse fear of spread to Germany. Relate to malnutrition and spread of hunger throughout Europe. Relate to unsanitary conditions and mismanagement by High Command or political leadership. Relate to hope of medical relief from the United States once Nazis are defeated.

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6. This plan itself should be shown by the Regional Coordinator only to the heads of the Operating Departments and should not be left on file anywhere except in the Secretariat of the Planning Board in Washington and New York.

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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7/20/42

56616
 X *man Agent*
 X *710*
 X *Lieber*
 X *P O Boyle*

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover
 The Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
 Department of Justice
 Washington, D. C.

Dear Edgar:

From a strictly confidential and reliable source, the following information has been received concerning (1) mail boxes situated in Mexico and Cuba used by the Euzia and Falange for the transmission of their material; (2) the address of a presumably German agent in New York; (3) activities of Pinto Basto & Co. in smuggling American currency into the United States.

(1) The following is a list of mail boxes used by the Euzia and the Falange for the transmission of material out of Berlin into Spain through the Spanish Legation at Lisbon and transmitted to destination:

Box 471 - Agencia Valdes, Mexico, D.F.

Box 2808 - Agencia Comercial, Mexico, D.F.

Av. Roma, Av. Uruguay 10, Mexico City
 E. 245 Laguna de San Cristobal 15,
 Mexico City

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Box 7305 - Birk, Mexico, D.F.

Box 865 - Bolbrugge, Mexico, D.F.

Box 225 - Manuel Diaz, Mexico, D.F.

Box 2004 - Knoll, Mexico D.F.

Box 2, Alfredo Mexico, D.F.

and directly to the Falange Police:

Box 1136 - Farre, Mexico, D.F.

Box 1614 - Arturo, Mexico, D.F.

and directly to the Havana Falange Police:

Box 1669 Havana

" 835 "

" 2566 "

" 1765 "

" 137 "

From Madrid Box 14, Pablo to Havana through Lisbon."

(2) "The Falange police, Spain, are receiving letters via Spanish Embassy, Lisbon through Clipper from General Delivery, General Post Office, 8th Avenue, 53rd Street, New York, U.S.A. Informer is certain sender is German agent residing New York."

(3) "I am now conducting an investigation of a major conspiracy involving the shipping house of Fink & Co. wherein they have been facilitating the smuggling of American currency for the enemy

-3-

CONFIDENTIAL

to the United States. Certain important documents are now in my possession and I will send copies or originals via the next clipper. I have already notified Customs authorities, Washington to apprehend one of the minor conspirators carrying \$5,000 in marked American currency."

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

RECEIVED
7/20/42

W.J. 2358

German Capabilities 5:42
X Turkey
X Syria
X Iraq
X Rome

March 27, 1942

Memorandum for Dr. Mason:

I have reread the memorandum on "German Capabilities in Turkey, Syria and Iraq". I am still troubled about it. Somehow it still seems unsound. I think there is ignored the possibility of the real attack being made by Rommel, particularly since I hear that he is now in command of all areas of the Mediterranean and not merely corps commander. I want to reconsider this before I give my final approval.

RJD

May 1, 1942

Honorable James C. Dunn
State Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear Jim:

I think you ought to know about
the attached memorandum. Is there any-
thing you want us to do?

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

*See Mr. Paschal Sigal around for
Hilbert with Economic Information on ...*

March 9th, 1942

Mr. Bartholomew P. Bouverie,
1424 16th Street, Room 402,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Bouverie:

This report on the DISTRIBUTION
OF GERMAN AIRFORCE came to us through one of our
reliable sources. I know you will be interested.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

WJD/v

March 9th, 1942

Colonel Louis J. Fortier,
Joint Intelligence Committee,
Room 204, Public Health Bldg.,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Fortier:

This report on the
DISTRIBUTION OF GERMAN AIRPOWER came to us
through one of our reliable sources. I know you
will be interested.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

WJD/v

March 9th, 1942

Brig. Gen. Raymond E. Lee,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G2,
War Department,
Monitions Bldg.,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Raymond:

This report on the DISTRIBUTION
OF GERMAN AIRFORCE came to us through one of
our reliable sources. I know you will be
interested.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

WJD/D

March 9th, 1942

Col. N. L. Walsh,
A-2 Air Corps,
Ammunitions Bldg.,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Col. Walsh:

This report on the DISTRIBUTION
OF GERMAN AIRFORCE came to us through one of our
reliable source. I know you will be interested.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

WPD/D

DISTRIBUTION OF GERMAN AIRFORCE (End of January)

Western Front: (KG--Kampf Geschwader, German for Bomber Group)

4 to 6 Bomber Groups of which--Group 1/KG 40 F.W. (Focke Wulf)
200 at Merignac and Cognac
Group 3/KG 40 F.W. at Rennes
Group 3/KG 40 Do. (Dornier) 215
in Holland
Group No. 106 He. (Heinkel) 3 (?)
and 1 Squadron of He. 115 (?)
(115?) Hydroplanes

--in addition identification of --one group of Stukas
2 to 3 Reconnaissance Squadrons
6 Squadrons of Hydroplanes armed
for pursuit.

Particulars are lacking but it can be estimated that there are in the
occupied territories to the west and northwest of Germany:

--14 Pursuit Groups Me. (Messerschmitt)
109
--2 Destroyer Groups Me. 110
--4 Night Pursuit Groups Me. 110 and
Ju. Junker 88

Interior Germany:

Identification of 12 to 14 Bomber Groups coming from various
sectors of the Russian front.

Italy:

In Italy: 4 to 6 Bomber Groups plus 4 to 6 Reconnaissance Squadrons.

In Greece: 2 Bomber Groups plus (location not specified):
4 Dive Bomber Groups
3 Pursuit Groups
2 Destroyer Groups
2 Night Pursuit Groups
3 Squadrons of Hydroplanes

Total:

3rd Flotilla : 1200 planes
Interior Germany : 1250 planes
Russian Front : 2000 planes
Flotilla Kesselring: 950 planes

12000 planes

German 46722
** Library : Information*
** West 10.11*

March 24, 1943

Mr. Randolph Paul,
Acting Secretary of the Treasury,
Treasury Department,
Washington, D.C.

My dear Mr. Paul:

I wish to acknowledge receipt of your letter stating that you have sent here the following books and pamphlets to be held by us under the terms on which we are holding other material from the German Library of Information:

Die Ehefeier
Die Totenfeier
Die Namens-gebung
Heilig ist das Blut
Der Fall Gostloff
Thuringens NSD an Wert
Continental Atlas fuer Kraftfahrer
Die Kultur Thuringens
Thuringen in Wort und Bild (Volume 1)
Thuringen in Wort und Bild (Volume II)
Meyers Deutscher Stadteatlas

I wish to express our appreciation for the above material and to thank you for your courtesy and help.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

German Library of Info 4672
x Kimball



TREASURY DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON

MAR 19 1942

Sir:

Dr. Walter L. Dorn of your office has requested the custody of the following books and pamphlets held in this Department as property of the German Library of Information (in the name of the Rev. W. E. Weidhaas) to be held by you on the terms on which you are holding other materials of the German Library of Information:

Die Ehefeier
 Die Totenfeier
 Die Namens-gebung
 Heilig ist das Blut
 Der Fall Gustloff
 Thuringens NSD am Wert
 Continental Atlas fuer Kraftfahrer
 Die Kultur Thuringens
 Thuringen in Wort und Bild (Volume I)
 Thuringen in Wort und Bild (Volume II)
 Meyers Deutscher Stadtatlas.

Accordingly, the foregoing are being sent to your office under separate cover to be held by you on the terms set out in the exchange of correspondence between your office and this Department dated April 24 and April 28, 1942.

Please acknowledge receipt of this letter and the materials to which reference is made.

Yours very truly,

Handwritten signature
 Acting Secretary of the Treasury.

Colonel William J. Donovan
 Office of Strategic Services
 18th and E Streets, N. W.
 Washington, D. C.



C
O
P
Y

TREASURY DEPARTMENT

Washington

April 28, 1942

Sir:

This will acknowledge receipt of your letter of April 24, 1942, pertaining to the transfer to you of custody over the records of the German Library of Information now in the possession of the Treasury Department by virtue of the Treasury Department's Foreign Funds Control powers.

This Department is agreeable to turning over the custody of the German Library of Information materials to you on the terms and conditions set forth in your letter of April 24, 1942, to me. Appropriate directions will issue promptly.

Yours very truly,

/s/ E. H. Foley

Acting Secretary of the Treasury

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
25th and E Streets, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Very. sent Per. 5/5.

German Lib. 4 Inform.
X Kinkel

TO: MR. BAKER
 FROM: WILLIAM A. KINKEL
 SUBJECT: GERMAN LIBRARY OF INFORMATION

APRIL 3 1945 *File*

THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL URGENT REQUESTS FOR THE MATERIAL IN THE GERMAN LIBRARY OF INFORMATION IN NEW YORK. I AM ADVISED BY MR. KLAUS, REPRESENTATIVE OF THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT, THAT THEY ARE WILLING TO TURN OVER ALL OF THE MATERIAL WHICH HAS BEEN SEIZED TO THE COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION FOR SAFE KEEPING AND STORING, PROVIDED WE ACCEPT ALL OF IT. WE WOULD THEN ALSO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR DISSEMINATING THE INFORMATION TO ALL OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES. THE ONLY STIPULATION THE TREASURY MAKES IS THAT IN RETURN FOR THIS WE ARRANGE TO HELP THEM WITH TWO OR THREE TRANSLATIONS OF SOME OF THEIR IMPORTANT MATERIAL WHEN NEEDED.

AS THIS MATERIAL IS IN NEW YORK, I HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING THE MATTER WITH MR. STURGES, AN ATTORNEY WITH ONE NEW YORK OFFICE. HE IS FAMILIAR WITH ALL DETAILS. IN ORDER TO AVOID COMPLICATIONS OF DEALING THROUGH ME AS A THIRD PARTY, WILL YOU PLEASE CALL MR. STURGES AT THE NEW YORK OFFICE SOMETIME AFTER 2:30 SO THAT HE MAY LEARN YOUR VIEW AS TO PROCEEDING.

IF YOU ARE NOW ACTING AS CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO HANDLE THIS MATERIAL, WOULD YOU PLEASE REQUEST THE ONE WHO HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS CHAIRMAN TO COMMUNICATE WITH MR. STURGES, AS INDICATED ABOVE.

W. A. Kinkel
 Mr. Sturges



German Library
Th... 46
File

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: WILLIAM A. KIMBLE
 TO: COLONEL DONOVAN
 SUBJECT:

DATE MARCH 25 1942

PURSUANT TO PREVIOUS MEMORANDA CONCERNING THE GERMAN LIBRARY OF INFORMATION, WE HAVE THE FOLLOWING TO REPORT. THE NEGOTIATIONS PRELIMINARY TO SEIZING THIS MATERIAL HAVE NOW BEEN CONCLUDED; THE MATERIAL HAS BEEN OFFICIALLY SEIZED AND PUT UNDER GUARD IN THE WAREHOUSE WHERE IT WAS STORED IN NEW YORK. IN THE COURSE OF A DAY OR TWO, IT WILL BE TRANSFERRED TO THE FOREIGN FUNDS RECORD LIBRARY AT 95 MAIDEN LANE, NEW YORK CITY. MR. BILBY IS IN CONTROL AND WILL HAVE RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT TO MAKE THIS MATERIAL AVAILABLE TO US.

THIS SEIZURE INCLUDES 92 CASES CONTAINING A GREAT VARIETY OF MATERIAL SUCH AS PUBLICATIONS, COPY OF MAILING LISTS OF THE LIBRARY WITH THEIR ADDRESSOGRAPHS, LANTERN SLIDES, RECORDS OF GERMAN BROADCASTS, FILMS, PHOTOGRAPHS, ETC., ETC.

AT THE SAME ADDRESS THERE IS ALSO BEING STORED AND IS AVAILABLE FOR OUR USE ALL OF THE MATERIAL IN THE RECORDS OF THE ITALIAN LINE RECENTLY SEIZED; ALSO THE MATERIAL OF THE CHERNYCO, A SUBSIDIARY OF THE GERMAN COMPANY OF FARMER I. G.

THE MATERIAL IN THE ITALIAN LIBRARY OF INFORMATION IS NOW IN THE PROCESS OF BEING SEIZED AND WILL SHORTLY BE AVAILABLE AT THE SAME PREMISES.

COLONEL DONOVAN

-2-

MARCH 25 1942

AS SEVERAL OTHER AGENCIES ARE INTERESTED IN THIS MATERIAL, OUR FRIENDS AT TREASURY ADVISE THAT IT WOULD BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO PURSUE OUR INTERESTS AS URGENTLY AS POSSIBLE. ALTHOUGH THE MATERIAL HAS NOT BEEN AVAILABLE, G-2 HAS HAD ITS REPRESENTATIVE ON THE SPOT TO TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTION WHEN OPENED. WE WILL NOT BE PERMITTED TO REMOVE ANY OF THIS MATERIAL, WITHOUT FURTHER NEGOTIATION ON SPECIFIC REQUEST.

I HAVE DISCUSSED THIS MATTER IN DETAIL WITH MR. STURGES IN THE NEW YORK OFFICE, WHO IS FAMILIAR WITH THE SITUATION IN GENERAL. KINDLY INSTRUCT THE UNDERSIGNED IF YOU WISH ANY FURTHER ACTION TAKEN.

WAK
WAK

CC: Mr. Bruce
Mr. Atherton Richards
Mr. Robert Sherwood
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Foynter
Col. Buxton
Mr. Stanley
Mr. Sturges

WAR PRODUCTION BOARD
WASHINGTON, D. C.

OFFICE OF
DONALD M. NELSON
CHAIRMAN

March 17, 1942

Dear Colonel Donovan:

Thank you for sending me a copy of
"Amendments to Report on German Food Situ-
ation Contained in German Study of December,
1941".

Sincerely yours,

Donald M. Nelson
Donald M. Nelson

Colonel William J. Donovan
United States Government
Coordinator of Information
Washington, D. C.

Germany 4526
For Information
File

OFFICE OF LEND-LEASE ADMINISTRATION
FIVE-FIFTEEN 22d STREET NW.
WASHINGTON, D. C.

E. R. Stettinius, Jr.
Administrator

March 14, 1942

Mr. William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
25th and E Streets N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill,

Thank you for your letter of March 13,
enclosing Report No. 20 entitled "Amendments
to Report on German Food Situation Contained
in German Study of December, 1941."

Since this is a supplement to a previous
report you furnished me, I am attaching it to
the previous report to make that report com-
plete and up-to-date.

I have been interested in reading the re-
port enclosed with your letter and appreciate
your having sent it to me.

With best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

E. R. Stettinius, Jr.
E. R. Stettinius, Jr.

Report #20 "Amendments to report
on German Food Situation Contained in Ger-
man Study of December 1941"

File

This is to thank you for your kindness
in sending me Report No. 20. I have read it
with interest and appreciate your thoughtfulness.

*German
Food Study*

Sincerely yours,

JFP
James Forrestal

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
Apex Building
Washington, D.C.

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON

14 March 1942

Dear Bill:

This is to thank you for your kindness
in sending me Report No. 20. I have read it
with interest and appreciate your thoughtfulness.

Sincerely yours,

JFP
Jane Forrestal

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
Apex Building
Washington, D.C.

Germany
Food Situation
Germany

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AIR
WASHINGTON, D. C.

March 15, 1942

The Honorable William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

I acknowledge with thanks receipt of
your confidential letter of March 13 enclosing
report #20 covering "Amendments to Report on German
Food Situation Contained in German Study of December
1941".

Yours sincerely,



ROBERT A. LOVETT
Assistant Secretary of War for Air

Germany 4526
* food situation
* Economic Dev

March 13, 1942

The Honorable Henry A. Wallace
The Vice President
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Wallace:

I am sending you herewith Report
No. 20 entitled "Amendments to Report on German
Food Situation Contained in German Study of
December, 1941"

This report is a supplement to the
report "The German Military and Economic Position,
Monograph No. 3, Rev.," prepared in December.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

Attachment:

For: FE

This letter was sent to all the names on
the attached list.

AIR

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: William L. Langer

TO: Colonel Donovan

DATE March 2, 1942

SUBJECT:

I am sending you herewith 15 copies of Report No. 20 prepared by the Economics Division, entitled *ARMED & DANGEROUS: THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN GERMANY SINCE 1 DECEMBER, 1941.*

This report is a supplement to the report of the *ARMED & DANGEROUS: THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN GERMANY SINCE 1 DECEMBER, 1941*, prepared in December, which you handed to the following people:

- ✓ The Vice President
- ✓ Harry Hopkins
- ✓ Secretary of the Treasury
- ✓ Secretary of State
- ✓ Secretary of Navy
- ✓ Undersecretary of ~~State~~ ^{Navy} ~~Prerostal~~
- ✓ Asst. Secretary of Navy Sarg
- ✓ Asst. Secretary of War McCloy
- ✓ Secretary of War
- ✓ Asst. Secretary of War for Air, Lovett
- ✓ Donald Nelson
- ✓ Milo Perkins
- ✓ Stettinius, Lend-Lease
- ✓ Noel Hall, ~~Brit. Emb.~~
- ✓ ~~Walter Dell, British Embassy~~

A copy for your personal use was transmitted with my memorandum to you of March 2, 1941.

*Revised to
Col. Ellis*

William L. Langer
William L. Langer
Director of Research

Attachments

Top ↑

Outside Edges of green
card indicate the edges of
the camera field

Even No. rolls

Exposure is $\frac{1}{25}$ @ f.6.3

Top ↑

Outside Edges of green
card indicate the edges of
the camera field

Even No. rolls

Exposure is $\frac{1}{25}$ @ f.6.3